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ABSTRACT 
This thesis attempts to identify factors that are important for shipping companies in 
tapping the capital markets for finance, either to raise equity or to issue debt in the 
high yield bond market. The analysis is carried out through the presentation of three 
research papers. 
The first paper presents evidence for the first time on the aftermarket perfomlance of 
27 initial public offerings (IPOs) of common stock in the shipping industry 
worldwide, for the period 1987-1995. The portfolio of shipping IPOs in the sample 
underperforms the local stock market indices by as much as 36.79% by the end of 
their second anniversary of trading, but there is no evidence of underperformance in 
relation to the Morgan Stanley Capital International Shipping Index. Moreover, 
univariate regression analysis shows that two year holding period returns are 
positively related to the initial level of gearing and negatively related to the fleet age 
of the companies at the time of the offering. 
The second paper examines for the first time the relationships between a prespecified 
set of global macroeconomic risk variables and shipping stock returns internationally. 
The sample consists of 36 companies that are listed in 10 stock exchanges around the 
world and the analysis concentrates in the period December 1989 - March 1998. The 
macroeconomic factors included in the analysis are the returns on the world equity 
market portfolio, and innovations in a prespecified set of global macro variables, 
namely, industrial production, inflation, oil prices, US dollar exchange rates, and laid 
up tonnage. Oil prices and laid up tonnage are found to have a negative effect on 
shipping stocks, whereas the exchange rate variable has a positive effect. In addition, 
it is found that, in general, the effects of macroeconomic factors exhibit a consistent 
pattern in the way in which they affect the shipping industry, across countries. 
The third paper examines for the first time the primary pricing of shipping high yield 
bonds. This is performed by testing for the relationships between the following factors 
and the new issue spread of 30 high yield bond offerings issued by shipping 
companies in the US market, during the period 1993-1998: rating, callability, term, 
float, default rate, security status, 144A status, gearing, laid up tonnage and fleet age. 
Findings of the paper are that shipping high yield bonds carry wider spreads, the 
lower the rating of their issue, the higher their gearing levels, and the higher the laid 
up tonnage for the two months preceding the issue. Moreover, there is a statistically 
significant increase in explanatory power arising from the inclusion of gearing and 
laid up tonnage in the estimation, suggesting that rating agencies have not fully 
incorporated the potential effects of these variables, as credit risk factors. 
xv 
Chapter 1: Thesis Overview 
1.1 Aim of the Thesis 
The aim of this thesis is to identify factors - based on the general finance literature 
and the interaction of demand and supply in the shipping markets - that are important 
for shipping companies when entering the capital markets to raise equity finance or 
issue debt in the high yield bond market. 
Shipping is a dynamic international industry with a major role in economic 
development. The important link of shipping to the world economy has been 
highlighted almost 200 years ago. Adam Smith, often regarded as the father of 
modem economics, viewed shipping as one of the stepping stones to economic 
growth. In his book The Wealth of Nations) he argued: 
As by means of water carriage a more extensive market is opened to 
every sort of industry than what land carriage alone can afford it, so it is 
upon the sea-coast, and along the banks of navigable rivers, that industry 
of every kind naturally begins to subdivide and improve itself, and it is 
frequently not until a long time after that those improvements extend 
themselves to the inland parts of the country ...... since such therefore, 
are the advantages of water carriage, it is natural that the first 
improvements of art and industry should be made where this 
I Smith [1776] (1983), p.122. 
conveniency opens the whole world to a market for the produce of every 
sort of labour. 
Since Smith wrote these words in 1776, shipping has developed into an integral 
industry and an important component of the world economy through its contribution 
to international trade. Stopford (1997) regards the story of the shipping industry since 
the 19th century as "one of ingenuity, professionalism, fabulous profits and some 
disastrous miscalculations". It involves the creation of superstars like Onassis and 
Niarchos, but also some miscalculations such as the placed orders for over 100 
million deadweight tons of supertankers in 1973, for which demand never 
materialised (Fearnleys, 1973). 
In addition, the industry is to a large extent segmented depending on vessel sizes, 
vessel types, cargo types, area of operations and distances. In many cases, the 
conditions that govern operations in one shipping sector may not apply to another and 
each sector may react differently to supply and demand changes. 
The world merchant fleet grew from 59 million gross tons in 1921 to over 553 million 
gross tons in 2000 (Shipping Statistics and Market Review, 2000). This growth has 
been followed by increasing vessel sizes and cargo carrying capacity. As a result, the 
initial capital investment required may not be covered completely by private equity 
and/or retained earnings. In addition, substantial capital is required for the 
replacement of the ageing fleet and the expansion of shipping companies worldwide 
(Peters, 1993); and for the increased concern for safety and the environment as 
emphasised by the regulatory changes in the industry (Grammenos and Choi, 1999). 
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Therefore, there is a pressing need for funds from less traditional shipping finance 
sources such as capital markets (Grammenos and Xilas, 1991). 
Despite the significance of the shipping industry as a means of transportation, its 
prominent economic role in the world economy and the substantial amounts of 
finance required, academics have generally shied away from studying (I) the capital 
markets as a source of finance in the shipping sector; and (2) the industry and/or 
company related characteristics that can be crucial in the decision of shipping 
companies to raise capital either in the equity markets worldwide or in the high yield 
debt market in the US. 
Such an analysis, however, would be of particular benefit to shipowners, investors 
(private and institutional), and investment bankers, as the uncovering of factors that 
may influence the raising of shipping finance in the equity and high yield capital 
markets can contribute towards sounder financing and investment decisions. 
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1.2 Thesis Structure 
Chapter 1 sets the scene before the presentation of the papers and enables the reader 
to comprehend the motivation behind the research of this thesis. The sole purpose of 
the chapter is to provide a theoretical background that constitutes the framework in 
the three research papers presented in the thesis. Thus, several aspects of the shipping 
markets are briefly examined. These are based on existing literature and include a 
number of features of the shipping industry that were omitted from the three papers, 
as they were not essential in their structure. In addition, the findings and usefulness of 
the research conducted in the papers are discussed. 
The remainder of Chapter 1 provides an overview of several characteristics of the 
shipping markets (sections 1.3-1.4), a synopsis of the developments in shipping 
finance (sections 1.5-1.6) and an outline of the important regulatory changes in the 
shipping industry in the 1990s (section 1.7). Sections 1.8 to 1.13 deal with several 
aspects of the equity and high yield debt capital markets. More specifically, section 
1.8 discusses briefly the pecking order theory of the capital structure, sections 1.9 and 
1.10 outline the pros and cons of issuing equity and high yield debt, respectively, 
section 1.11 summarises the restructuring options for companies with defaulted high 
yield bonds, whereas sections 1.12 and 1.13 outline briefly the role of the underwriter 
for equity and high yield bond offerings, respectively. Having set the background, 
sections 1.14 to 1.17 focus on the research findings 0 f the three papers presented in 
this thesis and their usefulness. In section 1.14 the research findings are presented and 
discussed. Section 1.15 offers some concluding remarks, highlighting the academic 
contribution of the thesis, while section 1.16 considers the usefulness of the thesis 
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findings for shipping companies, investors and portfolio managers, and investment 
banks. Finally, section 1.17 discusses the limitations of the thesis and provides some 
suggestions for further research. 
The second chapter comprises of the first paper, entitled "The Long Run Performance 
of Shipping Initial Public Offerings". The purpose of this study is to present evidence 
for the first time on the aftermarket performance of 27 initial public offerings (lPOs) 
of common stock in the shipping industry worldwide for the first two trading years, 
during the period 1987-1995. The companies are listed in seven stock exchanges 
internationally. Performance is measured against the local stock market indices and 
against the Morgan Stanley Capital International index for shipping equities. Three 
alternative performance measures are adopted. In addition, the paper examines the 
relationships of various factors with the aftermarket performance of new shipping 
equity offerings. These factors are gearing, fleet age, first day returns, the proportion 
of offered equity and fleet composition. Finally, performance in the aftermarket is 
also examined by year and country of issuance. 
Chapter 3 consists of the second paper, entitled "Macroeconomic Factors and 
International Shipping Stock Returns". The objective of this paper is to examine the 
relationships between a prespecified set of global macroeconomic risk variables and 
shipping stock returns internationally for the first time. The sample consists of 36 
companies that are listed in ten stock exchanges around the world and the analysis 
concentrates in the period December 1989 - March 1998. The macroeconomic factors 
included in the analysis are the returns on the world equity market portfolio, global 
exchange rate fluctuations measured against the US Dollar, oil prices, inflation and 
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industrial production growth. Laid up tonnage, an industry specific factor, is also 
included in the analysis. Furthermore, the relationships between these global factors 
and shipping stock returns are examined across the countries in the analysis. 
Chapter 4 includes the third paper, entitled "Determinants of Spreads on New High 
Yield Bonds in the Shipping Industry". This paper concentrates on the US high yield 
bond market for shipping companies. It examines for the first time the characteristics 
of shipping high yield bonds and their primary pricing. This is carried out by testing 
for any relationships that may exist between a set of factors and the initial spread of 
30 high yield offerings issued by shipping companies in the US market, during the 
period 1993-1998. The factors employed in the study are rating, callability, term 
(years to maturity), float (issue amount), default rate, security, 144A status, gearing, 
laid up tonnage and fleet age. The paper also examines the new issue spread of 
shipping high yield bond issues by year of issuance. 
Paper 1 has been published in the International Journal of Maritime Economics, 
(Grammenos and Arkoulis, 1999) and an earlier version was presented at the 
International Association of Maritime Economists (lAME) Conference in London, in 
September 1997. Paper 2 has been accepted for publication in the same journal, 
subject to revision. The revised version is presented in this thesis. The third paper has 
also been accepted for publication in Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and 
Transportation Review. 
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1.3 Supply and Demand in the Shipping Markets 
The aim of this section is to discuss briefly the major forces that affect demand and 
supply in the shipping industry. 
Freight rates - the most important income source for shipping companies - are 
determined by the interaction of demand for and supply of shipping services. Changes 
in demand and supply depend on the effects of changes in their determining factors 
(Metaxas, 1971). 
Stopford (1997, P 115) singles out ten important influences in the shipping markets, 
five affecting the demand and five affecting the supply of sea transport. The demand 
factors are the world economy, seaborne commodity trades, average haul, political 
events and transport costs, whereas the supply factors are the world fleet, fleet 
productivity, shipbuilding deliveries, scrapping and the freight rates. 
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1.3.1 The Demand for Sea Transport 
World Economy 
The world economy is the most important single influence on ship demand. This close 
relationship is expected, since the world economy generates most of the demand for 
sea transport through the import of raw materials and the trade of manufactured 
products. Trends in the shipping markets, therefore, depend on developments in the 
world economy. Moreover, the similar timing of fluctuations in freight rates and 
world economy cycles has been documented (Isserlis, 1938). Three aspects of the 
world economy may cause changes in demand for sea transport. These are the 
business cycle, trade elasticity and the trade development cycle. 
Seaborne Commodity Trades 
Seaborne commodity trades influence shipping demand in the short term and long 
term. Short term changes are primarily caused by the seasonality of some trades such 
as agricultural products. Longer term demand changes depend on the economic 
characteristics of the industries that produce and consume the traded commodities. 
There are four types of long term changes: changes in the demand for the particular 
commodity, changes in the supply sources, relocation of processing and the shipper's 
transport policy (Stopford, 1997). 
Average Haul 
Average haul is the distance over which cargo is shipped. To take account of this 
distance effect, demand for sea transport is measured in terms of 'ton miles' which is 
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defined as the tonnage of cargo shipped mUltiplied by the average distance over which 
it is transported (Grammenos and Xilas, 1991). 
An example of the effect on ship demand of changing the average haul is the closure 
of the Suez Canal that resulted in almost the double travel distance between Europe 
and the Arabian Gulf. 
Political Events 
Political factors and unforeseen events also affect the demand for sea transport in the 
sense that when they occur they bring about a sudden and unexpected change in 
demand (Gripaios, 1959). Such examples include the Suez crisis, the Yom Kippur 
war, the Iran revolution in 1979 and the Gulf War in 1990. 
Transport Costs 
Cost of sea transport is an important demand determinant. Cargo will be shipped from 
distant sources when the cost of reaching its destination stands at an acceptable level. 
According to a study by the European Economic Community in 1985, transport costs 
accounted for twenty per cent of the cost of dry bulk cargo delivered to countries 
within the Community (European Commission, 1985). Over the last century, the 
shipping community has managed to steadily reduce transport costs through improved 
efficiency, larger vessel sizes and effective organisation of the shipping operation. 
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1.3.2 The Supply for Sea Transport 
World Fleet 
The physical size of the fleet in a particular time period depends on the physical fleet 
size of the previous time period, newbuildings, scrapping and losses, and vessel 
adjustments during the time period that can alter vessel size and carrying capacity on 
a permanent basis (Grammenos and Xilas, 1991). In the long run, the rate of fleet 
growth is determined by scrapping and deliveries, with a slow pace of adjustment to 
changes in the market. 
Fleet Productivity 
Fleet productivity is important in the determination of supply and is defined as the 
total ton miles of cargo shipments in the year divided by the deadweight fleet actively 
employed in carrying the cargo. Increasing productivity increases shipping supply 
since more cargo can be moved by the same number of ships, and it is equivalent to 
using a greater number of ships to move the same amount of cargo at a lower 
productivity level (Stopford, 1997). 
Four main factors determine the productivity of a fleet of ships. These are speed, port 
time, deadweight utilisation and loaded days at sea. 
Shipbuilding Deliveries 
Shipbuilding production directly influences the level of output in the shipping markets 
and, hence, shipping supply. The delivery levels adjust to demand changes over a long 
period as the time lag between ordering and delivering a vessel is between one and 
10 
four years. Factors that influence shipbuilding prices are the market segmentation and 
vessel specification, market conditions, the second hand market, the availability of 
finance and tenns and conditions in shipyards (Grammenos and Xilas, 1991). 
Scrapping 
Scrapping is significant for the supply of sea transport, because it removes ships from 
the market. The balance between scrapped vessels and deliveries of new ships is 
crucial for the physical size of fleet. The main factors that detennine the level of 
scrapping are vessel age, technical obsolescence, scrap prices and market conditions 
(McConville, 1999). 
Freight Rates 
Freight rates also influence shipping supply in the sense that they motivate market 
participants to adjust capacity in the short term and to find ways of reducing their 
costs in the long term. When freight rates are at their peak no more vessels are 
available in the short run and the fleet operates at full capacity. Conversely, when 
freight rates are at low levels a large number of ships are laid up or being scrapped 
(Metaxas, 1971). 
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1.4 CyclicaIity and The Shipping Investment Cycle 
Cyclicality is an important characteristic of the shipping industry and as such it 
deserves particular attention. Freight rates behave in a cyclical manner causing a 
pattern of peaks and troughs. Changes in demand for and supply of shipping services 
cause these patterns, since it is their interaction that determines freight rates. 
Cycles and their corresponding volatility playa major role in the shipping markets by 
detennining the risk of shipping investment in an industry where there is great 
uncertainty about the future levels of vessel prices and cash flow income. The 
existence of cycles in the shipping industry has long been accepted as part of the 
business. In such an environment, the timing of the decision to buy, sell and charter 
ships is crucial (Stopford, 1997). 
Shipping market cycles have been examined SInce the early twentieth century. 
Kirkaldy (1914) views the cycle as a consequence of the market mechanism in the 
sense that peaks and troughs are signs that the market is adjusting supply to demand 
by regulating cash flow. Fayle (1933) suggests that cycles are triggered by the world 
business cycle or random events such as wars that create vessel shortages. As a result, 
freight rates rise and shipping capacity is expanded as new investors enter the market. 
Fayle's perception of the cycle suggests a sequence of three events; a trade boom, a 
short shipping boom and a prolonged slump. Isserlis (1938) also commented on the 
connection of the shipping cycle and the world economy, by observing similar timing 
of fluctuations in freight rates and in world trade in the period 1872-1912. 
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Cufley (1972) focused on the sequence of three events in thc cycle as well. Firstly, a 
shortage in vessel supply occurs, secondly freight rates rise and, thus, stimulate 
overordering of ships, leading to the third phase, market collapse and recession. 
Cufley also states that the prediction of the shipping cycle is impossible, because it is 
too irregular. 
Hampton (1991) analyses short and long shipping cycles and stresses the important 
part played by market participants in the cycle and the way they respond to price 
signals received by the market. He also argued that market sentiment is important in 
determining the structure of cycles. 
According to Metaxas (1971) fluctuations in the industry may be separated into four 
different stages with freight rates being the basic criterion in determining the different 
stages of the cycle. These are prosperity, recession, depression and recovery. The four 
stages of the shipping cycle are shown in Figure 1.1. 
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Figure 1.1: Stages in Fluctuations 
Prosperity 
Recession 
Time 
In the stage of prosperity, that is taken as a starting point, freight rates are high and 
this results to high second hand prices as vessel acquisitions rise due to the positive 
market conditions, the existence of long term charters and the often liberal credit 
availability. In addition, the positive market sentiment leads to an increase in the level 
of new building orders which, in tum, leads to high newbuilding prices and may often 
be accompanied by increased shipbuilding capacity. There is also a decrease in the 
number of laid up and scrapped vessels. 
Increased vessel prices in the newbuilding and second hand markets lead to over 
investment and oversupply as newbuildings ordered in the prosperity period are 
delivered. As a result, freight rates start to fall and the industry enters the recession 
stage. Increased tonnage and the often reluctance of owners to lay up or scrap their 
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vessels further reduces freight rates and the depression period begins. Depression can 
be accentuated by possible continued credit availability and further newbuilding 
deliveries (Grammenos, 1979). 
Recovery and the return to prosperity can take place only when the market oversupply 
is corrected and freight rates start to rise. This correction comes through increased 
scrapping and a reduced newbuilding orderbook and is often accompanied by 
stringent credit availability and reduced long term charters and shipbuilding capacity. 
Thus, the shipping cycle is commonly viewed as a mechanism devoted to removing 
imbalances in the supply and demand of ships (Branch, 1981); and it is associated 
with the behavioural pattern of market players - shipowners, banks, shipyards, 
governments and charterers - to market conditions. In this context, therefore, it 
determines the levels of employment, governmental intervention, availability of 
finance, and investment in newbuildings, second hand vessels and scrappings. 
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1.5 Developments in Shipping Finance 
Shipping is one of the world's most capital intensive industries. In the early 1990s the 
bulk shipping industry invested about $20 billion each year on new and second hand 
vessel acquisitions (World Shipping Monitor, 1995). Therefore, capital payments can 
dominate the cash flow of shipping companies and financial strategy decisions are of 
utmost importance for the smooth running of shipping companies, their expansion and 
even their very existence. 
Shipping companies, though, do not always satisfy the criteria of the financial 
community's requirements. Freight income and asset values fluctuate, and in several 
cases, financial structures lack transparency and audited financial information is not 
always readily available. This, coupled with the volatility in the shipping markets 
described in the previous section, may often create a negative perception to potential 
lenders and investors (Grammenos and Marcoulis, 1996). It has not been uncommon 
for ship values to gain or lose more than half of their value in a few months. 
Paradoxically, however, shipping markets have suffered, on occasions, from too much 
finance. Liberal credit policies have created oversupply by encouraging a large 
newbuilding orderbook (Stokes, 1992, p.S8). 
An important development in shipping finance was the introduction of the steam ship 
in the 1850s and the registration of ships in the UK as sixty four shares that could be 
owned by individuals, partnerships or by investors in a joint stock enterprise2. At the 
2 G. Atkinson (1854), 'The Shipping Laws of the British Empire', quoted in Palmer (1972), p.49. 
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time borrowing was not unusual. During the recession of 1904-11, however, many 
loans failed and as a result private equity became the main investment source until the 
1950s (Stunney, 1962). 
In the 1950s there was an increasing interest on behalf of the banking community to 
finance the shipping markets, mainly confined to the tanker sector. Some banks -
including Chase Manhattan Bank, Chemical Bank and Hambros Bank - became 
specialist banks for shipping, providing 60% of the value of an acquisition against a 
mortgage (Wijnolst and Wergeland, 1997). 
The banking approach was conservative and the 'cash flow' financing to shipping was 
applied where repayment is based on cash flow generation. 
Moreover, in the late 1950s, investment was concentrated on second hand vessel 
acquisitions by a number of young entrepreneurial shipowners who brought much 
needed equity into the shipping industry (Willingale, 1998). These new entrants came 
into the market in an attempt to buy ships cheaply and fix them on long tenn charters, 
so that banks are satisfied. With cash flow financing, banks felt more secure and were 
more flexible to their lending policies. This led to the first phase of bank shipping 
finance expansion that suffered, however, a temporary setback during the depressed 
markets (falling vessel earnings and prices) in the first half of the 1960s when a 
number of banks had undersecured non perfonning loans (Grammenos and Xilas, 
1991). 
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The years 1967-1973 were significant for bank shipping finance. The world economy 
was enjoying very high growth levels, due to the rapid expansion of world trade and 
industrial development. This led to increasing demand for shipping services and, thus, 
shipping finance. In parallel, there was a trend of increasing vessel size that 
substantially increased the level of initial capital investment to levels beyond the 
capability of private equity as a major provider of shipping finance. These 
developments contributed to the second phase of bank shipping finance expansion. 
The shipping sector became a source of profitability and, thus, banks expanded their 
medium/long term asset portfolios, mainly by providing loans for the financing of 
vessel acquisitions in the second hand market. The industry was also attractive to 
them, because it offered opportunities for risk diversification and intemationalisation 
(Grammenos and Xilas, 1991). 
In general, the years 1967-1973, marked by the second closure of the Suez Canal, saw 
shipping as a glamour industry sector, resulting to the arrival of many new banks to 
the shipping scene, either individually or as part of bank syndicates. The majority of 
new banks, though, were without any prior shipping background and they lacked the 
necessary competence for asset evaluation. 
This lack of expertise, together with the hardened competition between banks, 
resulted in a relaxation of loan conditions. Lending was often based on reputation and 
leading shipowners could acquire large finance sums, because of their established 
names. Financing limits were stretched to 100% or even 110% to cover working 
capital requirements. Credit facilities were to a large extent undersecured and granted 
with inadequate market research and insufficient analysis of existing charter quality. 
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Commercial bank finance also expanded in the newbuilding sector with top up 
finance being provided between vessel delivery price and other available fonns of 
newbuilding finance such as 'soft' debt from governmental agencies. 
The liberal bank credit policies, though, led to oversupply and proved disastrous for 
the shipping industry and the banks that provided finance. In addition, the first oil 
crisis in 1973 led to the collapse of the tanker market that was followed by a similar, 
less severe, fall in the dry bulk sector. 
Freight rates declined sharply and, thus, the cash flow streams of shipping companies 
deteriorated to a great extent making debt servicing difficult and in many cases 
impossible. Numerous banks were left with undersecured problematic loans and the 
prospect of significant write offs. The crisis, however, was not fully appreciated by 
the banking community that continued to provide finance in the hope that adverse 
conditions would tum out to be purely a cyclical fluctuation, albeit of exceptional 
severity. 
In 1976-77 a number of banks withdrew from the industry altogether and many 
members of the banking community reconsidered or established new shipping credit 
policies. Freight rates were, on average, not sufficient to cover running costs and by 
1977 many shipowners were experiencing severe liquidity problems (Feamleys, 
1977). 
This two-year period was followed by a market upturn in 1979 that was sustained 
through to the early months of 1981 (Wijnolst and Wergeland, 1997). The temporary 
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improving market conditions led some banks to firmly believe that the crisis was over. 
As a result, banks were again competing on cut-throat terms and the process of liberal 
credit build up, followed by plunging asset values and undersecured non performing 
loans was repeated through the mini boom, and led to oversupplied conditions and 
another market crisis in the first half of the 1980s (Stokes, 1992). 
Problematic loans and past losses forced large parts of the banking sector to exert a 
credit squeeze in the industry, in ironic contrast to previous years. Sounder and more 
prudent credit policies were applied, together with thorough credit analyses. This was 
emphasised by the fact that funds targeted the second hand market and borrowers 
were carefully selected for specific safe projects. 
After the crisis of the shipping industry in 1982-86, characterised by a sharp drop in 
freight rates and vessel market values, there was an erosion - in some cases 
destruction - in the equity base of shipping companies and a substantial decline in the 
role of banks as traditional providers of shipping finance. The focus in the second part 
of the 1980s has increasingly been towards the strengthening and broadening of the 
capital base of shipping companies, mainly in relation to attracting equity finance so 
that their gearing levels would be reduced (Grammenos and Xilas, 1991). 
The above developments suggest that a better environment had been created for the 
utilisation of new shipping finance sources such as the public capital markets. This 
was further emphasised by the substantial amounts required to expand and replace the 
ageing wet and dry fleets worldwide, the intemationalisation of the world capital 
markets and the regulatory changes in the industry. 
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In addition, developments in the banking sector, such as deregulation of financial 
markets, advances in technology, innovation, and the trend towards fee as opposed to 
interest rate generated income - particularly in conjunction with more stringent 
capital adequacy rules - have also been major contributory factors towards the 
utilisation of capital markets by shipping companies. 
In 1990-91, when the fundamentals of shipping companies had become considerably 
sounder, shipping companies were faced with banks reducing their shipping portfolios 
as provisions for loan losses reached enormous proportions (Stokes, 1992). Moreover, 
loan losses occurred at a time when international banks were being forced to adjust 
their solvency ratios in order to comply with the new capital adequacy rules 
introduced by the Basle Committee under the auspices of the Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS) in January 1993. The scale of loan losses in conjunction with the 
BIS ratios brought about a degree of risk aversion in the shipping industry (Stokes, 
1992) and signalled the trend of banks towards fee generated income as opposed to 
interest rate income (Grammenos, 1994). 
These limitations on new credit availability also contributed towards the increasing 
importance of the capital markets as a shipping finance source in the 1990s. In this 
respect, increased consolidation has taken place and is expected to continue through 
mergers and joint ventures or pools so that companies with greater penetration, 
operational efficiency, negotiating strength with major charterers and shipbuilders, 
and stronger financial flexibility are created (Stokes, 1992; Grammenos and Choi, 
1999). 
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Shipping funds entered the capital markets for speculative asset play reasons in the 
period 1987-1989. The purpose of their existence was to buy second hand vessels 
cheaply, trade and sell the vessels at a premium when a significant improvement in 
the resale market occurred. Net assets would then be distributed to shareholders. In 
addition, the companies intended to pay dividends from the available cash flow 
generated from operations. Other aspects regarding limited life funds are discussed in 
the next section. 
The period 1987-1995 also witnessed a growth in the number and size of initial public 
equity offerings by shipping companies (Grammenos and Marcoulis, 1996). The 
popUlarity of the high yield debt market in the US increased since 1993. Conditions 
have been favourable and the industry was enjoying a turnaround since the crisis in 
the early 1980s. In addition, interest rates were at record low levels. The amortisation 
schedule of high yield bonds has been particularly attractive to shipping companies, 
since only interest is paid throughout the life of the bond and, therefore, substantial 
amounts can be used for alternative profitable investments. Moreover, a bond issue in 
the high yield market is often regarded as an opportunity to shipping companies to 
satisfy their possible long term plans of a future equity issue by gaining experience in 
modem financial market techniques. 
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1.6 Limited Life Shipping Companies (Shipping Funds) 
The appearance of shipping funds has been an important development in shipping 
finance. The aim ofthis section is to discuss briefly their major characteristics and the 
circumstances under which they entered the US equity capital markets. 
Limited life shipping companies appeared during 1987-89, and were established by 
their promoters with a predetermined life of between five and seven years. These 
shipping funds raised equity for speculative asset play reasons (Grammenos and 
Dheere, 1991). Companies primarily intended to make second hand vessel 
acquisitions when the market was down, operate the vessels until there is a significant 
improvement in the resale market and then sell the vessels at a premium, liquidating 
the company and distributing its net assets to the shareholders. Dividend payments 
were also to be made from cash flow generated from operations. 
The asset play activity was primarily due to the erosion of the equity base of shipping 
companies during the crisis of the eighties (Grammenos and Marcoulis, 1996) and the 
resulting withdrawal of many financial institutions from the shipping markets, as they 
were unwilling to provide funds. Furthermore, Grammenos and Dheere (1991) 
suggest that external factors persuaded investors and the promoters of funds that the 
timing was right to invest in the shipping markets. Such factors stemmed from the 
improving market conditions in the shipping industry that occurred in the latter half of 
the 1980s. There was a steady increase in the demand for shipping services, increased 
scrapping, extensive rationalisation of shipbuilding capacity, and the phasing out of 
certain government subsidies. 
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Funds in the shipping industry were viewed as investment vehicles allowing their 
promoters to provide managerial services without taking serious investment positions 
(Grammenos and Marcoulis, 1996). A general manager was appointed and took the 
responsibilities of the buying, selling and operation of the company's vessels. 
Stopford (1997) identifies two problems with their structure. Firstly, equity had to be 
raised before any acquisitions took place and companies were faced with the problem 
of finding good quality vessels at short notice. Secondly, their commercial and 
management structure was ambiguous, since, as limited life funds, they were not 
shipping companies, but at the same time they had to operate vessels for a period of 
up to seven years. 
As expectations of shipping fund managers failed to realise, these problems came to 
surface. Companies operated fleets that often lacked quality and had a high age 
profile. This increased maintenance and repair costs and, in addition, insurance 
companies introduced substantially higher premia. These reasons, coupled with 
deteriorating market conditions manifested by dropping freight rates, led to the failure 
of shipping funds (Grammenos, 1996) and to sharp drops in their share prices3• 
3 The share price performance of shipping funds is examined in Chapter 2 (Paper I). 
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1.7 International Regulations in Shipping 
Since the 1950s the regulatory regime has become a central factor in the economics of 
the shipping markets. A complex regulatory system has evolved that has an impact on 
all aspects of the economics of operating ships. Ship design, maintenance standards, 
crewing costs, operating standards, company overheads, taxation, commercial 
confidentiality, pollution liability, and cartels are all subject to regulation (Stopford, 
1997). 
The two most important new regulations in the shipping industry during the 19905 
that affected the cost and management structure of shipping companies, are the Oil 
Pollution Act 1990 (OPA90) and the International Safety Management (ISM) Code. 
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1.7.1 The Oil Pollution Act (1990) 
The OPA 90 was formulated in response to the public concern caused by the 
grounding of the Exxon Valdez in the Prince William Sound, Alaska in March 1989. 
In that incident more than 30,000 tons of crude oil were spilled. The fact that the 
legislation applies to all vessels operating in US waters, had a worldwide impact as 
more than 90 per cent of the tank ships calling on US ports operate under a foreign 
flag (NRC Marine Board, 1998). 
The majority of the provisions of OPA 90 were targeted at reducing the number of 
spills through improved vessel design, operational changes, and greater preparedness. 
The Act also created a comprehensive scheme to ensure that sufficient financial 
resources are available to clean up a spill and to compensate persons damaged by a 
spill. In this respect, shipowners operating within the US navigable waters, up to three 
miles off shore or within the exclusive US economic zone up to 20 miles to sea from 
the shoreline, are required to carry a certificate of financial responsibility, 
demonstrating that they have sufficient financial means to cover a claim. Those 
failing to produce satisfactory documentation were banned from US waters and were 
liable to arrest or even forfeiture of the vessel (Wood, 1994). 
Oil pollution liability is also addressed by the Act. In the event of a spill, the 
responsible party is the owner or operator of the tanker who is liable to fund 
compensation for the cleanup and pollution up to a liability limit of $10 million or 
$1,200 per gross ton, whichever is the greater. However, there is unlimited liability to 
the owner if the spill is caused by either (1) gross negligence or wilful misconduct, or 
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(2) violation of an applicable federal safety, construction, or operating regulation. 
This potential for unlimited liability was a major cause of concern for shipowners and 
their insurers, bearing in mind that the cost to Exxon for the cleanup and 
compensation resulting from the Exxon Valdez pollution is estimated around $10 
billion (Grammenos and Choi, 1999). 
The Act also requires all vessels entering US waters to have double hulls. The 
legislation also stipulates that single hull tanker vessels of 5,000 gross tons or more 
will be excluded from US waters after 2010, if ordered after 30 June 1990 or 
delivered after 1 January 1994. Vessels equipped with a double bottom or double 
sides may be permitted to trade to the US through 2015, depending on their age. 
These new design criteria provided by the OP A 90 had a direct impact on vessel 
construction costs that increased, on average by 10 to 15 percent, because the use of 
extra steel is required in a double hull structure. In addition, the cargo carrying 
capacity of a double hull vessel is 5 to 6 per cent less than that of a single hull vessel 
of the same dimensions (Grammenos and Choi, 1999). 
The OP A 90 caused great controversy and many owners have seized operating within 
US waters. This has been due to the risks involved and also due to the prohibitive 
costs charged by protection and indemnity clubs for trading in this area (Wijnolst and 
Wergeland, 1997). However, the requirement of transporting oil still existed and for 
those operators prepared to take the risk of unlimited liability, a method of 
demonstrating professionalism and sound management control was necessary 
(Willingale, 1998). 
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The unlimited liability implied by the Act, has dramatically increased the risk that 
directors, managers and officers of shipping companies, charterers and operators may 
be personally liable as 'responsible parties' if a spill occurs from a vessel under their 
control or authority to control (Marine Money, 1995a). An additional reason why 
some tanker companies have entered the equity capital markets, therefore, has been to 
limit liability under the Act (Marine Money, 1995b). In this case, in the event of a 
spill, individuals are not liable under corporate law principles. 
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1.7.2 The International Safety Management Code (1998) 
The International Safety Management Code (ISM) (lMO, 1994) is a fonnallegislative 
agreement that focuses the attention of the international community on the 
management for the safe operation of ships and pollution prevention. In 1989, the 
International Maritime Organisation (lMO), an agency of the United Nations, adopted 
guidelines on management for the safe operation of ships and for pollution prevention 
"to provide those responsible for the operation of ships with a framework for the 
proper development, implementation and assessment of safety and pollution 
prevention management in accordance with good practice" (IMO, 1989). 
These guidelines were revised in November 1991 and the ISM Code itself was 
adopted as a recommendation in 1993. In 1994, the Code became mandatory and a 
new Chapter IX entitled "Management for the Safe Operations of Ships", was added 
to the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Convention. 
The ISM Code has come into force in two phases. Phase I started on 151 July 1998 and 
ISM compliance became mandatory for all tankers, bulk carriers, gas carriers, 
passengers and cargo high speed craft greater than 500 gross tons. Phase II of the 
Code is scheduled to come into force on 15t July 2002 and applies to all other vessels 
above 500 gross tons not covered under phase 1. These include general cargo ships, 
survey vessels, container ships, ocean tugs, mobile offshore drilling units, reefer 
ships, car carriers, livestock carriers, cement carriers and woodchip carriers. 
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The three main safety management objectives of the Code are to provide for safe 
practices in ship operation and a safe working environment, to establish safeguards 
against all identified risks, and to continuously improve safety management skills of 
personnel, including preparing for emergencies. Signatories to the agreement will 
prohibit vessels that are poorly crewed, maintained and operated from trading in their 
waters. 
The Code reqUires a Safety Management System (SMS) to be developed, 
implemented and maintained by every shipping company, in order to ensure 
compliance with all mandatory regulations. The ISM Code is divided into 13 sections 
and a compliant SMS should include a number of functional requirements of the Code 
such as: 
1. A safety and environmental protection policy; 
2. Instructions and procedures to ensure safety and environmental protection; 
3. Defined levels of authority and lines of communication between and amongst 
shore and shipboard personnel; 
4. Procedures for reporting accidents and non conformities with the provision of the 
ISM Code; 
5. Procedures for preparing for and responding to emergencies; and 
6. Procedures for internal audits and management reviews. 
Two types of certificates are required for all shipping companies under the Code. 
These certificates are issued by the state whose flag the ship is entitled to fly or by 
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recognised organisations responsible for verifying compliance with the requirements 
of the ISM Code and for issuing the appropriate certificates. 
A Document of Compliance (DOC) is issued after it has been verified that the 
shipping company concerned has properly developed and implemented a SMS that 
complies with the ISM Code. Objective evidence must be produced to show that the 
SMS has been in operation for at least three months on board at least one ship of each 
type operated by the company. A Safety Management Certificate (SMC) is issued for 
each ship operated by the company after an initial verification of compliance by way 
of an external audit on board the particular ship. 
The DOC, a copy of which should be kept on board each ship to be produced upon 
request, has a validity period of five years, subject to annual verification to check that 
the SMS is still functioning properly. The SMC also has a validity period of five 
years, but unlike the DOC, requires at least one intermediate verification within the 
validity period. 
By focusing on the managerial aspects of the shipping business, the ISM Code 
represents a new direction in maritime regulation and raises new problems over the 
implementation and policing of such a complex system. In the long term, shipping 
companies that do not comply with the Code will be considered substandard and it is 
likely that they will be forced out of the shipping industry, if priority is given to 
complying vessels (Story, 1998). 
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This potential reduction in the number of players in the industry will possibly result in 
mergers, joint ventures and buyouts, with the larger companies being the 
beneficiaries of such deals. Ted Petropoulos with reference to Greek ship 
management companies, argued: "Indeed, it is in the smaller size sector where most 
of the regulatory pressures are being felt, and it is these companies that are fiercely 
objecting to increased international regulations and ISM" (Marine Money, 1997). 
Smaller companies suffer from higher costs, since the Code imposes the same sort of 
cost structure for all shipping companies. Therefore, there will be increased 
competition for operational efficiency, economies of scale and financial cost, all of 
which favour larger size companies (Grammenos, 1996). Moreover, the industry may 
segment into the niche (but not necessarily small) players who will survive, because 
they have dedicated clients and a small spread of vessel type, and probably few really 
large players (Willingale, 1998). 
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1.8 The Pecking Order Theory of the Capital Structure 
Private equity dominated as a source for shipping finance in the pre world war years 
and vessel acquisitions had been primarily financed from reserves and retained 
earnings. The trend, however, of increasing vessel size substantially increased initial 
capital investment to levels that private equity was insufficient to cover. 
Consequently, since the second half of the 1950s, bank shipping finance grew in 
importance and provided 60% to 90% of acquisition finance - in some cases even 
higher to satisfy working capital needs - together with specialised financial 
institutions and shipyards. After the crisis in the shipping industry in the early 1980s, 
shipping companies have increasingly used the capital markets for their financing 
needs (see Section 1.5). This order of preference in the choice of finance by shipping 
companies could be explained by the Pecking Order Theory. 
The search for the optimal capital structure of finns by employing the correct mix of 
debt and equity and the right balance between internally and externally generated 
funds has been the subject of research for decades. The preferred traditional finance 
means for shipping companies over the years has been bank debt. This preference 
pattern may be explained by the Pecking Order Theory. 
Donaldson (1961) observes that "managers strongly favoured internal generation as a 
source of new funds even to the exclusion of external funds except for unavoidable 
'bulges' in the need for funds". Scott and Martin (1975) find that larger companies 
tend to borrow more than smaller ones and also prove that there is a strong correlation 
33 
between the industry sector and the financial structure of the company and between 
company size and financial structure. 
Myers (1984) formally put these arguments together and laid the foundations of the 
Pecking Order Theory. There are five main points that make up the Theory. Firstly, 
firms prefer internal to external finance and this order of preference is the basis of the 
pecking order. The second point applies to publicly listed companies and deals with 
their dividend policies. It states that firms adapt their target dividend payout ratio to 
their investment opportunities and try to avoid sudden changes in dividends, thus 
adopting a 'sticky' dividend policy. 
The third point of the Theory suggests that firms first draw on their cash balances and 
use external financing only when internal funds have been exhausted. Fourthly, when 
external finance is required, firms issue the safest security first. That is, they start with 
debt, then possibly hybrid securities such as convertible bonds, then perhaps equity as 
a last resort. Finally, the fifth point states that firms do not have a predetermined, well 
defined target debt level and managers are not restricted in their borrowing activities 
by an upper limit of debt allowed to exist in their balance sheets. 
Myers (1993) claims that the lack of a target debt ratio is a vital prerequisite for the 
Theory. In addition, the sequence of choice implied by the theory explains the 
negative correlation between profitability and leverage. Least profitable firms tend to 
borrow more, not because they have higher target debt ratios, but because they lack 
internally generated funds in the form of retained earnings. Thus, they have a greater 
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need for external funds and prefer debt, because it is the next best alternative in the 
pecking order. 
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1.9 Equity Public Offerings 
Equity is represented by owner's funds, share capital, retained earnings and reserves. 
A public offering of equity is a sale of equity securities, made available publicly by 
already listed companies or companies about to be listed in stock exchanges. 
Advantages of going public 
The primary advantage of issuing equity is the reduction in financial risk by raising 
funds without using debt and the corresponding obligations it entails (Brealey and 
Myers, 1988). Companies raising equity lower their gearing levels and, in contrast to 
debt interest and principal payments, do not have the obligation to pay dividends to 
shareholders. 
A successful public offering of equity and stock exchange listing gains prestige for 
the company, improves its reputation, and increases its market coverage. The liquidity 
of the shares, which is enhanced through a public offering, may also have a positive 
influence on the company's market value. 
Another advantage is that listed shares can be used as collateral in the future for loans 
or incentives for employees (Grammenos and Xilas, 1991). In addition, they can be 
used for mergers and acquisitions. 
Finally, the probability of fraudulent actions of management is reduced, since there is 
a tighter control over the company. 
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Disadvantages of going public 
The major disadvantage of going public is the increase in the cost of capital of the 
firm, since equity is riskier and shareholders require a return on their investment. 
Equity also entails a dilution of control of the company, depending on the proportion 
of the firm's value that is offered to the public (Weston and Copeland, 1986). In 
addition, there are disclosure requirements and relevant information regarding 
sensitive areas such as salaries, terms of vessels' employment, etc. has to be furnished 
regularly. In this sense, the management's job becomes onerous and less flexible, as it 
has to devote time in acting as a 'public communicator' (Grammenos and Xilas, 
1991). 
Moreover, once the company obtains its listing and its shares are traded publicly, the 
market share price is influenced by factors beyond the management's control. Such an 
external factor is the performance of stock exchanges. 
The one time direct and indirect costs involved in a public equity offering are 
substantial. Direct costs include the legal, auditing, advertising and road show 
expenses, and underwriting fees. The indirect costs are the management time and 
effort devoted to conducting the offering and, in some cases, the underpricing of the 
shares, when they are sold at an offering price that is lower than that prevailing in the 
market, shortly after the offering. 
Furthermore, the older management generation may resist and find it difficult to adapt 
to the company's change of policy. Internal company changes may also involve 
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higher overhead costs, while operating performance and profitability may not increase 
in line. 
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1.10 High Yield Bond Offerings 
High yield bonds are bonds rated below investment grade by the rating agencies. That 
is BB+ or lower by Standard and Poor's, and Bat or lower by Moody's Investors 
Service. These bonds, also known as 'junk' bonds, 'speculative grade' bonds or 'high 
interest' bonds, are often issued by high leveraged companies and carry a high yield 
in order to compensate investors for undertaking higher risk. 
Advantages of High Yield Bond Offerings 
The major advantage to raising finance by issuing high yield bonds is the attractive 
amortisation schedule. Only interest is paid throughout the life of the bond, while the 
principal is paid at the end of maturity. This feature frees up substantial amounts of 
capital that can be used for reinvesting in the business. In addition, the long maturities 
of bonds may match the duration of vessel life closer than bank debt (Grammenos, 
1996). 
Access to funds is also relatively quick and three months is the normal time required 
for a deal to be completed and the funds to be available to the company. Moreover, 
the disclosure requirements of this market are fewer in comparison to equity offerings 
(Kricheff and Strenk, 1999). 
The company is also provided with a diversified source of capital and access to US 
capital market funds. Furthermore, although there is a number of covenants in the 
high yield market, these are minimal restrictions that can also contribute to the better 
management of shipping companies (Grammenos and Choi, 1999). In addition, a 
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successful issue contributes to the credibility and pUblicity of the company in the 
market. 
Finally, high yield bonds provide companies with a first exposure in the public capital 
markets. In this sense, this financial sector is often regarded as the stepping stone to a 
future full stock exchange listing. 
Disadvantages of High Yield Bond Offerings 
The most important disadvantage of high yield bond offerings is that it is an 
expensive means of financing. The cost of interest is high in comparison to traditional 
bank loans and takes the fonn of coupon payments. In addition, initial transaction 
costs are also considerable and include fees paid to the underwriter and rating 
agencies. Other costs incurred are legal fees and printing expenses. 
As in the case of a public equity offering, there is loss of flexibility and lack of 
personal interface. Moreover, there is a degree of disclosure requirements to the rating 
agencies, investors and the Standard Exchange Commission (Fabozzi and Cheung, 
1990). 
When the high yield bond issue takes place through Rule 144A, liquidity is limited 
and the bonds are available only to a small number of investors, the Qualified 
Institutional Buyers (Altman, 1990). 
Finally, prepayment is nonnally not allowed for a number of years, while there is a 
high penalty for the early retirement of the bonds. 
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1.11 High Yield Bond Defaults and Restructuring Options 
Several shipping high yield bond defaults have been witnessed since 1998. The main 
reasons for these defaults have been the inherent cyclical fluctuations in the industry 
and the worsening market conditions, principally a consequence of the economic 
crises in Asia and Russia. This resulted in a deterioration of credit quality and, in 
some cases, several changes were made in relatively short periods (Moody's Investors 
Service, 1999). 
As the full impact of the Asian crisis begun to hit the freight markets, vessel values 
dropped heavily. This affected the valuations of several shipping companies even at 
the time their road shows were taking place. Additionally, freight rates - the most 
important income source in the shipping industry - fell sharply in all shipping sectors. 
This troubled many companies, especially those that were highly geared and could not 
maintain the high interest payments involving high yield capital (Moody's Investors 
Service, 1999; Jefferies & Company, Inc., 1998). 
Moody's definition of default was designed to rigorously assess the performance of its 
ratings as predictors of default. Consequently, Moody's definition is strict, and 
includes three types of default events: a) There is a missed or delayed disbursement of 
interest and/or principal, including delayed payments made within a grace period; b) 
An issuer files for bankruptcy (Chapter 11, or less frequently Chapter 7, in the US) or 
legal receivership occurs; or c) A distressed exchange occurs where (i) the issuer 
offers bondholders a new security or package of securities that amount to a 
diminished financial obligation (such as preferred or common stock, or debt with a 
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lower coupon or par amount), or (ii) the exchange had the apparent purpose of helping 
the borrower avoid default (Moody's Investors Service, 2000, p.3). 
A defaulted bond is in essence a default on a debt obligation. Companies whose high 
yield bonds have defaulted and investors in such issues are faced with the task of 
reorganisation. In the US, corporate bankruptcy reorganisations take place under 
Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code. Firms that liquidate file under Chapter 7. 
First, though, distressed firms usually try to avoid bankruptcy by negotiating an out of 
court restructuring with their creditors. The aim of reorganisation is either to reduce 
interest and principal payments, to extend the payment dates, or to substitute equity 
for debt. The primary difference between the two approaches is that in bankruptcy 
there is court supervision. 
In practice, more than nine in ten firms, attempt to restructure their debt out of court 
and file for Chapter 11 only when an agreement has not been reached (Gilson, 1999). 
Moreover, Gilson, John, and Lang (1990) find that approximately half of all US 
public firms that experienced financial distress in the 1980s managed to successfully 
restructure their debt out of court. 
It is normally the case that out of court settlements are accomplished at much lower 
cost than a court supervised reorganisation. Part of this difference reflects savings in 
legal and other administrative costs. Chapter 11 filings generally impose a much 
heavier burden on the business, because of the greater demands placed on 
management's time and costly delays caused by litigation. 
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There are, however, several advantages to filing for bankruptcy under Chapter 11 of 
the US Bankruptcy Code. First the Code allows finns to issue new debt that ranks 
senior to all debt incurred prior to filing. Such debt, known as DIP financing (Debtor 
In Possession), allows finns to borrow on cheaper tenns and conserve cash. Secondly, 
no interest is payable by the distressed finn on unsecured debt. Unfavourable leases 
can also be rejected under Chapter 11, subject to certain limitations. This may 
encourage lessors to grant the bankrupt finn more favourable terms. Furthermore, a 
reorganisation plan in Chapter 11 requires fewer creditors for its approval than an out 
of court agreement that usually requires the creditors' unanimous consent. Finally, the 
financial information required to be filed under Chapter 11 makes it an attractive 
solution to investors. 
Prepackaged Chapter 11 filings are also adopted by an increasing number of 
distressed firms. This option enables the realisation of benefits of both out of court 
and court supervised reorganisation. Settlement takes typically less time, because the 
firm presents its claimholders with a preapproved reorganisation plan for a vote and 
files for Chapter 11 at the same time. 
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1.12 The Role of the Underwriter in Equity Offerings 
The main role of underwriters of equity offerings, usually investment banks or the 
investment ann of commercial banks is to underwrite and distribute the issue. In 
doing this, the underwriter takes the risk of adverse price fluctuations during the 
distribution period, in return for a fee and risks his reputation if the flotation is not 
successful. Large issues can be underwritten by syndicates (made up of financial 
institutions) so that the risk is spread. 
The choice of underwriter is very important for the company. The range of 
underwriters is wide, depending on size (capital base), prestige and experience. The 
company's management, therefore, has to consider the past underwriting record of a 
number of investment banks and discuss its intentions with a number of underwriters. 
Another consideration is the matching of the size of the offering with the size and 
network of the underwriter (Grammenos, 1996). 
There are three main forms of the underwriting agreement that are normally used for 
international equity issues. Under a firm commitment the underwriter buys the shares 
and holds the amount not sold to investors for its own account. Secondly, when equity 
issues are underwritten on a best effort basis, the underwriter acts as the company's 
agent in selling the offering. Finally, under the bookbuilding process, the underwriter 
collects bids from investors to determine the selling price. 
Fees to the underwriter vary according to the risk taken in each method of distributing 
the shares. Charges are highest under the firm commitment basis, as in this case the 
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risk entailed is high and fees are paid to the underwriter both when the shares are 
bought and sold. 
In pricing a common stock offering, the underwriter values the company concerned. 
There are various tools used for company valuation among which are the discounted 
cash flow, the net asset value, the economic value added and the multiples methods. 
Furthermore, the underwriter assesses the ability of management to go public and 
sustain a positive share price performance in the aftermarket. One method for this 
assessment is based on the '6 es' of credit analysis from an investment perspective 
(Grammenos, 1989). Important factors taken into account are: 
• The company's operational and financial performance - past and projected, 
including comparisons with the industry'S trends 
• Management character and capacity 
• Market orientation 
• Fleet composition and its position within the particular shipping market 
• Fleet age and condition 
• Fleet employment - spot vs. time charters 
• Growth potential and strategic plan 
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1.13 The Role of the Underwriter in High Yield Bond Offerings 
The role of the underwriter is also very important in the success of a high yield bond 
issue. Leadership is provided to the issuer in drafting the registration statement and 
the prospectus, and in preparing for the presentations to the rating agencies and to 
institutional investors during the roadshow. The underwriter also negotiates the issue 
price, markets the securities and is responsible for educating investors about the 
shipping sector. In addition, the underwriter can act as the market maker for the bonds 
after the issue. Moreover, his reputation is at stake if the issue is not successful. 
The main objectives of the underwriter in this financial sector are to introduce an 
inexperienced issuer to a relatively new market and to create and sustain a positive 
image with bond investors. In addition, the underwriter aims to achieve the lowest 
financing costs to the issuer and to develop aftermarket liquidity for the bonds. 
Company assessment is also essential for underwriters of high yield bonds. 
Assessment is similar to that for companies issuing equity, however, the focus in this 
case lies more on the ability of the issuer to make timely interest payments and repay 
the debt to investors. 
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1.14 Major Findings of the Thesis 
Having discussed several aspects of the shipping markets that set a theoretical 
framework, the aim of this section is to discuss the findings of the research conducted 
in the three papers presented in this thesis. 
The major findings of the thesis are presented in Tables 1.1 A, 1.1 B, and 1.1 C in 
tabular fonn. 
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Table 1.1A: Major Findings of Paper 1 presented in the Thesis. "The Long Run 
Performance of Shipping Initial Public Offerings" 
Period Covered: 1987-1995 
Methodology: Three performance measures (Cumulative Average Returns, Holding 
Period Returns and Wealth Relatives) and Regression Analysis 
Sample: 27 shipping equity IPOs in 7 stock exchanges internationally 
Major Findings (2 trading years): 
• Cumulative Average Returns (CARs) for 24 months in the aftermarket: Stock 
Market Index Adjusted: CAR = -36.79% (significant from 15th month of 
seasoning onwards). MSCI Shipping Index Adjusted CAR = -8.43% (not 
significant) 
• Classification of IPOs according to: 
• Year of Issuance: Stock market underperformance a general phenomenon. 
Worst performing group in years 1987-1989 (includes six shipping funds). 
• First Day Returns (Underpricing): No clear pattern. 
• Across Countries: Widespread underperformance with respect to stock 
market indices. No underperformance with respect to the shipping 
industry, with the exceptions of Greece and the US. 
• Proportion of Equity Offered: No clear pattern. 
• Fleet Composition: Tanker companies perfonn in line with the shipping 
industry and ferry companies are the worst perfonning group. 
• Company Fleet Age: Clear inverse relationship with aftermarket 
performance. 
• Initial Gearing Level: Strong tendency for IPOs with high initial gearing 
levels to perform better. 
• Regression Analysis: 
• Significant relationships established between aftermarket performance 
and: Initial Gearing Level (positive), Fleet Age (negative) 
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Table 1.1 B: Major Findings of Paper 2 presented in the Thesis. "Macroeconomic 
Factors and International Shipping Stock Returns" 
Period Covered: December 1989 - March 1998 
Methodology: Regression Analysis, Multi Factor Model employing Global 
Macroeconomic Factors 
Sample: 36 shipping companies listed in 10 stock exchanges internationally 
Major Findings: 
• Regression Analysis: 
• There are factors that influence shipping stock returns, besides the world 
market portfolio 
• Significant relationships established between shipping stock returns and 
changes in: 
- Oil Prices 
- Laid Up Tonnage 
- Global US Dollar Exchange Rate 
(negatively) 
(negatively) 
(positively) 
• No significant relationships established between shipping stock returns and 
changes in: 
- Global Inflation 
- Global Industrial Production 
• The established relationships exhibit a consistent pattern across the six 
countries in the analysis 
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Table 1.tC: Major Findings of Paper 3 presented in the Thesis. "Determinants of 
Spreads on New High Yield Bonds in the Shipping Industry" 
Period Covered: 1993 - 1998 
Methodology: Classification of the sample into groups according to the factors under 
analysis and Regression Analysis 
Sample: 30 High Yield Bond Offerings by Shipping Companies in the US market 
Major Findings: 
• Classification of High Yield Bond Offerings according to: 
• Credit Rating: Lower rated bond issues carry higher new issue spreads. 
• Security Status: Secured offerings tend to carry wider new issue spreads. 
• Term to Maturity: Offerings with smaller term to maturity tend to carry 
wider new issue spreads. 
• Amount of Issue: Smaller issues tend to carry higher new issue spreads. 
• 144A Status: Rule 144A issues tend to carry higher new issue spreads. 
• Callability: Callable bonds tend to carry wider new issue spreads. 
• Gearing: Offerings from companies with high gearing tend to be 
associated with higher new issue spreads. 
• Fleet Age: No clear pattern emerges. 
• Univariate Regression Analysis: Statistically significant relationships are 
established between new issue spread and: 
- Credit Rating (negative) 
- Gearing (positive) 
- Laid Up Tonnage (positive) 
- Security Status (negative) 
- Term to Maturity (negative) 
• Multivariate Regression Analysis: Statistically significant relationships are 
established between new issue spread and: 
- Credit Rating (negative) 
- Gearing 
- Laid Up Tonnage 
(positive) 
(positive) 
• Significant increase in explanatory power by including Gearing and Laid 
Up Tonnage. 
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1.14.1 Paper 1: The Long Run Performance of Shipping Initial Public Offerings 
The aim of this paper is to examine for the first time the aftermarket performance of 
IPOs in the shipping industry for their initial two years of listing. The study period is 
1987-1995 and the sample includes 27 IPOs of common stock issued in the stock 
exchanges of Greece, Hong Kong, Norway, the Philippines, Singapore, Sweden and 
the United States. 
Three measures are used in the paper, consistent with empirical evidence (e.g. Ritter, 
1991; Levis, 1993), to calculate aftermarket performance for the first and second 
listing anniversary. These are cumulative adjusted returns, holding period returns and 
wealth relatives. All three performance measures are calculated against local stock 
market indices as well as the shipping industry. The Morgan Stanley Capital 
International Index (MSCI) for shipping equities is employed as a proxy for the 
shipping markets. 
Offerings are first categorised according to certain criteria in an attempt to establish 
patterns that may influence aftermarket performance. Regression analysis is 
subsequently performed to confirm or reject any relationship that is established in the 
first part of the analysis. The factors deemed to have a role to play in the performance 
of shipping IPOs in the aftermarket are the proportion of equity offered to the public, 
the initial level of gearing, first day returns, fleet composition and fleet age. In 
addition perfonnance is measured by country and year of issuance. 
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Particular attention is also paid to the six shipping investment funds that are included 
in the sample and their aftennarket perfonnance. Shipping funds are discussed in 
section 1.6 of this chapter and merit this additional analysis due to their special 
characteristics and the circumstances in which they entered the equity capital markets 
in the United States. 
Cumulative average adjusted returns (CARs) exhibit a gradual and steady decline for 
two years of trading in the aftennarket. With respect to local stock market CARs, 
returns fall to -36.79%, whereas the respective figure for MSCI adjusted CARs is 
-8.43%. Only the fonner CAR series is significant, however, from the 15th trading 
month onwards, contradicting empirical evidence (Ritter, 1991) that suggests IPOs 
underperfonn even when perfonnance is measured against similar size and industry 
finns. This finding is attributed to unfavourable conditions in the shipping markets 
following the listings of several companies and to positive future expectations that did 
not materialise. 
Evidence on aftennarket perfonnance when shipping IPOs were ranked according to 
their year of issuance shows that IPOs perfonned in line with their local stock market 
indices and the MSCI index for their first trading year. However, with respect to two 
trading years, perfonnance was considerably worse when measured against that of the 
local stock market indices. Moreover, stock market underperfonnance seems to be a 
general phenomenon for the most years under analysis. The worst perfonning group 
emerges for IPOs that came to the market during the period 1987-89 and contains all 
the six shipping funds in the sample. 
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With respect to first day returns, no clear pattern emerges to establish a relationship 
between aftermarket performance and underpricing. The worst performance, though, 
is for the group of companies that had positive initial returns, again due to the fact that 
most of the shipping funds in the sample fall under this category. 
Performance for the first trading year is similar across the different countries in the 
sample, both for the local stock markets and the MSCI index adjusted returns, 
exception being the Norwegian IPOs that underperform in both cases. For the second 
trading year, stock market underperformance is evident for shipping IPOs in all 
countries, whereas offerings in the US and Greece also underperform the MSCI index. 
The shipping funds account for this in the US, as they were all issued in American 
stock exchanges. Greek IPO underperformance is attributed to adverse conditions in 
the passenger ferry sector that followed their stock market registration. 
No pattern emerges for aftermarket performance with respect to the proportion of 
equity offered to the public. The worst performer, though, is the group offering the 
highest percentage of equity to the public. Again, this is due to the bad performance 
of the shipping funds, as they offered 98.10% of their equity, on average. 
Performance for the first year of trading across different fleet compositions appears to 
be similar with respect to both the local stock markets and the shipping industry. For 
the second year of aftermarket performance, though, the passenger ferry sector is the 
worst performer for the reasons stated earlier. 
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Categorising the IPOs in the sample by their corresponding company fleet age 
produces no pattern for the first listing year. A clear inverse relationship emerges, 
however, between fleet age and performance for two years in the aftermarket, with 
IPO groups from companies with a young fleet clearly being the best performers. This 
important finding can be attributed to the profound implications the fleet age profile 
of shipping companies may have on their operating and financial performance. On 
one hand, it affects costs (e.g. maintenance, repairs and insurance costs) and, 
therefore, income, while, on the other, it influences chartering opportunities and the 
perception of investors. 
A reduced sample of 19 IPOs is also ranked according to their companies' gearing 
levels at the time of listing. This is because eight companies were debt free at the time 
of issue. In this case, no pattern emerges for the first trading year. With respect to the 
second year in the aftermarket, though, there appears to be a strong tendency for IPOs 
with higher comparative initial gearing levels to perform better, as manifested by the 
fact that the group with the highest geared companies is the best performer. 
The better performance for offerings from highly geared shipping companies may be 
attributed firstly to the higher expected return required by investors for holding the 
riskier, highly geared stock issues; and secondly to the trend of a decrease in gearing 
by the shipping companies in the sample by their first listing anniversary. In fact, 
closer examination revealed that 13 out of 19 companies in this sub sample stated that 
debt repayment was an intended use of their proceeds. Moreover, the average debt to 
equity ratio falls from 1.41 at the time of issue to 0.72 at the end of the first trading 
year. 
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Subsequent univariate regression analysis generally confinns the above findings. 
Aftennarket perfonnance is negatively related to fleet age and positively related to the 
initial gearing level of the shipping companies in the sample. Moreover, these two 
variables remain significant in a multivariate context. 
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1.14.2 Paper 2: Macroeconomic Factors and International Shipping Stock 
Returns 
The objective of this paper is to examine the relationship between shipping stock 
returns internationally and a set of prespecified global macroeconomic risk variables 
for the first time. The study sample includes 36 companies that are listed in the stock 
exchanges of ten different countries worldwide. These are Denmark, Finland, Hong 
Kong, India, Japan, Norway, Singapore, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the US. 
The period of analysis is December 1989 - March 1998. 
The macroeconomic factors included in the analysis are the returns on the world 
equity market portfolio, global exchange rate fluctuations measured against the US 
Dollar, oil prices, inflation and industrial production growth. Monthly changes in laid 
up tonnage is also included in the analysis as an industry specific factor. Furthermore, 
the effects of these global risk factors are examined across the countries in the 
analysis. 
The above variables are deemed to influence the returns of shipping stocks due to 
their strong links with the forces that determine supply and demand in the shipping 
markets and, hence, freight rates. 
In the paper, consistently with empirical evidence (e.g. Wasserfallen, 1989), the 
expected components of the global factors are filtered out by using Auto-Regressive 
Moving Average models and their unexpected components are used as explanatory 
variables. In addition, dynamics are included in the estimation procedure as past 
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studies (e.g. Poon and Taylor, 1991) have suggested that the relationship between 
macroeconomic impacts and stock returns may not be contemporaneous. Multivariate 
least squares methods are used for estimation in the paper, as common coefficients are 
imposed on the macroeconomic factors. 
In addition to estimating the full model that includes all of the macroeconomic factors 
under examination, the one factor market model is also estimated and includes only 
the world equity market portfolio as an explanatory variable. 
Results suggest that there are factors in the global macroeconomic environment, 
which - in addition to the world market portfolio that remains the driving force 
behind international stock returns - influence the returns of shipping common stock 
worldwide. 
Firstly, the constant in both the one factor and the multi factor specification models is 
negative and statistically significant. This suggests that shipping companies have, on 
average, been overpriced during the period analysed. 
With respect to the parameter estimation of the global macroeconomic factors, it is 
found that oil prices and lay up tonnage are negatively related to shipping stock 
returns internationally, whereas a positive relationship is detected for the exchange 
rate variable. Moreover, no significant relationships are established between the 
returns of shipping equities and the global risk measures of inflation and industrial 
production. 
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The negative relationship between oil prices and shipping stock returns may be partly 
attributed to the association of oil with the world economy, as was demonstrated by 
both oil crises in the 1970s, when high oil prices eventually led to overcapacity in the 
shipping markets and consequently lower freight income; and partly to the fact that oil 
is an important component of voyage costs in terms of fuel. 
Laid up tonnage is a strong indicator of market conditions in the shipping industry. 
An increase in laid up vessels is a sign of bad conditions, since vessels are inoperative 
due to low freight rates, and shipowners anticipate a further market downturn. These 
adverse effects in profitability are reflected in lower shipping stock returns. 
The positive relationship established between the global US dollar exchange rate and 
shipping stock returns suggests that a dollar depreciation implies higher returns. This 
is due to the fact that the various currencies used for revenue and cost components are 
all measured against the US dollar internationally. A change, therefore, in the value of 
the dollar may have implications for profitability. 
Regression analysis is also performed for the returns of shipping companies in six 
different countries included in the sample. Results from this estimation suggest that 
the global risk factors in the analysis exhibit a consistent pattern in their relationships 
with international shipping stock returns. In addition, world market betas differ across 
countries with respect to their magnitude. In the case of India, a negative world 
market beta is observed. The highest positive world beta is that of Norway, whereas 
the lowest is that for US shipping companies. 
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1.14.3 Paper 3: Determinants of Spreads on New High Yield Bonds in the 
Shipping Industry 
The purpose of the third paper is to analyse the primary pricing of shipping bonds in 
the high yield bond sector and examine the effects of a set of factors on their new 
issue spread for the first time. In addition, the offerings are also examined by year of 
issuance. The sample includes 30 bond offerings issued by shipping companies in the 
US high yield debt market during the period 1993-1998. 
The factors employed in the study are credit rating, callability, term (years to 
maturity), float (issue amount), the prevailing one year default rate in the sector, 
security status, 144A status, the two month percentage change in laid up tonnage, 
gearing and fleet age at the time of issue. 
Examination of the offerings by their year of issuance reveals that the issuing activity 
is concentrated in two distinct time periods, namely 1993 and 1997-98. This 
clustering of high yield bond issues coincides with low prevailing interest rates and 
high volumes of issuance in the high yield market from other industrial sectors. 
Moreover, the first cluster coincides with high equity IPO activity by shipping 
companies, as documented in empirical evidence (Grammenos and Marcoulis, 1996). 
The majority of shipping companies in the sample raised funds to replace and/or 
restructure banking debt with the more attractive - but more expensive - amortisation 
schedule offered by high yield bonds. The long maturities of bonds may match closer 
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the duration of vessel life, whereas substantial amounts are freed up, because only 
interest is payable throughout a bond's life. 
Bonds in the sample are classified into groups according to the factors or criteria in 
the analysis so that any patterns that emerge between them and the initial issue spread 
can provide useful insight as to the forces that may influence primary pricing. 
Regression analysis is then performed to statistically confirm or reject these possible 
patterns. 
Classifying the sample in credit rating classes reveals a clear pattern. Lower rated 
issues exhibit higher initial spreads in comparison to higher rated ones. This is 
because a higher default probability is associated with bonds of a low credit quality 
and, hence, the higher initial spreads. In addition, offerings of smaller sizes tend to be 
associated with lower credit ratings. 
Bonds are also categorised with respect to their security status, term to maturity, issue 
amount, 144A status, callability, gearing and fleet age. 
Regarding security, it appears that secured offerings carry wider spreads than 
unsecured ones, contrary to expectations. A closer examination, though, into the 
credit rating of the secured issues reveals that almost half of the secured issuance 
volume falls under the three lowest rating classes, accounting for this difference in 
initial spread. 
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Offerings with a smaller term to maturity also tend to have higher spreads. Bad credit 
quality accounts for this spread difference as well, as approximately two thirds of the 
issuance volume for offerings with a term to maturity of ten years or less is rated B3 
or less by Moody's. 
Smaller issues tend to carry higher spreads, because of their lower marketability, 
however, they constitute only a small portion of the total amount raised in the sector. 
Issues that came into market through rule 144A and those with a call option also tend 
to carry higher spreads than public and non callable bonds, respectively. In the case of 
144A deals, the higher spread is due to the lower liquidity in this market until 
registration with the Securities Exchange Commission takes place, whereas callable 
bonds offer higher spreads to compensate investors for taking the risk of being forced 
to reinvest at a possible lower rate. 
Offerings from shipping companies with higher debt to equity ratios also tend to carry 
wider spreads. This is attributed to the increased financial risk of such issues. 
Moreover, no specific pattern emerges between initial spread and different groupings 
of fleet age. Nevertheless, the highest new issue spread is observed for bond offerings 
by companies that operate the oldest fleet. This higher risk premium is expected, since 
older vessels often require higher maintenance and repair costs and, in addition, they 
may restrict chartering opportunities. Moreover, the average fleet age in the sample 
stands at 14.31 years, suggesting that vessels, on average, are going to be close to the 
end of their economic life at maturity. 
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Univariate regressions confinn the above findings and five factors emerge with a 
statistically significant coefficient. These are gearing, rating, laid up tonnage, security, 
and tenn to maturity. Rating exhibits the highest correlation with new issue spread 
(R2=0.59), whereas the corresponding figures for gearing (R2=0.38), laid up tonnage 
(R2=0.37), tenn (R2=0.29), security status (R2=0.27), and 144A status (R2=0.1l) are 
also considerable. The signs of all coefficients are consistent with expectations apart 
from that of the security status variable. In this case, the negative sign indicates that 
secured offerings carry higher spreads. This, however, is attributed to the bad rating 
quality of a substantial amount of the secured issuance in the sample, as explained 
above. 
Multivariate regression analysis includes all the factors under examination. Three 
variables emerge as statistically significant and they are rating, gearing and laid up 
tonnage. These factors explain as much as 71.01 % of the variance in the spread of 
new issues, as indicated by the R2 of the model. Moreover, the increase of 12% in 
explanatory power arising from the inclusion of gearing and laid up tonnage in the 
estimation is statistically significant. This finding is important as it suggests that 
ratings may have not fully incorporated the potential effects of gearing and market 
conditions, as credit risk factors. 
Consistently with past evidence (Fridson and Gannan, 1998) rating appears to be the 
most significant factor in the pricing of shipping high yield bonds. This is because 
agencies weigh up a variety of different factors in assigning ratings. Specifically for 
shipping companies, these factors include management quality, the cyclicality of 
freight rates, economic conditions in the shipping markets at the time of issue and the 
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companies' operating position, customer base, chartering mix and fleet. The final 
assigned rating, therefore, is related to the ability of shipping companies to sustain 
future cash flow generation and make timely payments of interest and principal. 
Lower rated bond offerings are associated with higher default probabilities and, 
hence, higher initial spreads 
The inclusion of gearing and laid up tonnage in the final model adds significantly to 
the explanatory power of the model as stated above and indicates that industry factors 
have a role to play in the pricing of shipping high yield bonds. 
Gearing has profound financial implications, particularly at times when market 
conditions are unfavourable and when highly geared companies are heavily exposed 
in the spot charter market. These risks, therefore, are reflected in higher new issue 
spreads. 
Laid up tonnage is also important as an indicator of conditions in the shipping 
industry. An increase in the number of vessels being laid up implies worsening 
conditions. In addition, less employment opportunities are available and freight rates 
remain at low levels. Therefore, high yield bond offerings that are issued at times 
when there is increased laid up tonnage and, hence, greater uncertainty, carry higher 
spreads. 
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1.15 Conclusion and Academic Contribution of the Thesis 
Following the summary of the findings of this thesis, this section is concluded with an 
overview of the findings that contribute to the general shipping finance literature. 
The academic contribution of the thesis is that for the first time, several factors that 
have a role to play in the equity and high yield debt capital markets as sources of 
shipping finance have been empirically uncovered. These factors are derived from the 
findings ofthe three papers presented in this thesis and are summarised in Table 1.2. 
Market conditions and the degree of leverage of shipping companies appear as the 
two most prominent factors related to the pricing and performance of both equity and 
high yield bond offerings in the shipping industry. 
The importance of the state of the shipping markets is illustrated by the findings of 
papers 2 and 3. Specifically, the second paper shows that market conditions, 
approximated by laid up tonnage, are reflected on the returns of shipping equities 
internationally, whereas in the third paper, laid up tonnage is found to be an important 
primary pricing factor in the high yield sector for shipping companies. 
Papers 1 and 3 highlight the role of gearing, as calculated by the debt to equity ratio. 
With respect to the international equity markets, paper 1 illustrates that gearing at the 
time of issue is positively related to the long run performance of shipping IPOs. With 
respect to the high yield debt market, the third paper demonstrates that gearing is an 
important factor to consider in the initial pricing of shipping high yield bonds, by 
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detecting a positive relationship between new issue spread and gearing at the time of 
the offering. 
Other factors that are important for equity offerings by shipping companies are the 
age of the companies' fleets, exchange rates measured against the US dollar and the 
price of oil. 
In paper 1, it is shown that the age of vessels is negatively related to the long run 
performance of shipping IPOs. In paper 2, it is found that shipping stock returns 
internationally are negatively related to oil prices and positively related to a dollar 
depreciation. 
Moreover, credit rating appears to be the dominant factor in the primary pricing of 
shipping bonds in the US high yield debt market. It emerges as the most important 
pricing factor as documented in paper 3. 
In addition, the fact that gearing and laid up tonnage emerge as statistically significant 
in a multivariate context and increase the explanatory power of the model is also 
important. This finding suggests that rating agencies may have not taken fully into 
account the potential effects of these two variables when making their credit risk 
assessments. 
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Table 1.2: Important Factors in Equity and High Yield Capital Markets for Shipping Companies 
Factor 
Gearing 
Laid Up Tonnage 
Credit Rating 
Fleet Age 
Oil Prices 
US $ Exchange Rate 
IPO Aftermarket International Stock High Yield Bond 
Performance Returns Pricing 
(Jan 1987 - Dec 1995) (Dec 1989- March 1998) (Jan 1993 - Dec 1998) 
+ + 
+ 
+ 
+ 
Note: (+) indicates a positive relationship, (-) indicates a negative relationship, and where no sign appears no significant relationship has been detected for the corresponding 
factor 
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1.16 Usefulness of the Thesis Findings 
The findings of this thesis can be useful to shipping companies, portfolio managers, 
and investment bankers. A variety of factors - both company specific and factors 
linked to macroeconomic developments in the shipping industry and the world 
economy - have been identified that may have a role to play in the pricing and 
performance of equity and high yield bond issues by shipping companies, for the 
periods under examination. Thus, in a highly capital intensive and cyclical industry 
such as shipping, these factors and conditions merit particular attention from the 
shipping and financial communities. 
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1.16.1 Usefulness and Implications of the Findings for Shipping Companies 
Several findings of the thesis are useful to shipping companies, depending on whether 
they are entering the equity or the high yield bond market. 
With respect to the equity markets, the degree of leverage and the fleet age of vessels 
are important company specific factors. High gearing when making an initial equity 
offering appears to favour the performance of the issue, since investors seek 
compensation for taking higher risk. Equity issues by shipping companies that operate 
young fleets may also perform well. Young vessels have a longer economic life, entail 
lower running costs, and create a positive perception of the company in the eyes of 
charterers and investors. 
Gearing should also receive the attention of shipping managers with respect to the 
high yield bond sector where it emerges as an important primary pricing factor. Bond 
offerings by highly geared shipping companies carry, on average, higher spreads than 
offerings by lower geared companies. In contrast to the equity capital markets, high 
leverage in this financial sector appears to be negatively related to pricing. Shipping 
managers, therefore, should pay particular attention to gearing levels when tapping 
this financial sector, as the cash flow cost involved in the form of interest payments is 
considerable. 
The macro economy has a major role to play for shipping companies in entering both 
the equity and the high yield debt markets. Market conditions have been found to 
influence stock returns, whereas in the high yield sector they are important in pricing 
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and, in addition, are associated to the probability of default. In this respect, careful 
evaluation ofthe state of the shipping markets is crucial. 
Finally, oil prices and movements in the dollar exchange rate ought to be carefully 
monitored as they affect share price perfonnance. 
One implication of the thesis findings is the possible trend of the capital structure of 
shipping companies to move towards a higher level in the pecking order, as they 
increasingly resort to the global financial capital markets for finance. This trend has 
been due to a number of factors among which is the need for fleet replacement. Other 
factors include financial globalisation and the introduction of international regulations 
in the industry that have increased costs and the initial capital investment required to 
levels that cannot be covered by private equity and/or retained earnings. These 
developments encourage shipping companies to redefine their corporate objectives 
and strategies in order to become larger in size, so that higher operational efficiency, 
economies of scale, and financial flexibility can be achieved. 
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1.16.2 Usefulness and Implications of the Findings for Investors and Portfolio 
Managers 
The strategy of investors and portfolio managers in the capital markets is to select a 
proper mix of stocks, bonds and other financial instruments so that return is 
maximised subject to their risk profiles. In order for this to be achieved and provided 
that the shipping industry is selected in their portfolios, it is essential that the 
fundamental characteristics of shipping companies and the shipping markets are 
analysed. This can provide insight as to the features that are related with the 
performance of their stock and bond portfolios. Findings of the thesis are, therefore, 
useful in this respect. 
Factors that are important for the performance of shipping stocks from a 
macroeconomic viewpoint are market conditions, oil prices and US dollar exchange 
rates. Furthermore, gearing and fleet age are material elements of investment analysis 
for the aftermarket performance of shipping equity offerings. 
The most informative factor in the high yield debt market is credit rating. Therefore, 
ratings assigned to shipping companies should be carefully analysed and interpreted 
by investors, as they convey important information with respect to the issuer's ability 
to generate and sustain cash flow generation, so that timely payments of interest are 
made. In addition, ratings also take into account the vulnerability of the issuer to 
economic cycles. However, the finding that gearing and laid up tonnage - a proxy for 
market conditions - are important pricing factors adds significant value to the 
investment selection process. 
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These findings are of particular interest to high yield managers who rely heavily on 
the new issue market, because liquidity after the offering is often limited. Moreover, 
bond investors who adopt a buy and hold strategy can also benefit, by paying 
particular attention to the above factors, as the regular payment of coupons - hence 
bond yield - may be affected. 
Speculative investors in shipping equities and high yield bonds may also benefit from 
the findings of this thesis. For example, investing in shipping stocks when oil prices 
are rising, may suggest a negative return. 
In addition, taking into account that investor focus is increasingly inclined towards an 
industry oriented approach, investors and portfolio managers can benefit from the 
findings documented in this thesis, by adding to their diversification capacities; and, 
thus, allocate a proportion of their portfolios in shipping equities and/or high yield 
bonds. 
71 
1.16.3 Usefulness and Implications of the Findings for Investment Banks 
The responsibilities of investment banks demand the thorough understanding and 
analysis of the shipping markets and companies. The important factors in the equity 
and high yield debt capital markets identified in the thesis affect the cost of capital of 
shipping companies and, thus, warrant particular attention by investment banks. 
Furthennore, a successful issue of bonds or equity in both the primary and secondary 
markets is a prerequisite in establishing and maintaining their reputation. 
The evidence provided in the thesis can benefit investment banks in the pricing and 
structure of high yield bond and common stock offerings. Credit rating is not the only 
infonnative factor to consider when pricing shipping high yield bonds. Findings 
suggest that gearing and laid up tonnage are additional important factors in this 
respect. For example, the underwriter is to pay particular attention to the gearing 
levels of the shipping company concerned and adjust the offering price accordingly, 
as issues of highly geared companies entail more risk. For equity offerings, fleet age 
is an important pricing factor, as young vessels are likely to boost share price 
perfonnance in the aftennarket. 
Investment banks may also use the findings of the thesis to improve their advisory 
services to customers and investors. For instance, in periods of increased laid up 
tonnage the offering of shares or high yield bonds may be postponed, because market 
conditions are deteriorating. Additionally, in the case of equities, a smaller percentage 
of the company's value may be offered to the public, since the success of the issue is 
threatened. 
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1.17 Thesis Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 
A possible limitation of this thesis may be that the list of factors examined is not 
exhaustive. Future research, in this respect, can provide fruitful evidence. For 
example, the author has attempted to include the issuers' chartering policy in the 
analyses, as it may have a major role to play in the pricing and perfonnance of 
shipping equities and high yield bonds. The infonnation, however, contained in 
company prospecti proved insufficient in several cases. Future research might devise 
a workable approach to quantify and include this variable in such analyses, as noted in 
paper 3. 
Management quality is another potentially important factor in raising finance for 
shipping companies in the public capital markets. Specifically, the ability and stamina 
of managers to adapt to the cyclical fluctuations of the shipping industry, particularly 
in weathering market crises, are of utmost importance. In this respect, resourcefulness 
in income generation and cost budgeting are critical in ensuring survival. Quantifying, 
however, these management attributes can be hazardous and subjective. Future 
research can shed more light into this matter. 
An additional area of interest for future research would be the examination of factors 
that led to a number of defaults by shipping companies in the high yield debt market 
(see Section 1.11). Such an analysis can relate several pricing characteristics of high 
yield bonds to their default probability and would benefit shipping companies, 
investors and underwriters. Furthennore, any pricing factors that are related to the 
probability of default can add value in the rating process. 
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Another suggestion for future research is to examine the relationships established in 
this thesis by comparing them to other industries in the public capital markets. Such 
comparisons can be of particular benefit to portfolio managers and optimisation 
techniques can be applied for the purpose of forming portfolios, according to certain 
criteria, depending on their risk profiles. These portfolios can include a mix of stocks 
and bonds selected from a variety of countries and can also be diversified across 
different industrial sectors. 
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Chapter 2: The Long Run Performance of Shipping 
Initial Public Offerings 
Costas Th. Grammenos and Angelos G. Arkoulis· 
ABSTRACT 
This paper examines for the first time the performance of Initial Public Offerings 
(IPOs) in the shipping industry for the initial twenty four months of trading in the 
secondary market. In the analysis a sample of 27 shipping [POs issued in the stock 
exchanges of seven different countries in the period 1987-1995 is used. Aftermarket 
performance is measured against the local stock market indices of each IPO and 
against the Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) index for the shipping 
equity market. The portfolio of shipping IPOs in the sample underperforms the local 
stock market indices by as much as 36.79% by the end of the second anniversary of 
public listing, but there is no evidence of underperformance in relation to the MSC[ 
Shipping index. Furthermore, the two year holding period returns of the dataset are 
found to be positively related to the initial level of gearing and negatively related to 
the fleet age of the companies at the time of the offering. 
Keywords: Shipping initial public offerings; aftennarket perfonnance; gearing; fleet age. 
• City University Business School, Department of Shipping, Trade and Finance. We would like to 
thank Professor Mario Levis for his useful remarks and suggestions. This paper was first presented at 
the 1997 International Association of Maritime Economists (lAME) Conference in London. 
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2.1 Introduction 
The equity capital markets have been a minor source of capital for the shipping 
industry throughout the years. Owners' funds and retained earnings have provided a 
small percentage of equity in the financing of vessels in the secondhand and the 
newbuilding markets after the 1950s, while banks, specialised financial institutions 
and shipyards have been the main providers of debt, ranging from 60% to 90% -
sometimes even higher - of the market value or the shipbuilding price of vessels. This 
has been due to a number of factors, such as: the ready availability of finance by the 
global banking system which has - since the 1960s - been internationalised; the 
development and strengthening of the Eurodollar market, which was able to provide 
finance to an industry whose income and most banking transactions were made in US 
dollars; the availability of state supported provision of finance to the shipbuilding 
industry or its provision through the international commercial banking industry; the 
reluctance of the owners of shipping companies to dilute control and disclose 
information; and the unattractiveness of the shipping industry to institutional and 
private investors due to its cyclicality and, therefore, inability to provide stable income 
streams. 
The severe crisis of the shipping industry in the early eighties - characterised by a 
sharp drop in freight rates and market values of vessels - led to the decrease or erosion 
of the capital base of many shipping companies in major shipping centres such as 
Hong Kong, London, New York, Oslo and Piraeus. Furthermore, the large number of 
international banks that provided shipping finance declined sharply in the mid and late 
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eighties. This was mainly due to the realisation of substantial losses from non-
performing shipping loans and the sale, between 1984 and 1986, by the banks of their 
main loan security, the vessels, whose market values have decreased in many cases 
between 50% and 60%; also due to the more stringent Capital Adequacy Rules 
discussed in the 1980s and introduced in 1993 by the Basle Committee, the banking 
trend towards fee generated income, and the regulatory changes in the shipping 
industry. 
The recent regulatory changes in the shipping industry stem from the introduction of 
the Oil Pollution Act 1990 (OPA90) and the International Safety Management (ISM) 
Code (July 1998). The OPA90 calls for stringent measures to be taken by ships 
entering US waters: every new vessel must have a double hull while the right of single 
hull vessels to enter US waters is phased out according to year of built. Furthermore, 
the liability of the shipowner and the parties related to ship ownership to pay damages 
is unlimited, if negligence or violation of regulations can be proved. All vessels will 
be required to be of double hull by the year 2015. These requirements inflate 
construction costs by 10-15%, inducing at the same time the replacement of second 
hand vessels by newbuildings. As a consequence, the need for substantial external 
funding arises. 
The ISM Code stems from continuing failures in the safe management and operation 
of ships and is mandatory from 1 July 1998. The Code's objective is to reduce the 
human error element by creating an industry standard of good management. Its three 
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main principles are the improvement of safety of seafarers, the protection of property, 
and the reduction of the pollution incidents at sea. As a consequence, the Code, in 
conjunction with the intensification of controls by Classification Societies; Port 
States; P&I Clubs and oil companies induces a level playing field in terms of 
competition. Such developments may lead to an increase in the size of shipping 
companies in order to achieve economies of scale and higher operational efficiency. 
This recognition, coupled firstly with the substantial amounts required (Grammenos, 
1989; Peters, 1993) to replace the ageing wet and dry fleets worldwide! and secondly 
the intemationalisation of world equity markets, has created a better environment for 
the utilisation of equity and debt markets as an available source of shipping finance. 
Numerous studies document the pricing and the performance of Initial Public 
Offerings (JPOs) of common stock in the short, medium, and long run. Previous 
empirical work, however, has not focused on shipping JPOs, exception being the study 
by Grammenos and Marcoulis (1996). They examine for the first time the major 
features of shipping companies that go public either to fund their growth or for other 
purposes such as vessel acquisitions, asset play and debt repayment. The paper shows 
that the number and size of shipping companies raising public capital have increased 
during 1983-1995 and that the majority of shipping companies entering the capital 
markets were new companies being created from old ones or resulting from merger 
activities. 
I According to 1988 estimates, approximately US$200 billion would be needed in the nineties for world 
fleet replacement. This amount rose to US$400 billion, according to 1993 broader estimates. 
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In the same study, the initial return2 characteristics of 31 shipping IPOs were analysed 
and it was found that shipping IPOs exhibit relatively small but statistically significant 
underpricing, this being attributed to the international sale and purchase market in the 
industry that limits information asymmetries, and to the fact that the market value of 
shipping IPOs is closely linked with the value of their underlying physical assets -
their vessels. 
In addition, the authors document that shipping funds exhibit similarities to IPOs of 
closed end funds and property companies3. The seven shipping funds in their sample 
have an average first day return of 2.51 %. 
The present paper concentrates on examining the performance of shipping IPOs in the 
aftermarket. No previous study has performed this task. The scope, therefore, of this 
paper is to fill this gap in the literature by presenting evidence on the long run 
performance of IPOs in the shipping industry, by using a sample of 27 shipping IPOs 
of common stock that are listed in the stock exchanges of seven countries. 
Performance is measured against the local stock exchange indices of the issues and 
against the Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCn Shipping Index that is taken 
as a proxy for the shipping market. Furthermore, the effects of various factors on the 
aftermarket performance of shipping new issues are examined, these factors being the 
2 As measured by first day returns. 
3 e.g. Peavy III (1990) and Weiss (1989) do not find evidence of underpricing for closed end fund 
IPOs, and Wang and Chang (1992) fmd that property IPOs are not underpriced. On the other hand, 
Levis and Thomas (1995) find evidence of some underpricing for 105 UK funds, but its magnitude is 
rather low and stands at 1.91 %. 
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proportion of equity offered, the initial level of gearing, fleet composition and fleet 
age. Moreover, the paper examines performance in the aftermarket by year of issuance 
and country. 
There is a wide literature base on the long run performance of IPOs. Most, if not all, 
of the studies indicate that IPOs perform poorly in the secondary market. Aggarwal 
and Rivoli (1990), using a sample of 1598 IPOs that went public in the US in the 
period 1977-1987, document an abnormal return of -13.73% at the end of the first 
year of trading. Ritter (1991) reports evidence of IPO underperformance beyond the 
first year of trading. His sample of 1526 IPOs in the US during 1975-1984 
underperfonned similar size and industry finns by 29% by the third year anniversary 
of their public listing. 
Poor performance of IPOs in the long run has also been documented for other 
countries. Levis (1993) finds that 712 IPOs in the UK underperfonned the Hoare 
Govett Smaller Companies Index4 by 8.31 % by the end of their third year of listing. 
Uhlir (1989) shows that Gennan IPOs underperformed the market by 7.41% in their 
first year of trading, while Aggarwal, Leal, and Hernandez (1993) report three year 
market adjusted returns of -47%, -19.6% and -23.7% for Brazil, Mexico and Chile, 
respectively. McGuiness (1993) reports that 92 IPOs issued in Hong Kong in the 
period 1980-1990 underperfonned the market by 4.60% in their first year of trading. 
Furthennore, Peavy m (1990) documents that 41 IPOs of closed end funds issued in 
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the US in the period 1986-1987 underperfonned the market by 12.79% in the first 100 
days of trading, whereas Wang, Chan, and Gau (1992) document that 87 IPOs of real 
estate companies issued in the US during 1971-1988, underperfonned similar size and 
industry finns by 7.48%, during the first 190 trading days. 
4 Long run underperformance is also present using alternative benchmarks. 
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2.2 Data and Methodology 
The sample used is comprised of 27 shipping companies that went public by issuing 
common stock during the period 1987-1995, in the stock exchanges of Greece, Hong 
Kong, Norway, the Philippines, Singapore, Sweden and the US. The companies are 
presented in appendix 1, by country and by year of issuance. The sample can be 
considered relatively small, because the focus of the study is on companies whose 
prime business is in the operation of vessels (i.e. shipyards are excluded). However, 
all shipping IPOs - in the tanker, dry and ferry sectors - issued in these countries over 
the period of examination are included in the sample. 
Table 1 provides details on the size, proportion of equity offered, age of the company 
and fleet, and gearing of the companies in our sample of shipping IPOS5. 
The average size of all shipping companies going public is US$150.65 million. 
Companies in the Far Eastern countries are by far the largest and exhibit an average 
size ofUS$247.56 million. Greek companies have the lowest average size ofUS$5.44 
million, whereas the size of Norwegian, Swedish and US shipping companies is close 
to the overall average. 
The mean proportion of equity offered varies across countries. It fluctuates between 
80% in the US to 29% in the Far East and 25% in Greece. The average figure, 
however, for the US is very high, because six US limited life funds gave out 98% of 
S Company Size is calculated as the number of post IPO shares times the offer price. The proportion of 
equity offered is calculated as: gross proceeds / size of company at the time of the offering; debt to 
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their equity. The remaining three US companies offered 48.8% of their equity to the 
public. Similar percentages of equity were offered by Swedish (38%) and Norwegian 
(45%) companies. 
The average gearing level of shipping IPOs at the time of the offering is 1.40,6 but this 
figure exhibits considerable variation across countries. It is quite high in the US and 
Norway standing at 3.88 and 2.21 respectively, whereas it is much lower in the Far 
East, Sweden and Greece standing at 0.89, 0.74 and 0.41, respectively. Average 
gearing of US companies may not be a very representative figure, because the six US 
listed funds entered the market as new companies free of debt. Average gearing also 
exhibits considerable variation within some countries as is indicated by its standard 
deviation. In Norway it is higher than the mean, standing at 2.49 and in the US it is 
also very high at 3.38. In the Far East and Sweden it is lower standing at 0.58 and 0.17 
respectively, whereas in Greece it is a very low 0.10. 
The average fleet age of the shipping IPOs is 13.39 years. Greek companies are the 
outlier here with an average age of 25 years, 12 years older than the all country 
average. This is because all the Greek companies in our sample operate coastal 
vessels, which often have a higher economic life than other bulk carrier or container 
vessels. Fleet age at the time of the offering is broadly similar for Norwegian, Far 
Eastern and US shipping IPOs, standing at 11.21, 12.97 and 12.69 years, respectively. 
The US average fleet age, though, is driven up by the shipping funds with an average 
equity ratios are computed as: long term debt / shareholders' equity; fleet age is the average age of the 
vessels of the companies at the time of the issue. 
6 Our sample includes one Norwegian company, Atlantic Containers, whose debt to equity ratios is 8. 
Excluding this company the average gearing ratio drops to 1.03 which is close to the median gearing of 
the whole sample (0.90). 
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fleet age of 13.78 years. The average age of the remammg US listed shipping 
companies is 9.38 years. Swedish IPOs exhibit the lowest average fleet age, 9.15 
years. 
Six companies included in the sample are shipping funds and initially entered the 
capital markets for speculative asset play reasons. These companies appeared in the 
US during the period 1987-89 and were established by their promoters as limited life 
shipping funds. In other words, their life was predetermined to last between five and 
seven years. Their purpose was to buy second hand vessels at a market downturn, 
trade the vessels until the market improved significantly, and liquidate the company 
by selling the vessels at a premium distributing its net assets to its shareholders. Apart 
from the to-be-generated revenue from the eventual sale of the vessels, it was also the 
companies' intention to pay dividends out of operational cash flows. Reasons for the 
appearance of such funds included the erosion of the equity base of the shipping 
companies during the crisis of the eighties and the resulting reduction in the number 
of financial institutions willing to provide capital for the shipping industry, as well as 
the willingness of some shipowners to utilise the equity capital markets not only for 
speculation, but also in order to maintain their companies in the public domain 7• 
Prices at the end of the first day of trading, the last day of the first trading month and 
at the end of each month for a two year period in the aftermarket, were collected from 
DataStream International and converted into US dollars (where applicable). Other 
details regarding individual characteristics of each IPO - i.e. size, proportion of equity 
7 For a thorough discussion of the nature of shipping funds see Grammenos and Marcoulis (1996). 
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offered, debt to equity ratios, age of the fleet, and fleet composition - were obtained 
from the individual offer prospecti and the annual reports of each company. 
For each issue, i, three measures of performance are calculated: 
i) The first day return, Ri is defined as the percentage change in price from the 
offering date to the close of the first trading day: 
(1) 
where PI is the closing price on the first trading day and OP is the offer price. 
ii) The first month adjusted return, arjJ. defined as the realised return from the close of 
the first trading day to the last calendar day of the first trading month, rjl, less the 
equivalent benchmark return, rml. The time interval, therefore, of ari I ranges from 1 to 
30 calendar days. 
(2) 
iii) The long run return which assesses the aftermarket performance for the 24 months 
following the first month of trading. Monthly abnormal returns8, arjt , are calculated 
for each issue as follows: 
8 Monthly returns are based on the last day of the month of which the stock is traded, incorporate 
dividend payments and where applicable are adjusted for splits and/or rights. 
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arit = rit - rmt (3) 
where rit is the raw return for IPO i, in month t, and r mt is the benchmark return for the 
corresponding month. 
When calculating monthly abnormal returns as above, an implied assumption 
regarding systematic risk is that the beta coefficient is equal to unity. This is unlikely 
to affect the essence of our results. Authors have shown that the average beta of newly 
listed firms is higher than one9• Therefore, the measures of abnormal performance 
used are likely to provide conservative estimates of IPOs' underperformance (Levis, 
1993). 
Two benchmarks are employed in the study. Firstly, to adjust for stock market 
movements, the MSCI equity index of each stock exchange in which each company is 
listed is used. Secondly, to adjust for industry effects the MSCI Shipping Index is 
employed as a benchmark. All indices are calculated in US dollars, include dividends 
and were collected from DataStream International. 
The MSCI indices are value-weighted and aim for 60% coverage of the total market 
capitalisation for each market. The chosen list of stocks includes a representative 
sample of large, medium, and small capitalisation companies from each local market, 
taking into account the stocks' liquidity. Furthermore, stocks with restricted float or 
cross-ownership are avoided. 
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A variety of indices exists that is based on each segment of the shipping industry. The 
MSCI Shipping Index has been chosen, however, because it is representative of the 
overall conditions in the shipping markets. It comprises of companies in the shipping 
industry that differ in size, fleet composition and specialisation. This is illustrated in 
Figure 1 that plots the values of the index for the time period under analysis. The 
rising freight rates both in the tanker and dry bulk sectors of the market for the years 
1988-1989 are reflected in the index, together with the worsening market conditions 
in the second half of 1990 and during 1992. The apparent improving conditions in the 
industry that prevailed in 1993 and 1994 are also well captured by the index. 
To facilitate comparability with existing empirical evidence, the same measures of 
long run performance are employed as in Ritter (1991) and Levis (1993). Therefore, 
the average adjusted return on a portfolio of n IPOs for month t is the simple 
arithmetic average of the benchmark adjusted returns: 
1 n 
ARt =-La'it 
n ;=1 
(4) 
The cumulative benchmark adjusted aftermarket performance from the beginning of 
the first full calendar month of trading to event month q is the summation of the 
average benchmark adjusted returns: 
q 
CAR1,q = L ARt (5) 
tzl 
9 e.g. Ibbotson (1975) and Clarkson and Thompson (1990). 
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The statistical significance of CARs is assessed by: 
I( CAR ) = CARl . .[;; 
I ~ t . var+ 2 . (I - 1) . cov (6) 
where t is the event month, var is the average (over 24 months) cross sectional 
variance, and cov is the first order autocovariance of the ARt series. 
When a firm in portfolio p is delisted from the DataStream database, the portfolio 
return for the next month is an equally weighted average of the remaining firms in the 
portfolio. Thus, the cumulative adjusted return for months 1 to 24 involves monthly 
rebalancing, with the proceeds of a delisted firm equally allocated among the 
surviving members of the portfolio p in each subsequent month. 
As an alternative to the use of cumulative average benchmark adjusted returns which 
implicitly assumes monthly portfolio rebalancing, two year holding period returns 
(HPR) are also computed as: 
24 
HPR; = n (1 + 'il) - 1 (7) 
I~t 
where rit is the raw return of firm i in event month I. This measures the total return 
from a buy and hold strategy where an IPO is purchased on the first day of the first 
full calendar month and held until either its second year anniversary or its delisting 
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whichever is first. In order to interpret this 2-year total return, wealth relatives are 
computed as: 
1 + average 2-year total return on IPOs (8) 
WR= 1 + average 2-year total return on a market benchmark 
A wealth relative of greater than 1.00 can be interpreted as IPOs outperforming the 
market benchmark, whereas a value below 1.00 indicates IPO underperformance JO • 
10 We also employed another approach in the analysis to check if our results are robust to different 
performance measures. Average buy and hold abnormal returns, defmed as HPRj-HPRn, [Barber and 
Lyon (1997)] have also been calculated. Results not reported here, point to qualitatively similar 
conclusions to the performance measures used throughout the paper and are available from the authors 
on request. 
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2.3 Results and Discussion 
Cumulative Adjusted Returns 
Table 2 reports the cumulative average benchmark adjusted returns (CARs), excluding 
first partial month returns, for the 24 months in the aftermarket. Separate results are 
shown for both benchmarks. Both CAR series exhibit a gradual but steady decline 
during the 24-month period following the first month of trading. They fall to 
36.79% (market adjusted), and -8.43% (MSCI Shipping adjusted). However, only the 
market adjusted CAR series becomes significantly negative in the 15th month of 
trading. The MSCI Shipping adjusted CAR series remains insignificant throughout the 
first 24 months oftradingll. 
This latter finding is not consistent with existing empirical evidence. As mentioned 
above, most of the studies have shown that IPOs perform poorly in the secondary 
market even when performance is measured against similar size and industry firms. 
Ritter's (1991) sample, for instance, underperforms a portfolio of industry and size 
matched firms. Moreover, when aftermarket performance was categorised by industry, 
he found that in 11 out of 14 cases, IPOs underperformed their corresponding industry 
group. 
The fact that the portfolio of shipping IPOs underperformed their local stock market 
indices by their second anniversary of public listing, but not the MSCI Shipping Index 
II In order to evaluate the aftermarket performance of the portfolio of IPOs for the local investor, all the 
performance measures are re-calculated without translating prices and local stock market indices into 
US dollars. Cumulative average abnormal returns for the two years in the aftermarket are -37.23% 
(market-adjusted) and -12.81% (MSCI Shipping adjusted). Only the former CAR series is statistically 
significant, from the 15th month of trading. All other relevant results are available from the authors. 
98 
Paper published in the International Journal of Maritime Economics, 1: 71-93,1999 
implies that conditions in the shipping industry have been unfavourable for some 
years after a number of shipping companies chose to go public and/or that 
expectations for many companies have not been realised. 
This implication is particularly strong for companies that entered the capital markets 
in the periods 1988-89 and 1993-9412• Five companies going public during the first 
period were asset play companies (shipping funds). These companies experienced 
severe underperformance as is discussed in the next sub-section. The majority of 
companies that issued stock in 1993-94 were tanker operators. Tanker companies 
entered the capital markets in this period, at a time when there had been signs of 
future improvement in this sector. Such signs were increased vessel scrapping and the 
slow tanker fleet replacement through newbuildings. However, these expectations 
were not realised and tanker freight rates for the two years of trading in the 
aftermarket for these 12 issues remained low. 
Aftermarket performance by Year of Issuance 
In Table 3 first day returns and aftermarket performance are categorised by their year 
of issuance. The one and two year holding period returns and wealth relatives based 
on the two benchmarks are shown. It can be seen that aftermarket performance varies 
depending on the year of issuance and on the benchmark employed. Average wealth 
relatives for the first year in the aftermarket are close to unity both with respect to the 
shipping industry (0.98) and with respect to the stock market indices (1.00). However, 
for the second year of trading, it can be seen that wealth relatives with respect to the 
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shipping industry are consistently higher than those based on the stock market indices. 
The average wealth relative for the second year of trading for the stock market 
adjusted returns is very low and stands at 0.68. This indicates that shipping IPOs 
severely underperformed their local stock market during their second year of listing. 
The fact that most wealth relatives based on the local stock market returns are quite 
low for most of the years under analysis, indicates that market underperformance is a 
general phenomenon. This is not the case, though, for wealth relatives calculated on 
the basis of the MSCI Shipping Index performance. In most instances, wealth relatives 
are close to unity. Nevertheless, it is evident, that the worst performing IPO group 
emerged in the years 1987-1989, when six out of nine companies entered the capital 
markets for asset play. When an outlier (Stolt Nielsen) that has a 2-year HPR equal to 
121 % is dropped from the sample, the average 2-year HPR for 1988 falls to -12.31 % 
and wealth relatives for the year fall to 0.67, and 0.79. The average 2-year HPR for the 
asset play companies alone is -30% and their corresponding wealth relatives are 0.53 
and 0.62. 
The severe underperformance of the shipping funds can be attributed to the fact that 
they entered the capital markets when market conditions and prospects appeared to be 
favourable for the shipping industry. External factors, that persuaded promoters of 
shipping funds and potential investors that the timing was right for investing in the 
shipping industry, were the improving shipping markets as manifested by increased 
scrapping followed by rising demand for shipping services, and the rationalisation of 
12 Grarnmenos and Marcoulis (1996) have shown that the number of shipping IPOs is clustered around 
these two distinct time periods. Eight shipping companies go public in 1988-89, whereas twelve issue 
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the shipbuilding industry along with the fading out of governmental shipbuilding 
subsidies13• These expectations, however, were not realised. Furthermore, the shipping 
funds operated fleets with a high age profile. This increased their running costs, 
particularly those of maintenance and insurance. 
Aftermarket Performance categorised by First Day Return/4 
To further examine the relationship between initial and long run performance, firms 
are categorised according to their level of first day returns in Table 4. Ritter (1991) 
and Levis (1993) found that there is a tendency for offerings with the highest initial 
returns to do worst in the aftermarket. In both cases, this tendency was partly 
attributed to the fact that investors are periodically overoptimistic about the earnings 
potential of newly issued firms ls. 
In our case, however, no such pattern is evident. It can be seen, though, that IPOs that 
were overpriced (negative initial returns) are the worst performing group in our 
sample, both by their first and second armiversary of public listing. Four of the 
companies in this group are shipping funds. As discussed above, underperformance 
for such asset play companies was severe. Furthermore, when a single company is 
dropped from the second group of IPOs (Stolt Nielsen), wealth relatives drop to 0.73 
(market adjusted) and 0.81 (MSCI Shipping adjusted) for the first year of trading, and 
0.54 (market adjusted) and 0.80 (MSCI Shipping adjusted) for the second year of 
common stock for the ftrst time in 1993-94. 
13 Grammenos and Marcoulis, (1996). 
14 calculated as in Equation (1). 
IS Furthermore, evidence provided by DeBondt and Thaler (1985, 1987) demonstrates that, at least for 
low capitalisation stocks, there is a negative relation between past and subsequent abnormal returns on 
individual securities using holding periods of a year or more. 
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trading. No clear relationship can be established, therefore, between the level of initial 
returns and aftermarket performance. 
Aftermarket Performance across Countries 
In Table 5 the aftermarket performance of shipping IPOs is categorised by country. 
Wealth relatives for the first year of trading indicate that performance across countries 
is similar. Those that are based on market performance are close to one, whereas those 
based on the MSCI Shipping Index are slightly above unity. The notable exception, 
however, in both cases is Norway, which exhibits wealth relatives below one for both 
cases. 
By the second year of listing, wealth relatives based on the local stock market indices 
are consistently less than one, confirming the incidence of widespread 
underperformance in this respect. This is not the case, though, for wealth relatives 
measured against the MSCI index performance. Long run performance for shipping 
IPOs in Norway, Sweden, and the three Far Eastern countries has been similar to the 
performance of the shipping market as indicated by their corresponding wealth 
relatives. Companies in Greece and the US, however, have on average 
underperformed the industry. All three Greek IPOs included in the sample are ferry 
companies and were introduced into the Athens Stock Exchange in 1994 (Strintzis 
and DANE) and 1995 (NEL). For the two years following their listing, conditions in 
this market segment have been adverse. Consequently, long run performance of these 
companies has been poor. Six of the US companies are shipping funds. As mentioned 
above, these companies have been exceptionally poor performers. When they are 
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excluded from the analysis, wealth relatives for the US rise to 1.02 (market adjusted) 
and 1.24 (MSCI Shipping adjusted). 
Aftermarket Performance categorised by Proportion of Equity Offerei 6 
Table 6 reports the aftermarket performance of shipping IPOs categorised by 
proportion of equity offered. This differs across countries and stock exchanges. In the 
stock exchanges of Athens and Stockholm it is required that at least 25% of the 
company shares are owned by the general public. In Norway, the Oslo Stock 
Exchange regulations specify that for a company to obtain a public listing there must 
be at least 500 shareholders. In Hong Kong and Singapore, listing requirements 
specify either the minimum of 25% of total capital, or not less than HK$50,000,000 
and $1,500,000 (whichever is higher) must be in public hands (in the case of 
Singapore in the hands of not less than 500 shareholders). In the Philippines, the 
applying company must have a minimum authorised capital stock of at least 
$15,000,000, of which a minimum of 25% must be subscribed and fully paid. With 
respect to the US stock exchanges, requirements vary according to which stock 
exchange the company seeks listing. In the NYSE there must be at least 1,100,000 
publicly held shares outstanding, in the case of the AMEX there must be at least 
500,000 publicly held shares outstanding, and finally, in the case of the NASDAQ 
there must be at least 100,000 publicly held shares outstanding. 
In general, no relationship is established between aftermarket performance and the 
proportion of equity offered to the public, both by the end of the first and the second 
16 The proportion of equity offered is calculated as: gross proceeds / size of company at the time of the 
offering. 
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year of listing. It can be seen, though, that the group with the highest proportion of 
equity offered is the worst performing group in the aftermarket. This can be partly 
explained by the bad performance of the shipping funds included in this group, which 
offered, on average, 98.10% of their equity. The bad performance of asset play 
companies, as mentioned above, can be attributed partly to the high costs incurred - in 
terms of insurance and maintenance - due to the high average fleet age of their vessels 
(13.78 years), in addition to adverse market conditions. Furthermore, the agency 
problem that may exist when owners of a company hold such a small stake of their 
own equity, could also account for the bad performance of such companies. 
Aftermarket Performance by Fleet Composition 17 
In Table 7, long run performance is categorised by the fleet composition of the 
companies. Performance by the end ofthe first anniversary of public trading is similar 
across different fleet compositions and is close to that of the local stock markets and 
the shipping market, as manifested by the wealth relatives. However, the two year 
performance measures indicate that performance varies across different fleet 
compositions. The worst performing group is that of ferry companies. As mentioned 
above, conditions in this shipping sector were unfavourable for the two years 
following the public listing of these companies, and this is reflected in their share 
performance. 
Companies that operate in the dry bulk sector also exhibit underperformance both 
with respect to the stock market where they are listed and to the shipping industry. 
17 Companies are classified according to their primary activities (70% or more) as tanker, dry bulk, 
passenger and diversified operators. 
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However, three shipping funds are included in this group. When they are dropped, 
wealth relatives rise to 0.58 (market adjusted) and 1.04 (MSCI Shipping adjusted). 
Finally, performance of shipping IPOs in the tanker sector has been similar to the 
performance of the shipping market, as indicated by the corresponding wealth relative 
ofl.00. 
Aftermarket Performance by Fleet Age l8 
In Table 8, long run performance is categorised by the age of the fleet of the 
companies in the sample. No pattern emerges for the first year of trading; however, 
there is a clear inverse relationship between the age of the fleet of the companies in 
the sample and performance for the two years after listing. The two groups with the 
lower fleet age are the best performing groups with wealth relatives equal to 1.07 and 
1.26 (market adjusted), and 1.10 and 1.18 (MSCI Shipping adjusted). This pattern is 
not surprising. The age profile of a company's fleet may have direct and profound 
financial implications. Grammenos and Marcoulis (1996) have pointed out the 
importance of the fleet age of a shipping company: first, it affects operating costs and 
therefore its income; secondly, it influences the perception of the company in the eyes 
of charterers and investors. 
Although new vessels are normally much more expensive, it is not clear whether they 
are favoured by the existence of a two-tier market. In such a market, new modem 
vessels will command a monetary premium over old ones. In the case of tankers, 
Tamvakis (1995) does not find enough evidence to support a two tier market 
hypothesis in the period 1989-1993. As a result, it is possible that in a good market 
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both old and new vessels earn roughly the same freight. This would imply that in a 
good market older vessels may earn more profits, while, provided they were bought 
when the market was 'low', they may survive a bad market less painfully than new 
vessels, since new ones would have the additional burden of high capital outlay and 
debt repayment. 
However, operating older ships may entail relatively higher running costs, e.g. fuel, 
insurance costs, manning requirements and maintenance l9 • Furthermore, factors such 
as the US Oil Pollution Act of 199020 and often the reluctance of major oil companies 
and other first class charterers to employ older vessels may result in the creation of a 
two-tier market, in a number of cases in terms of monetary premiums, but mostly in 
terms of preference for employment. 
Aftermarket Performance by Initial Gearini l Level 
In Table 9, aftermarket performance is categorised by the geanng level of the 
companies at the time of going public. The debt to equity ratios of the companies in 
the sample are used. It should be noted that in this case, the sample is reduced to a 
total of 19 companies, due to the fact that eight IPOs were gearless at the time of 
going pUblic22• No pattern emerges in this case either for the first year of trading. 
Nevertheless, the group with the highest debt to equity ratios is the best performer 
18 Fleet age is the average age of the vessels of the companies at the time of the issue. 
19 It should be noted that two sister vessels may be in a materially different operating state if the one is 
well maintained and the other not. 
20 OP A 90 is designed to protect US waters from oil pollution; it requires vessels to have double hulls 
therefore increasing newbuilding costs; it also imposes unlimited liability for damage resulting from oil 
spills therefore increasing insurance costs. Furthermore, OPA 90 provides for the gradual phasing out 
of older single hull vessels. 
21 see footnotes 5,6. 
22 The six shipping funds were not geared at the time of their offerings. 
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with wealth relatives above 1, both with respect to the local stock market index and 
the MSCI Shipping Index. 
In the second year of trading, the best perfonning group is again that with the highest 
average initial gearing level. All four companies in this group exhibit positive two 
year HPRs. There is, therefore, a strong tendency for IPOs with higher initial gearing 
levels to do better in the aftennarket. The group with the lowest average initial gearing 
level appears to be a good perfonner with respect to the MSCI Shipping Index. Only 
one issue in this group (Jinhui Holdings), however, has a positive 2 year HPR equal to 
40%. Excluding this company from the group, the wealth relative based on the MSCI 
Shipping Index drops to 0.96. 
Shipping companies in the seventies and eighties had quite high geanng levels. 
Debt/equity ratios of 3 or higher were not unusual. This proved to be quite painful 
during the crisis period of the mid-seventies and the first part of the eighties, and in a 
number of cases catastrophical; particularly for companies which did not generate 
stable income through medium or long tenn time charters and/or contracts of 
affreightment but operated in the spot market (Grammenos, 1995). After the crisis, 
though, shipping companies have maintained a more conservative approach towards 
gearing with debt to equity levels above 2.5 being less nonnal. 
Three IPOs in our sample with high debt to equity ratios, Atlantic, Teekay Shipping 
and William23, enter the capital markets with the primary purpose of reducing their 
23 Debt to equity ratios for these companies were 8.01, 1.75 and 1.47 respectively, at the time of the 
offering. 
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debt levels. Moreover, 13 out of 19 of the companies in the sample state in their offer 
prospecti that a proportion of the proceeds of their offerings is to be used for repaying 
a portion of their long term debt. In fact, the average debt to equity ratio for the sub-
sample of 19 companies drops from 1.41 (pre-IPO level) to 0.72 by the end of the first 
year of trading. Furthermore, the debt to equity ratio for the second year in the 
aftermarket is similar and stands at 0.78. 
This apparent trend of shipping companies reducing their debt levels, alongside 
financial institutions becoming more stringent in their lending policies24, could also 
improve the industry's attractiveness in the eyes of investors. Furthermore, 
Grammenos and Marcoulis (1996) have found that gearing is also positively related to 
the degree of underpricing for shipping offerings. The positive association of 
aftermarket performance and the initial gearing level has the following explanation. 
Higher gearing levels reduce the value and increase the risk of a shipping company. 
Therefore, investors require higher rates of return in order to be compensated for 
taking more risk. In addition, it can be said that since investors in the shipping 
industry tend to correlate high levels of debt with offerings of a higher risk class, the 
lower debt to equity ratios of publicly quoted shipping companies (13 out of 19) in the 
aftermarket is perceived as a positive signal, hence the positive association with 
aftermarket performance. 
Regression Results 
24 However, in 1995 increased competition among international fmancial institutions in attracting 
desirable clientele, has led to an increase in financial leverage of shipping companies sometimes 
accompanied by relaxation in the required securities [Grarnmenos (1995)]. 
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To examine more closely the effects of the local stock markets and the MSCI 
Shipping Index on the aftermarket performance of shipping IPOs, univariate 
regression analysis is performed. More specifically, two sets of regressions are carried 
out. For the first set, the dependent variable is the one year holding period return for 
each IPO, whereas for the second, the dependent variable is the two year holding 
period return for each IPO. 
The independent variables used in both cases are: the local stock market index (M), 
the MSCI Shipping Index (MSCI), first day returns (INRET), the percentage of equity 
offered to the public at the time of the offering (%EO), the initial gearing level25 
(GEARING) and the natural logarithm of the age of the fleet26 (LAGEF) of the IPOs 
at the time of the offering. Furthermore, to test whether performance is affected by the 
fleet composition of the issues in the sample, three binary variables are used, namely 
(TANKER) for companies that operate in the tanker sector, (DRY) for companies that 
operate in the dry cargo sector and (FERRY) for companies that operate in the ferry 
sector of shipping. A binary variable (FUND) is also employed in the analysis to test 
whether the six shipping funds in the sample perform on average worse than the 
. . . 27 
remammg companIes. 
25 The fact that we found that shipping companies with high debt at the time of the IPO perform better 
in the aftermarket than shipping companies with low debt, led us to question whether holding period 
returns are related to changes in gearing from the time of the offering. For this purpose, regression 
analysis is performed. Specifically, the changes in gearing from the time of the offer to the end of the 
first year of trading are regressed on one year holding period returns and the changes in gearing from 
the time of the offer to the end of the second trading year are regressed on two year holding period 
returns. No significant relationships are established in either case. Results not reported here, are 
available from the authors. 
26 Many empirical studies that examine age as a determinant of aftermarket performance use the natural 
logarithm of one plus the age in years as the explanatory variable [e.g. Ritter (1991)]. 
27 We also employed another technique, a ranking procedure, to test for the effects of first day returns, 
the percentage of equity offered to the public, the age of the fleet and the gearing level, on aftermarket 
returns. Ranking is based on the groupings of tables 4,6,8 and 9 and the four variables created through 
this ranking procedure are RINRET, R%EO, RGEARING, and RAGEF, respectively. 
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Regression results are shown in Table 1028 •29 • With respect to the first set of 
regressions where the dependent variable is the first year holding period return, it can 
be seen that cross sectional betas are quite similar both with respect to the local stock 
market indices (M) and the MSCI Shipping Index (MSCI) are quite different and their 
coefficients stand at 0.55 and 0.93, respectively. One would expect these values to be 
slightly above 1.00, given the findings of several studies that the average beta for 
newly listed finns is greater than one30• The coefficient of MSCI, though, is increased 
to 1.15 when two shipping funds, B&H Bulk and B&H Ocean are excluded from the 
sample. One year HPRs for these finns are 36.34% and 39.03%, respectively, whereas 
the return on the MSCI Shipping Index is 14.06% and 73.71 % for the corresponding 
period. 
The coefficient of the local stock market index (M) drops to 0.46 for the second set of 
regressions, although that ofthe MSCI Shipping Index (MSCI) is almost the same and 
stands at 0.82. The distortion of the effect of the shipping market by the above two 
funds is more evident for the second year of trading. The 2-year HPR for B&H Bulk is 
-7.77%, while the corresponding return for the MSCI index is 75.99%. Accordingly, 
the 2-year HPR for B&H Ocean is 3.39%, whereas that of the MSCI index is 46.76%. 
Excluding these two companies from the sample the coefficient of MSCI is 
dramatically higher and stands at 1.85. This suggests that aftennarket performance of 
shipping IPOs is dominated by conditions in the shipping market by the end of both 
their first and second trading years. 
28 For both sets of regressions, parameters were estimated using Ordinary Least Squares. 
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Regarding the remaining explanatory variables, results for both sets of regressions, 
generally confirm the findings discussed in the previous section of the paper. In panel 
A of the table univariate regressions for each variable are performed. Aftermarket 
performance for the first 24 months of trading is found to be positively related to the 
initial gearing level of shipping IPOs, and negatively related to fleet age. In addition, 
panel B of Table 10, demonstrates that when gearing and fleet age are simultaneously 
introduced as explanatory variables, both their coefficients remain statistically 
significant in a multivariate setting3 ! . 
29 Both sets of regressions were also performed for a reduced sample that excludes the six shipping 
funds. Results, available from the authors, are essentially the same. 
30 see footnote 10. 
31 The coefficient ofINRET is statistically significant, however, this is due to one company (Frontline) 
that has a first day return equal to 83.33% and can be regarded as an outlier. When this company is 
dropped from the analysis the coefficient of INRET becomes negative and is highly insignificant. 
Aftermarket performance is therefore unrelated to the degree of underpricing. No other relationship is 
established. 
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2.4 Summary and Conclusions 
This paper examines for the first time the performance of shipping IPOs in the 
aftermarket. The analysis includes a sample of 27 shipping lPOs that were issued 
during the period 1987-1995 in the stock exchanges of Greece, Hong Kong, Norway, 
the Philippines, Singapore, Sweden and the US. Performance is measured for the first 
24 months of trading against the local stock market indices of each IPO and against 
the Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) Shipping Index. 
Average cumulative adjusted returns demonstrate that the portfolio of shipping IPOs 
in the sample underperformed their local stock market indices by 36.79%, by the end 
of their second anniversary of public listing. However, no underperformance was 
documented when IPO returns were adjusted by the MSCI Shipping Index. This was 
attributed to the adverse conditions that prevailed in the shipping market for certain 
years during the period under analysis and to the poor performance of the six shipping 
funds included in the sample. 
Furthermore, holding period returns and wealth relatives were calculated as 
performance measures for the portfolio of the companies in our sample. Aftermarket 
performance was ranked by year of issuance and it was found that IPOs performed as 
well as the shipping market for most of the years in the analysis, in their first year of 
trading. For the second year of trading, though, shipping new issues performed poorly 
in the period 1987-1989. This was attributed to the bad performance of the six 
shipping funds in the sample. 
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Different countries display similar performance in the aftermarket. Wealth relatives 
for the first year in the aftermarket based on both the local stock market and the MSCI 
Shipping Index indicate underperformance for companies in Norway. Wealth relatives 
for the second year of listing indicate that Greek and US companies have performed 
poorly. In the case of Greece, underperformance of three Greek ferry companies was 
attributed to the adverse conditions that prevailed in this sector after their listing in 
1994 and 1995. Poor performance in the US is documented, because all six asset play 
companies were issued in this country in the period 1987-1989. 
Similar performance in the aftermarket is documented across different fleet 
compositions of the companies, for the first year of their public trading. For the 
second year of trading, though, performance was particularly bad for ferry companies. 
Finally, wealth relatives based on the MSCI Shipping Index were found to be very 
close to unity for firms that operate in the tanker sector. 
Aftermarket performance was also ranked by the proportion of equity offered, initial 
gearing and fleet age. No pattern is evident in the case of the proportion of equity 
offered to the public at the time of the offering. Companies, though, that are on the 
highest grouping of equity offered did substantially worse in the aftermarket. Again, 
this was attributed to the bad performance of the six shipping funds that fall under this 
category. 
In Grammenos and Marcoulis (1996) it is documented that the level of gearing 
immediately prior to going public is positively related to underpricing. In this paper, 
the initial gearing level emerges as an important factor of aftermarket performance. 
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Wealth relatives for the second year of trading, as well as regression analysis, indicate 
that IPOs with higher debt to equity ratios at the time of the offering perform better in 
the aftermarket. This is attributed to the higher rates of return required by investors for 
taking more risk and to the lower financial leverage of the companies in the secondary 
market, that is perceived as a positive signal. In fact, the average debt to equity ratio 
for the sample drops from 1.41 at the time of the offering to 0.72 and 0.78, by the end 
of the first and second trading years, respectively. 
Fleet age was found to be negatively related to performance in the long run. Offerings 
with a younger fleet do better in the long run than those with an older one, as is 
indicated both by wealth relatives in the second trading year and regression results. 
This finding is not surprising. Operation of older ships usually involves higher 
running costs in terms of maintenance and repairs, insurance and oil consumption. 
Another finding of the paper is that the long run performance of shipping IPOs is 
more in line with the shipping market - as proxied by the MSCI Shipping Index - than 
the local stock market for each issue. Moreover, aftermarket performance in the longer 
run is driven mostly by industry factors; when regression analysis is performed, the 
only significant effects on two year performance are those of fleet age and the gearing 
level of the companies at the time of their offerings. 
Finally, there is an equally important conclusion based on our findings. The cyclical 
nature of the shipping industry, the variety of shipping companies that are listed on 
stock exchanges, and the diversity of their performance which is linked to 
microeconomic (company-specific) and macroeconomic (world economy and the 
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overall shipping industry) factors and conditions require a thorough understanding of 
both factors and conditions as well as sound investment analysis skills. In this context, 
there is great need to educate the investment analyst for the benefit of both the 
investors and the shipping companies. 
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Table 2.1: Sam)!le Descri)!tive Statistics 
Country ALL HELLAS NORWAY FAR EAST SWEDEN US 
Mean Size of Company 150.65 54.44 137.76 247.56 147.70 149.95 
(US$miliion) 
Median Size of Company 100.23 34.22 162.99 292.35 147.70 75.24 
($million) 
Proportion of equity offered 54% 25% 45% 29% 38% 80% 
(%) 
Standard Deviation (%) 31% 3% 23% 7% 5% 32% 
Mean Gearing of Company 1.40 0.41 2.21 0.89 0.74 3.88 
at the time of going public 
Standard Deviation 1.72 0.10 2.49 0.58 0.17 3.38 
Mean Age of Company at 7.07 13.33 5.75 16.75 0.00 3.80 
the time of going public 
(Years) 
Standard Deviation (Years) 11.28 10.60 9.13 19.96 7.74 
Mean Age of the fleet at the 13.39 25.00 11.21 12.97 9.15 12.69 
time of going public (Years) 
Standard Deviation (Years) 5.40 0.75 3.39 5.86 5.44 2.99 
Number of IPOs 27 3 9 4 2 9 
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Table 2.2: Cumulative Average Adjusted Returns for Shipping Initial Public 
Offerings, 1987-1995. Excluding Initial Returns. 
Local Stock Market Index MSCI Shipping Index 
Adjusted Adjusted 
Month of Number of CAR t-statistic CAR t-statistic 
Seasoning Firms Trading % % 
1 27 -3.73 -1.91 -2.02 -0.83 
2 27 -5.53 -1.95 -3.40 -1.17 
3 27 -4.40 -1.25 -1.03 -0.61 
4 27 -1.20 -0.29 1.92 0.34 
5 27 -2.33 -0.51 0.60 -0.07 
6 27 -4.69 -0.94 -0.55 -0.5 
7 27 -4.94 -0.91 0.01 -0.42 
8 27 -7.41 -1.28 -1.86 -0.82 
9 27 -8.72 -1.42 -1.90 -0.83 
10 27 -11.11 -1.71 -2.49 -0.86 
11 27 -11.26 -1.65 -2.62 -0.95 
12 27 -10.89 -1.53 0.22 -0.53 
13 27 -10.67 -1.44 1.51 -0.23 
14 27 -12.42 -1.62 0.58 -0.37 
15 27 -15.39 -1.97 -2.59 -0.88 
16 27 -18.59 -2.26 -3.27 -0.98 
17 27 -21.91 -2.58 -6.91 -1.42 
18 27 -24.54 -2.81 -5.21 -1.14 
19 27 -29.19 -3.25 -7.72 -1.42 
20 26 -31.95 -3.41 -9.85 -1.54 
21 25 -32.91 -3.36 -9.10 -1.41 
22 24 -36.51 -3.57 -11.72 -1.61 
23 24 -36.38 -3.47 -8.39 -1.32 
24 24 -36.79 -3.44 -8.43 -1.28 
Note: t-statistics are computed using Equation (6). 
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Table 2.3: Long Run Performance by Year of Issuance for Shipping Initial 
Public Offerings. 1987-1995. Excluding Initial Returns. 
Wealth Relatives 
First Year Second Year 
Year Number Average Average Average Stock Market MSCI Stock Market MSCI 
of 1st Day 1-Year 2-Year Indices Shipping Indices Shipping 
Issues Return HPR% HPR% Index Index 
1987 1 -2.5 36.84 -7.74 1.58 1.20 0.80 0.52 
1988 4 18.72 58.36 21.01 1.25 1.09 0.92 0.99 
1989 4 3.87 -19.98 -40.49 0.71 0.80 0.46 0.71 
1990 2 8.48 -7.45 -33.10 1.04 1.15 0.72 0.95 
1991 1 5.83 24.69 40.00 0.94 1.61 0.49 1.33 
1993 6 1.61 2.86 -17.29 0.82 0.93 0.70 0.99 
1994 6 6.75 -9.47 -15.69 0.79 1.01 0.71 0.93 
1995 3 2.90 -3.44 -9.92 0.88 0.94 0.66 0.87 
All 
Issues 27 5.77 6.27 -8.93 1.00 0.98 0.68 0.91 
Note: Wealth Relatives are defined in Equation (8). 
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Table 2.4: Long Run Performance by First Day Return Categories for Shipping 
Initial Public Offerings, 1987-1995. Excluding Initial Returns. 
Wealth Relatives 
First Year Second Year 
1st Day Number of Average Average Stock Market MSCI Stock Market MSCI 
Return (%) Issues 1-Year 2-Year Indices Shipping Indices Shipping 
Category HPR% HPR% Index Index 
<0 8 4.02 -18.78 0.88 0.89 0.62 0.74 
0.00 - 2.00 6 12.86 0.12 0.94 0.97 0.74 0.95 
2.01 - 8.00 7 3.78 -9.69 0.89 1.08 0.60 0.95 
8.00+ 6 5.58 -3.94 0.98 1.14 0.82 1.08 
A" Issues 27 6.27 -8.93 1.00 0.98 0.68 0.91 
Note: Wealth Relatives are defined in Equation (8). 
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Table 2.5: Long Run Performance by Country for Shipping Initial Public 
Offerings, 1987-1995. Excluding Initial Returns. 
Wealth Relatives 
First Year Second Year 
Country Number Average Average Stock Market MSCI Stock MSCI 
of 1-Year 2-Year Indices Shipping Market Shipping 
Issues HPR% HPR% Index Indices Index 
ELLAS 3 2.71 -29.62 0.91 1.11 0.55 0.73 
NORWAY 9 -2.55 -0.88 0.79 0.94 0.74 1.02 
FAR 4 9.64 -6.85 0.92 1.08 0.61 1.01 
EAST"' 
SWEDEN 2 16.43 -19.34 1.16 1.19 0.77 0.94 
US 9 16.47 -8.47 1.00 0.97 0.69 0.82 
All Issues 27 6.27 -8.93 1.00 0.98 0.68 0.91 
Note: Wealth Relatives are defined in Equation (8). 
* The Far Eastern Countries included in the analysis are Hong Kong, the Philippines 
and Singapore. 
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Table 2.6: Long Run Performance by Proportion of Equity Offered for Shipping 
Initial Public Offerines, 1987-1995. Excluding Initial Returns. 
Wealth Relatives 
First Year Second Year 
Proportion of Number Average Average Stock Market MSCI Stock Market MSCI 
Equity offered of 1-Year 2-Year Indices Shipping Indices Shipping 
Category % Issues HPR% HPR% Index Index 
0.01 - 30.00 11 14.42 -1.97 0.98 1.12 0.70 0.98 
30.01 - 50.00 5 3.62 -8.10 0.93 1.02 0.77 1.00 
50.01 - 85.00 4 6.90 10.58 0.85 1.00 0.78 1.12 
85.01+ 7 -0.92 -31.61 0.86 0.84 0.53 0.64 
All Issues 27 6.27 -8.93 1.00 0.98 0.68 0.91 
Note: Wealth Relatives are defined in Equation (8). 
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Table 2.7: Long Run Performance by Fleet Composition for Shipping Initial 
Public Offerings, 1987-1995. Excluding Initial Retu rns. 
Wealth Relatives 
First Year Second Year 
Fleet Composition Number Average Average Stock Market MSCI Stock Market MSCI 
of 1-Year 2-Year Indices Shipping Indices Shipping 
Issues HPR% HPR% Index Index 
Tanker 11 3.29 -2.62 0.81 0.98 0.74 1.00 
Dry Bulk 7 5.00 -17.17 1.17 1.02 0.56 0.80 
Passenger 4 2.16 -34.07 0.92 1.03 0.54 0.68 
Diversified 2 49.16 9.00 0.88 1.02 0.86 0.89 
Other 3 -2.99 8.78 0.89 1.00 0.86 1.20 
All Issues 27 6.27 -8.93 1.00 0.98 0.68 0.91 
Note: Wealth Relatives are defined in Equation (8). 
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Table 2.8: Long Run Performance by Fleet Age for Shipping Initial Public 
Offerings, 1987-1995. Excluding Initial Returns. 
Wealth Relatives 
First Year Second Year 
Fleet Age Number Average Average Stock Market MSCI Stock Market MSCI 
Category of 1-Year 2-Year Indices Shipping Indices Shipping 
(Years) Issues HPR% HPR% Index Index 
5.30 - 9.19 6 7.25 1.93 1.07 1.05 1.07 1.10 
9.20 - 10.83 6 18.84 20.38 1.17 1.16 1.26 1.18 
10.84 -13.17 5 4.78 -24.82 0.92 0.90 0.76 0.65 
13.18 - 16.00 5 0.27 -20.71 0.88 0.90 0.74 0.84 
16.00+ 5 -1.98 -29.45 0.95 1.00 0.73 0.73 
All Issues 27 6.27 -8.93 1.00 0.98 0.68 0.91 
Note: Wealth Relatives are defined in Equation (8). 
128 
Paper published in the International Journal of Maritime Economics, 1: 71-93,1999 
Table 2.9: Long Run Performance by Initial Gearing Level* for Shipping Initial 
Public Offerings, 1987-1995. Excluding Initial Returns. 
Wealth Relatives 
First Year Second Year 
Gearing Number Average Average Stock Market MSCI Stock Market MSCI 
Level of 1-Year 2-Year Indices Shipping Indices Shipping 
Category Issues HPR% HPR% Index Index 
0.297-0.465 5 5.86 -3.02 0.93 1.16 0.62 1.05 
0.466-0.948 5 5.10 -25.12 0.95 1.10 0.63 0.82 
0.949-1.618 5 -15.47 -19.96 0.71 0.79 0.62 0.82 
1.619+ 4 54.06 60.35 1.29 1.35 1.16 1.44 
All Issues 27 6.27 -8.93 1.00 0.98 0.68 0.91 
Note: Wealth Relatives are defined in Equation (8). 
* The Initial Gearing Level of the Shipping IPOs is proxied by the Debt to Equity 
Ratio, defined as: Long tenn Debt / Total Shareholders' Equity 
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Table 2.10: Regression Resultsl 
Panel A: Univariate Regression Results 
Indegendent Variable2 First 12 Months First 24 Months 
M 0.55* 0.41* 
MSCI 0.93* 0.82* 
MSCI3 1.15* 1.85* 
INRET 0.48* 0.34* 
INRET' -0.24 -0.31 
%EO -0.13 -0.23 
GEARING 0.05 0.13* 
LAGEF -0.18 -0.41 * 
TANKER -0.05 -0.08 
DRY -0.02 -0.11 
PASSENGER -0.05 -0.30* 
FUND -0.05 -0.31* 
RINRET 0.03 0.12 
R%EO -0.08 -0.08 
RGEARING 0.08 0.31* 
RAGEF -0.05 -0.19* 
Panel B: Multivariate Regression Results 
Indegendent Variable 
GEARING 
LAGEF 
RGEARING 
RAGEF 
Notes: 
First 24 Months 
0.12* 
-0.31* 
0.30* 
-0.14* 
1. Sample comprises of 27 Shipping Initial Public Offerings issued in the Stock 
Exchanges of seven different countries during the period 1987-1995. 
2. Definitions of the variables are given in the text. 
3. Sample excludes two shipping funds, B&H Bulk and B&H Ocean. 
4. Sample excludes one company, Frontline, with a first day return of 83.33% . 
... indicates significance at the 5% level 
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Appendix 2.1: Shipping IPOs partitioned by Country Year of Issuance 
Company Year of Offer 
Hone-Kona the Philiooines and Sinaaoore 
Pacific Carriers 1990 
Jinhui 1991 
Osprey Maritime 1994 
William 1995 
~ 
B & H Bulk Carriers 1987 
B&H Ocean Carriers 1988 
Global Ocean Carriers 1988 
Stolt Nielsen 1988 
MC Shipping 1989 
B&H Maritime Carriers 1989 
Nortankers 1989 
BT Shipping 1989 
Tee kay 1995 
Sweden 
Frontline 1988 
United Tankers 1990 
Norway 
Awilco 1993 
First Olsen 1993 
Bona 1993 
Western Bulk Shipping 1993 
Smedvig Tankship 1993 
Nordic American 1993 
IAtlantic 1994 
Jinhui Shipping and Transportation 1994 
Larvik 1994 
Greece 
Strintzis 1994 
Dane 1994 
NEL 1995 
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Chapter 3: Macroeconomic Factors and International 
Shipping Stock Returns* 
Costas Th. Grammenos and Angelos G. Arkoulis 
ABSTRACT 
The aim of this paper is to present evidence, for the first time, about the relationships 
of global macroeconomic sources of risk with shipping stock returns internationally, 
for the period 1989:12 - 1998:3. For this purpose, a sample of 36 shipping 
companies (listed in 10 stock exchanges worldwide) is used in the study. The return 
on the world equity market portfolio and innovations in the following prespecified set 
of global macro variables are employed in the analysis: a) industrial production; b) 
inflation; c) oil prices; d) fluctuations in exchange rates against the US dollar; and e) 
laid up tonnage. Several significant relationships are established between returns of 
international shipping stocks and global risk factors: Oil prices and laid up tonnage 
are found to be negatively related to shipping stocks, whereas the exchange rate 
variable displays a positive relationship. In addition, it is found that, in general, the 
macroeconomic factors exhibit a consistent pattern in the way in which they are 
linked to the shipping industry, across countries. 
Keywords: Global macroeconomy; shipping stocks; industrial production; inflation; oil 
prices; exchange rates; laid up tonnage. 
• This paper has been accepted for publication in the International Journal of Maritime Economics. 
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3.1 Introduction 
Studies on industry returns and risk have been perfonned at a national level. Saunders 
and Yourougou (1990), and Isimbabi (1994), for example, compare the stock market 
perception of banking risk to other industrial sectors - such as utilities, petroleum 
refining, and others, in the US. Both studies employ a multi factor model in an attempt 
to examine the sensitivity of returns of companies in each industry to a set of 
macroeconomic and industry risk factors. Berry, Bunneister and McElroy (1988), Eun 
and Resnick (1992), Chen and Jordan (1993), and Kavussanos and Marcoulis (1997) 
are studies that also use industrial classification within the same country. In addition, 
previous studies have examined risk pricing in relation to a set of macroeconomic 
factors according to size (Chen, Roll and Ross, 1986; Poon and Taylor, 1991) and 
according to industry classification (Chen and Jordan, 1993). 
Studies on stocks in the shipping industry have been very limited in number and 
scope. For instance, Grammenos and Marcoulis (1996) examine a cross section of 
shipping stock returns by using a set of microeconomic factors. The sensitivities of 
shipping stock returns to global macroeconomic factors, however, have not been 
examined in the past. 
The objective of this paper is to fill this gap in the literature by presenting evidence 
about the relationships of world macroeconomic news with shipping stock returns 
internationally. For this purpose, several global macroeconomic risk variables are 
constructed in the spirit of Ferson and Harvey (1994), and their relationships with the 
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returns of 36 shipping companies that are listed in 10 di fferent stock exchanges 
around the globe during the period December 1989 - March 1998, are examined. 
The highly international nature of the shipping industry and the complex mechanism 
through which freight rates are determined by the interaction of supply and demand 
makes such a study particularly interesting at the global macroeconomic level. 
Furthermore, the industry is segmented (dry bulk, tanker, their sub markets and liner) 
to a large extent, with each sector reacting differently - in many cases - to a change in 
demand and/or supply. From a macroeconomic perspective, though, one is interested 
in the total - or average - effects of such changes in the shipping industry as a whole. It 
is primarily on this basis that we choose the global macroeconomic factors to be used 
in the analysis ofthis paper. 
Moreover, the risk/return profile of the shipping industry in relation to the 
macroeconomy can be beneficial to those investors who are considering investing in 
shipping equities, in the sense that they can include them in their portfolios either for 
diversification or even for speCUlation purposes, by timing their investment 
appropriately. 
In this paper. the set of prespecified global risk variables includes the returns on the 
world equity market portfolio. global exchange rate fluctuations measured against the 
US Dollar. oil prices. inflation and industrial production growth. Monthly changes in 
laid up tonnage is also examined, as an important shipping industry factor that proxies 
market conditions. Empirical evidence suggests that the relationships of 
macroeconomic factors with industry returns offer little similarities. Berry. Burmeister 
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and McElroy (1988) and Kavussanos and Marcoulis (2000), for instance, find that the 
macroeconomy has different effects across several different industries in the US. This 
makes a priori expectations difficult to detennine. The effect of a global risk factor 
could be positive in a particular industry, and negative or insignificant in another, 
depending on specific industry characteristics. 
In an efficient market, prices should reflect all available infonnation at any point in 
time. Thus, as has been suggested by Chan, Chen and Hsieh (1985), Bernard (1986), 
Wasserfallen (1989) and Poon and Taylor (1991), innovations in macroeconomic 
factors are the relevant explanatory variables of the risk premia awarded in the stock 
market. Therefore, Auto-Regressive Moving Average (ARMA) models are used to 
filter out the expected component of each macroeconomic variable, and the 
unexpected components are used as explanatory variables. 
The most important findings of this paper are the several significant relationships that 
are established between returns of international shipping stocks and the global risk 
factors considered. Oil prices and laid up tonnage are found to be negatively related 
with shipping stocks, whereas the exchange rate variable has a positive relationship. 
Moreover, no significant relationships were detected, regarding the global measures of 
inflation and industrial production. In addition, the relationships of the global factors 
with the returns of shipping companies were tested in six different countries. It is 
found that, in general, the macroeconomic factors exhibit a consistent pattern in the 
way in which they are connected to the shipping industry, across different countries. 
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The paper is organised into five sections. The next section describes the 
macroeconomic variables included in the study and discusses the methodological 
aspects of the approach employed to empirically test for the long run impacts of these 
variables on international shipping stock returns. Section 3 describes the data and the 
derivation of the global risk factors. The results are discussed in section 4, while 
section 5 summarises the findings and offers concluding remarks. 
136 
3.2 Theory / Methodology 
Although empirical studies on modelling the macroeconomic detenninants of stock 
returns have focused on a similar set of variables (e.g. Chen, Roll and Ross, 1986; 
Hamao, 1988; Martinez and Rubio 1989; Wasserfallen, 1989; Poon and Taylor, 1991; 
Chen and Jordan, 1993), the pricing relationships detected in each case differ. 
However, in the shipping markets, the forces that establish equilibrium in the supply 
and demand for shipping tonnage and, thus, freight rates - the most significant source 
of income for shipping companies - provide us with an insight of a priori 
expectations. Stopford (1997) identifies five factors that are believed to influence the 
demand for, and five factors believed to influence the supply of, shipping transport. 
The demand factors are the world economy, seaborne commodity trades, average haul, 
political events, and transport costs. The supply factors are the world fleet, fleet 
productivity, shipbuilding deliveries, scrapping, and freight rates. 
This set of expected influences on supply and demand provides a backdrop for this 
study that attempts to uncover the pricing relationships between international shipping 
stock returns and unanticipated changes in the returns of the world equity market and 
the following prespecified set of global macroeconomic factors: a) exchange rates, b) 
global inflation, c) changes in oil prices, d) growth in industrial production, and e) laid 
up tonnage, a factor specific to the shipping industry. Equation (1) expresses this 
mathematically: 
Ri - Rr= f( WdRET, UdGIOFX, UTLP, UdOIL, UdG7IP, LAYUP) (1) 
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where Ri is the return of company i, Rr is the risk-free interest rate, WdRET is the 
excess return on the world equity market, UdG 1 OFX is unexpected changes in global 
exchange rates against the dollar, UTLP is unexpected global inflation, UdOIL is 
unexpected changes in oil prices, UdG7IP is unexpected changes in global monthly 
industrial production, and LAYUP is unexpected changes in laid up tonnage. 
The empirical version of equation (1) can include a constant, which is expected to be 
zero if there is no mispricing of stocks. When the intercept is positive, stocks are 
underpriced and vice versa. 
The excess return on the world equity market, WdRET, is the monthly logarithmic 
return of the Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) World Equity Index in 
excess of the risk free rate, and is taken as a proxy for the 'world market' portfolio. 
The MSCI price indices are value-weighted and aim for 60% coverage of the total 
market capitalisation. The chosen list of stocks is formed from the share prices 1 of 
approximately 1600 securities in 22 countries and includes a representative sample of 
large, medium, and small capitalisation companies from each local market, taking into 
account the stocks' liquidity. Furthermore, stocks with restricted float or cross-
ownership are avoided. The variable has been used in empirical studies in the past. 
Harvey (1991) finds that the MSCI World Equity Index has considerable explanatory 
power in the set of 22 MSCI country returns. 
Several empirical studies investigate and establish a relationship between foreign 
exchange risk, dG 1 OFX, and equity returns, in a number of cases. The findings of 
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Dumas and Solnik (1995), for instance, justify the existence of time-varying foreign 
exchange risk premia in the international financial markets. Ziobrowski and 
Ziobrowski (1995) reach similar conclusions in an international context. Hamao 
(1988) finds that unanticipated changes in foreign exchange do not explain the returns 
from a cross-section of stocks listed in the Tokyo Stock Exchange. In contrast, Ferson 
and Harvey (1994), using a similar aggregate measure of exchange risk as in this 
paper, found a significant average risk premium across 18 national equity markets. 
The shipping markets are heavily oriented towards international trade and, therefore, 
foreign exchange rate volatility may have a substantial effect on shipping equities. 
Foreign exchange risk has been a concern for the shipping industry since the 
breakdown of the Bretton Woods agreement in the early 1970s. McConville (1999) 
identifies a direct and an indirect effect of exchange rates on shipping. On one hand, 
since freight rates are quoted in dollars, an appreciation of the dollar relative to other 
currencies will probably increase effective freight rates. A dollar depreciation, 
conversely, will effectively decrease freight rates. On the other hand, from a 
macroeconomic viewpoint, a move in exchange rates may affect the shipping industry 
indirectly, by increasing or decreasing the level of international trade, thus, making 
exports of the major trading countries cheaper (or more expensive) and, consequently, 
increasing (reducing) the demand for shipping. 
Leggate (1999), in an attempt to quantify the impact of foreign exchange rate 
movements on the operating results of the shipping industry, asserts that the 
importance of this issue stems from the fact that a volatile foreign exchange market 
1 Share prices included in the indices are adjusted for any rights issues, stock dividends and/or splits. 
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exists in an industry where revenue is fixed in US dollars. Her findings suggest that 
exposure to such risks can have a positive or a negative effect on expenditure 
denominated in non US dollars, depending on the direction of movement in the 
exchange rate. Consequently, operating profits can rise or fall sharply, simply because 
of such movements. 
Unexpected global inflation, UTLP, is another potential worldwide source of risk2• It 
is particularly important for the shipping industry, because of the repercussions it has 
on international trade and, consequently, on the world economy and the profitability 
of shipping companies. These repercussions may be beneficial in the real world, 
depending upon the net impact of differential inflation rates. However, in this paper 
the analysis focuses solely upon a global aggregate measure of inflation. Ferson and 
Harvey (1994) include such an inflation variable in their study following the intuition 
that inflation may be priced if it has real effects. For example, higher inflation may 
signal higher levels of economic uncertainty, which makes consumers worse off. 
Kavussanos, Marcoulis, and Arkoulis (2001) also include a similar aggregate global 
inflation measure in studying the effects of a set of global macroeconomic factors on 
international industry stock returns. 
Several studies include oil prices, as an important systematic factor, that is believed to 
influence stock returns. Findings have, however, been contradictory. Chen and Jordan 
(1993), for example, find that oil prices are negatively related to stock returns in the 
US, while Chen, Roll and Ross (1986) find a marginally significant positive 
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relationship. Hamao (1988), on the other hand, examines oil price risk in Japan, but 
does not establish a significant relationship. 
World oil production has grown from 66.9 million barrels per day in 1990 to 75.3 
million barrels per day in 1998 (International Energy Agency, Monthly Oil Market 
Reports). The oil tanker fleet on January lSI 1989, had 5,689 ships, totalling 244.8 
million deadweight tons, accounting for 39.8% of the total world merchant fleet. By 
the beginning of 1999, the oil tanker fleet had grown to over 7,000 ships, totalling 
289.6 million deadweight tons, and representing 38.5% of the total world merchant 
fleet tonnage (Shipping Statistics and Market Review, March 1999). The oil trade and 
oil prices, therefore, are particularly important in the shipping industry, mainly 
because of their unique influence on world economic growth and, hence, on the 
supply and demand for seaborne trade. The impact of oil prices on world economic 
activity has been well illustrated by both oil crises in 1973 and 1979. Oil prices rose 
significantly and as a consequence freight rates fell sharply, due to overcapacity -
firstly in the tanker sector and then in the dry bulk sector - and reduced demand for oil 
imports, due to inflationary pressures and poor economic conditions. 
In addition, fuel is the single most important item of voyage costs, representing 47% 
of the totat3. Therefore, a rise in oil prices would increase costs and thus restrict the 
profitability of a shipping company. The above suggest a negative relationship 
between oil prices and shipping stock returns. 
2 Unexpected changes in real interest rates, is also a potential variable to be included in this study. 
However, as Chen and Jordan (1993) point out, because of the Fisher effect this variable is perfectly 
negatively correlated with the unexpected inflation rate, and was therefore not considered. 
3 Stopford (1997) quotes this figure based on an analysis of a ten year old Capesize bulk carrier under a 
Liberian flag at 1993 prices. 
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There has been some empirical evidence on the effect of changes in the level of 
industrial production on average stock prices. Chen, Roll and Ross (1986) and 
Kavussanos and Marcoulis (2000), study the effect of US industrial production in the 
US market, while Hamao (1988), examines the same relationship using Japanese data. 
Results regarding this variable, however, have not been conclusive. Poon and Taylor 
(1991) study the effects of unexpected changes in industrial production in the UK 
equity market and find a negative effect on UK equities. Chen and Jordan (1993) find 
no association between the variable and stock returns, while Hamao (1988) detects a 
positive association between the variable and Japanese equities. 
Financial theory regarding this variable suggests a positive association with stock 
returns, on the grounds that higher industrial production implies improving economic 
conditions and, therefore, higher stock returns (Chen, Roll and Ross, 1986). Isserlis 
(1938) notes that fluctuations in freight rates and cycles in the world economy exhibit 
similar patterns. Furthermore, by examining the relationship between the growth rate 
in OECD industrial production and the growth rate in seaborne trade, Stopford (1997) 
reaches the conclusion that cycles in the OECD economy invariably mirror cycles in 
sea trade during the period 1963-1995. Since industrial production is the major 
parameter affecting the demand for sea transport through world trade, the relationship 
between global industrial production and international shipping stock returns is also 
expected to be positive. 
The final factor included in the analysis, laid up tonnage, is specific to the shipping 
industry and is closely linked to the equilibrium of supply and demand for seaborne 
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trade and hence with the detennination of freight rates. According to McConville 
(1999), laid up tonnage is "." the barometer giving a clear indication of the economic 
and commercial condition of the industry". In periods of recession, vessels are laid up 
because no remunerative employment can be found and market conditions make it 
uneconomic to trade. Conversely, in periods of prosperity, there is little or no laid up 
tonnage and freight rates are sustained at high levels. Zannetos (1966) has shown that, 
the greater the capacity of laid up (tanker) vessels, the lower freight rates will be. The 
variable, therefore, is expected to be negatively related to shipping stock returns. 
Several authors (e.g. Wasserfallen, 1989; Poon and Taylor, 1991) have suggested that 
the relationship between returns and the macroeconomy may not be contemporaneous. 
On one hand, if markets are efficient, the reaction of the international stock market 
may lead the perfonnance of the economy. On the other hand, any macroeconomic 
impact could be slow and affect returns in the long run. These dynamics are 
incorporated in the model, and 1 monthly lead, 1 monthly lag and the 
contemporaneous values of each risk factor are included as additional regressors in the 
specification of equation (1). 
A widely applied methodology to estimate the parameters of equation (1) has been that 
ofFama and MacBeth (1973). This methodology involves estimating equation (1) across 
companies for every month in the sample period and saving the resulting time-series of 
the coefficient estimates (the betas). Returns are then regressed on the estimated betas 
and standard t-tests are perfonned to examine whether the effect of the explanatory 
variables is, on average, significant. 
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Although the Fama - MacBeth (1973) methodology has been used in studies similar to 
ours (e.g. Chen, Roll and Ross, 1986; Poon and Taylor, 1991), estimating our model as a 
system of equations is a more appealing approach. For instance, when the error terms are 
correlated across individual equations (companies), the Seemingly Unrelated Regression 
(SUR) methodology is applicable. The SUR methodology, adjusts for the cross-equation 
correlation and leads to estimates which are more efficient than OLS (Brown, Kleidon, 
and Marsh, 1983; Jaffe, Keirn, and Westerfield, 1989). Moreover, estimating our 
model as a system of equations is more advantageous, since common parameters can be 
imposed over the regressors (the macroeconomic factors) and, thus, assume the role of 
averages. 
However, in the case where the explanatory variables are identical across equations, 
estimation of the system by SUR methods produces estimates equivalent to Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS), and there is no gain in efficiency (see Theil, 1971 for a formal 
proof). However, if there are cross equation constraints on the parameters, such as when 
imposing common coefficients on the macroeconomic factors, Multivariate Least 
Square (MLSQ) methods are used to estimate the equations as a system as 10 
Kavussanos and Marcoulis (2000). 
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3.3 Data 
Our sample consists of 36 shipping companies that are listed in 10 stock exchanges 
worldwide and whose shares have been actively traded in the period December 1989 to 
March 1998. The focus of the study is on companies whose prime business is in the 
operation of vessels (i.e. shipyards are excluded); hence, all such shipping companies 
that are listed in these stock exchanges, over the period of examination, are included 
in the sample. 
Monthly data on stock prices (Pit) adjusted for stock splits and stock dividends, and 
dividend yields (DYit) for the stocks of these companies are obtained from DataStream 
International Service. These are used to calculate holding period returns, measured in 
US dollars4, for each company i, as: Rit=ln(PitlPit-J)+DYit. Company excess returns are 
obtained by subtracting the one month US treasury bill rate. 
Summary statistics and first order augmented unit root tests for the monthly excess 
returns of the companies are presented in Table 1. Companies in the table are classified 
according to the country in which they are listed. The average monthly excess return for 
28 out of the 36 shipping companies is negative, while their industry average is -0.63%. 
This return is lower than the corresponding excess return on the MSCI World Equity 
Index, which is marginally positive and stands at 0.22%. Total average risk in the 
industry, as measured by the average standard deviation of monthly excess returns, is 
11.82%, much higher than the standard deviation of the MSCI Index, which is 3.82%. 
4 All non-US dollar currencies were converted into US dollars at the end of the month exchange rates, 
defined as US dollars per unit of local currency. 
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Coefficients of skewness are on average negative, whereas coefficients of kurtosis are, 
on average, positive. None, however, is significantly different than zero.5 Finally, first 
order augmented unit root tests confinn that all shipping company monthly excess return 
series are stationary. Consequently, they can be used to make inferences in models such 
as equation (1), and produce meaningful results (Engle and Granger, 1987). 
The explanatory variables entering equation (1) are defined as follows: WdRET is the 
US dollar monthly logarithmic excess return on the MSCI World Equity Index, where 
the I-month US Treasury Bill rate is used as the risk-free rate. That is: 
W dRETt=ln(PItlPlt-I)-USTBt where PIt is the world equity index value (including 
dividends) in US dollars. dGIOFX is the monthly unanticipated global exchange rate 
against the US dollar in 10 industrialised countries (G-l 0). It is derived by calculating 
the log first difference in the trade-weighted US dollar price of the currencies of the 
10 industrialised countries6,7. TLP is the real GDP weighted inflation rate in the G-7 
countries. Country inflation rates are derived as logarithmic first differences of 
consumer price indices. LA YUP is the logarithmic first difference in laid up tonnage 
for tankers and dry cargo vessels in deadweight tons, for vessels of 300 grtIgt and 
over. dOlL represents the percentage change in oil prices, the latter measured as the 
current month US dollar price per barrel of Brent Oil (FOB). dG7IP is the weighted 
average of monthly industrial production growth rates in the G-7 countries, with real 
GDP as weights. All data series required for the construction of the global macro 
S Coefficients of skewness and kurtosis are distributed asymptotically as .JT. SK == N(0,6) and 
.fi. KU == N(O,24), where T=100 in this case. 
6 The 10 industrialised countries are the G-7 countries (excluding the United States), plus the 
Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden, and Switzerland. The G-7 countries are: Canada, France, Gennany, 
Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 
7 The trade weights are each country's US dollar denominated FOB imports, expressed as a percentage 
of total imports in the G-I0 countries. 
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variables are collected from DataStream International, with the exception of LAYUP. 
This series is obtained from the Shipping Statistics Yearbooks 1989-1997, published 
by the Institute of Shipping Economics and Logistics (Institut fur 
Seeverkehsrwirtschaft und Logistik) in Bremen, Germany. 
Univariate ARMA models for each macroeconomic variable are used to filter out the 
expected component of the series. The unexpected components are then used as 
explanatory variables in estimating equation (1), as suggested by Wasserfallen (1989), 
and Poon and Taylor (1991). We filter the series ofthe variables so that the creation of 
spurious relationships and possible errors in variables problems are avoided (Poon and 
Taylor, 1991). Table 2, shows the autocorrelations of the series (up to 12 lags) and the 
Box - Pierce Q-statistic (at lag 20). It can be seen that only WdRET and LAYUP are 
noisy enough to be treated as innovations, whereas all the remaining four series are 
serially correlated. 
Based on the investigation of the autocorrelations ofTLP, dOlL, dGI0FX, and dG7IP, 
and on the Akaike (1973) and Schwartz (1978) information criteria, the best ARMA 
model is chosen and the residuals from the fitted process are used to proxy the 
unanticipated components of these series. Parameters of the chosen ARMA models 
and their standard errors are shown in Table 3. The new variables created are UTLP, 
UdOIL, UdGI0FX, and UdG7IP. Autocorrelations and Q-statistics associated with 
these variables confirm that these series are white noise. 
Having derived innovations in the set of macroeconomic variables, we test for their 
effects on shipping stock returns. In Table 4, the contemporaneous correlation matrix 
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of the global risk factors is presented. The only significant correlation is that between 
UdOIL and UTLP (+0.5282). The values of these correlation coefficients do not 
suggest that multicollinearity is present in the estimated model. 
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3.4 Empirical Tests and Results 
The relationships of the innovations in macroeconomic factors on shipping industry 
stock returns are examined by employing MLSQ to estimate equation (1), including 
contemporaneous, lead and lag values of each of the explanatory variables. Dynamics 
are incorporated in the model, as Poon and Taylor (1991) and Wasserfallen (1989) 
argue that lead and lag values of each macroeconomic variable have a role to play, since 
the former reflect the slow impact of macroeconomic shocks while the latter reflect 
expectations. 
The general - to - specific modelling procedure is adopted in the estimation, in order 
to select the 'best' model. Past empirical tests on macroeconomic factors and stock 
prices have been conducted by presenting models with each of the factors entering the 
model alone or in combination with other macro factors (e.g. Chen, Roll and Ross, 
1986; Wasserfallen, 1989). This approach has been criticised on the grounds of 
presenting results which are subject to omitted variables bias (Spanos, 1986). Therefore, 
in this paper, we first estimate the most general model for the period January 1990 -
February 1998, with all the variables included and end up with a model that includes 
only the set of significant factors. This approach remedies the possible omitted 
variables problem that may occur otherwise. 
Results from the above estimation procedure are reported in Table 5. Panel A of the 
table shows the significant lead, lag and contemporaneous values of the coefficients of 
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the factors, whereas Panel B shows the derived long run coefficients8 and their 
significance. Panel C presents the long run coefficients of a model that includes only 
WdRET as an explanatory variable. 
The constant in both the one factor and the multi factor specification is negative (-
0.0068 and -0.0077 respectively) and statistically significant, suggesting that shipping 
companies have, on average, been overpriced during the period analysed. Moreover, 
under the one factor specification the intercept is higher (less negative), suggesting 
lower overpricing. This can possibly be explained by the fact that factors other than 
the market capture part of the mispricing. 
The long run world market beta is positive and statistically significant, standing at 
0.8113 for the single factor specification and at 0.7941 for the multi factor 
specification. The difference suggests that the inclusion of macroeconomic factors in 
the estimation procedure remedies the omitted variables problem that may be present 
under the one factor specification. 
Changes in oil prices, UdOIL, and laid up tonnage, LAYUP, are negatively related to 
shipping stock returns. Both results are in line with our expectations, as discussed 
earlier. 
The coefficient of the exchange rate variable, UdG 1 OFX, is found to be positive. In 
other words, a dollar depreciation implies higher returns, since exchange rates are 
8 The long run coefficient of each variable can be interpreted as the long run impact of that factor, on 
the returns of international shipping stocks. 
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measured in US dollars per national currency units. A possible explanation for this 
finding is that fluctuations in exchange rates against the dollar have implications on 
profitability and, as discussed earlier, can affect the shipping market indirectly. This 
may happen when movements in exchange rates occur in such a way as to make 
exports of major trading nations more competitive, thus altering the level of 
international trade and the demand for shipping services. 
Global unexpected industrial production, UdG7IP, and unexpected global inflation, 
UTLP, have not been found to have an effect on international shipping stock returns. 
This result was to a certain degree surprising, given the close association between 
seaborne trade - hence the world economy - and the two variables. A possible 
interpretation is that the influence these two factors may have on shipping stock 
returns is already captured by the remaining macroeconomic factors. 
In Table 6, we show the results of estimating equation (l) for the returns of shipping 
companies in six different countries, according to our sarnple9. In general, the global 
factors exhibit a consistent pattern in the way in which they affect shipping stocks 
internationally, and the significant relationships established so far hold for companies 
in most of the countries under analysis. 
Oil prices, UdalL, and laid up tonnage, LAYUP, are negatively related to the returns 
of shipping companies for four countries under analysis, whereas the exchange rate 
variable, UdG 1 OFX, exhibits a positive relationship with shipping stock returns for 
three countries. A possible explanation for the insignificance of this variable in the US 
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and Hong Kong is that the unit of account in the fonner country is the US dollar, 
while the currency of Hong Kong is pegged to the US dollar. This may also apply to 
the case of India, where, since 1995, revenue and almost all costs for Indian 
companies are made in US dollars. Prior to that, freight revenue in local currency was 
guaranteed in dollar tenns. Regarding unexpected changes in inflation, UTLP, no 
significant relationship is established. This is not the case, however, for the measure 
of global industrial production, UdG7IP, where it is found to be negatively related to 
stock returns in the case of Hong Kong. This finding contradicts empirical evidence in 
the sense that higher industrial production implies improving economic conditions 
and, thus, higher stock returns. 
An interesting observation can be made with respect to the world market betas. Their 
magnitUde differs across countries and in the case of India, a negative world market 
beta is observed. The lowest positive world beta is that of the US, whereas the highest 
is that of Norway. 
9 Equation (1) has not been estimated for countries where only one company is included in the sample. 
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3.5 Conclusions 
This is the first study to examine the long run impact of several sources of global risk 
on international shipping stock returns. For this purpose, a multi factor model is 
employed, with the return on the MSCI World Equity Index taken as a proxy for the 
world market. The analysis incorporates innovations in the following pre-specified set 
of macroeconomic factors: a) exchange rates, b) global inflation, c) changes in oil 
prices, d) industrial production growth, and e) laid up tonnage, a factor specific to the 
shipping industry. Recent literature suggests that the relationship between 
macroeconomic impacts and stock returns may not be contemporaneous. Dynamics in 
the model are incorporated by including 1 monthly lead, 1 monthly lag and the 
contemporaneous values of each risk factor as additional regressors. The long run 
impact of a particular variable is then calculated. 
Results suggest that there are factors other than the world market that influence 
returns of stocks in the shipping industry, suggesting that use of the multi factor model 
is more appealing than the traditional single factor specification. 
Several significant relationships are established between returns of international 
shipping stocks and the global risk factors considered. Oil prices and laid up tonnage 
are found to be negatively related to shipping stock returns, whereas the exchange rate 
variable exhibits a positive relationship. No significant relationships were detected, 
regarding the global measures of inflation and industrial production. 
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Moreover, the global factors were examined in relation to the stock returns of 
shipping companies in six different countries. Generally, results demonstrate that the 
macroeconomic factors exhibit a consistent pattern in the way in which they are 
related to the shipping industry. 
To conclude, findings in this paper have been encouragmg. For the first time, a 
prespecified set of global macroeconomic risk variables are used and tested for their 
impacts on stock returns of the shipping industry. More importantly, several 
significant relationships, have emerged which, in turn, have several implications for 
the potential investor in shipping equities, who can increase his diversification 
capacity or even speculate by timing his investment. 
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics and First Order AUl:;mented Unit Root Tests 
Mean Standard Skewness Excess ADF(I) 
Deviation Kurtosis 
USA 
BT SHIPPING -0.0135 0.1363 0.0528 0.6507 -6.8479 
GLOBAL OCEAN CARRIERS -0.0145 0.1408 0.3568 0.5988 -6.6938 
INTERNATIONAL SHIPHOLDING -0.0031 0.0612 0.3596 0.2284 -7.9362 
MC SHIPPING -0.0105 0.1407 0.0203 3.7780 -8.3872 
OMI CORPORATION -0.0043 0.1016 -0.3912 0.1375 -6.5640 
OVERSEAS SHIPHOLDING GROUP -0.0026 0.0814 -0.2281 -0.0960 -6.4527 
STOLT NIELSEN 0.0009 0.0959 0.0693 0.5219 -6.8417 
ANANGEL AMERICAN -0.0049 0.0721 -0.1182 0.4641 -6.0106 
B&H OCEAN CARRIERS -0.0052 0.1569 0.1328 1.0008 -8.1632 
NORWAY 
LEIFHOEGH -0.0012 0.0866 -0.5686 0.2976 -7.4665 
AWILCO 0.0013 0.1385 -0.0611 0.3824 -5.5664 
BERGESEN -0.0061 0.0947 -0.9499 1.8618 -6.1504 
BONHEUR 0.0016 0.1146 -0.2618 0.2230 -6.3118 
FARSTAD SHIPPING 0.0080 0.1160 0.5791 2.5736 -6.2791 
GANGER ROLF 0.0017 0.1113 -0.2745 0.2258 -6.1553 
STORLI -0.0031 0.1021 -0.6306 1.2879 -6.8604 
WILHS. WILHELMSEN 0.0022 0.1083 -0.5569 1.3921 -7.1511 
NCLHOLDING -0.0184 0.2132 0.1364 1.6128 -7.1627 
SWEDEN 
ARGONAUT -0.0173 0.1342 -0.4844 0.3188 -6.8339 
CONCORDIA MARITIME -0.0069 0.1255 -0.1894 1.5615 -7.5960 
STENALINE -0.0122 0.1220 0.1735 2.1681 -5.2462 
NORDSTROM & THULIN -0.0072 0.1049 -0.3370 0.1059 -5.8394 
FINLAND 
BIRKA LINE -0.0034 0.0975 0.4412 1.3736 -5.4312 
DENMARK 
J.LAURITZEN HOLDINGS -0.0128 0.1171 -0.3736 -0.0892 -7.2588 
UK 
JAMES FISHER 0.0010 0.1127 0.3450 6.8821 -7.1408 
LONDON & OVERSEAS -0.0077 0.1184 1. 7881 8.0438 -5.7407 
FREIGHTERS 
JACOBS HOLDINGS 0.0029 0.1074 0.2762 2.6288 -6.7422 
SEACON HOLDINGS -0.0022 0.0913 -0.0430 1.5324 -8.4142 
HONG KONG 
WAH KWONG -0.0150 0.0954 0.2718 2.3944 -6.0869 
IMC HOLDINGS -0.0128 0.1201 -0.2412 2.3458 -8.4954 
ORIENT OVERSEAS -0.0048 0.1348 0.2883 4.0474 -7.1294 
SINGAPORE 
NEPTUNE ORIENT LINES -0.0089 0.1062 0.8097 12.3143 -7.4822 
JAPAN 
MITSUI OSK LINES -0.0189 0.1117 0.2855 -0.2079 -7.6291 
INDIA 
GREAT EASTERN SHIPPING -0.0014 0.1549 0.5721 1.1160 -7.1659 
ESSAR SHIPPING -0.0167 0.1754 0.5253 2.0424 -6.3466 
V ARUN SHIPPING -0.0115 0.1535 0.5467 3.5351 -7.2964 
Industry Average: -0.0063 0.1182 0.0645 1.9237 
MSCI World Egui!l Index 0.0022 0.0382 -0.4615 0.7412 -7.4414 
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Table 3.2: Autocorrelations of the Monthly Macroeconomic Series. 
Autocorre1ations 
Series Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6 Lag 7 Lag 8 Lag 9 Lag 10 Lag 11 Lag 12 Q-statistic 
{lag 20} 
WdRET -0.0740 -0.0274 -0.0610 -0.1480 0.0918 -0.0801 0.1710 0.0570 0.1060 0.0126 -0.1140 0.0102 22.80 
LAYUP -0.0413 0.0614 0.0719 -0.0689 0.0849 -0.0355 -0.0381 0.1990 -0.0631 0.0175 -0.1400 -0.0397 17.70 
TLP 0.2990'" -0.0382 -0.1030 0.0415 0.2680'" 0.2770'" 0.2650'" 0.0477 -0.0856 -0.1120 0.1240 0.4390'" 79.10* 
DOlL 0.2310'" 0.0394 -0.0836 -0.2850* -0.3060'" -0.1120 -0.1660 0.0665 0.1530 0.1230 0.1090 0.0666 46.40* 
dG10FX -0.0837 -0.2280* -0.0529 0.0546 -0.1250 0.1150 -0.2070* 0.1760 -0.0113 -0.1980 -0.0098 0.4400* 60.50* 
dG7IP -0.2280* -0.0425 0.2810* -0.0391 0.1090 0.1490 -0.2200* 0.1540 0.1640 -0.1910 0.1160 0.2200* 72.30* 
UTLP 0.1810 0.0133 -0.1340 -0.0568 -0.0625 0.0582 0.1460 0.0345 0.0048 -0.0306 0.0391 -0.1420 13.80 
UdOIL 0.1440 -0.0439 -0.0857 0.0137 0.0175 0.0098 -0.0029 -0.0045 -0.0172 -0.0586 -0.0925 -0.0351 9.81 
UdG10FX 0.0285 -0.0991 0.0051 -0.1130 -0.0571 0.0050 -0.0731 0.1580 0.0440 -0.1290 -0.0712 -0.1030 19.70 
UdG7lP 0.0047 -0.0364 -0.0381 0.0308 0.0154 -0.0024 0.0408 -0.0586 0.0144 0.0337 0.0741 0.0673 7.73 
Notes: 
1. Table displays partial autocorre1ations for 12 lags and the Box - Pierce Q-statistic for 20 lags. 
2. WdRET is the return on the M.S.C.I. World Equity Index, TLP is the G-7 inflation rate, LAYUP is laid up tonnage for tanker and dry bulk vessels in deadweight tons, dOlL 
represents changes in the u.s. dollar price per barrel of Brent Oil, dG 1 OFX is the G-l 0 aggregate exchange rate against the U.s. dollar, and dG7IP is monthly industrial production in 
the G-7 countries. UTLP, LAYUP, Udall, UdGIOFX, and UdG7IP are the unexpected components ofTLP, LAYUP, dOlL, dGIOFX, and dG7IP, respectively. 
3. '*', and ,**, indicate significance at the 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
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Table 3.3: 'Best' ARMA models. 
G-7 Inflation Rate (TLP) Changes in Brent Oil Price G-IO Aggregate Exchange Rate G-7 Monthly Industrial 
(dOlL) against the US Dollar (dG 1 OFX) Production (dG7IP) 
Constant 0.0005* Constant 0.0028 Constant 0.0009 Constant 0.0010 
TLP(-5) 0.1612* DOIL(-4) -0.2535* DGI0FX(-7) -0.1470* DG7IP(-I) -0.2687** 
TLP(-12) 0.5023** DOIL(-5) -0.2650** DGI0FX(-12) 0.4269** DG7IP(-3) 0.2985** 
DOIL(-7) -0.2041* DG7IP(-4) 0.2066* 
DG7IP(-5) 0.1815* 
DG7IP(-7) -0.2381** 
DG7IP(-12) 0.2190* 
AlC: -9.8652 AIC: -2.0156 AIC: -3.8565 AlC: -7.2724 
SBIC: -12.6255 SBIC: -4.7493 SBIC: -6.6162 SBIC: -9.9280 
Notes: 
1. TLP is the G-7 inflation rate, dOlL represents changes in the U.S. dollar price per barrel of Brent Oil, dGIOFX is the G-IO aggregate exchange rate against the U.s. dollar, and 
dG7IP is monthly industrial production in the G-7 countries. 
2. AlC: Akaike Information Criterion 
3. SBIC: Schwarz Bayes Information Criterion 
4. **, and * imply significance at the 1 % and 5% levels respectively 
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Table 3.4: Correlation Matrix of the World Risk Factors. 
Variable WdRET 
WdRET 1.0000 
UTLP -0.1625 
UdOIL -0.0966 
UdGlOFX -0.0597 
UdG7IP -0.1877 
LAYUP 0.0726 
Notes: 
UTLP 
1.0000 
0.5282* 
0.1098 
0.0902 
-0.0693 
UdOIL UdG lOFX UdG7IP LAYUP 
1.0000 
-0.0492 
0.0901 
-0.0456 
1.0000 
-0.1425 
-0.0152 
1.0000 
0.0312 1.0000 
1. WdRET is the return on the M.S.C.I. World Equity Index, TLP is the G-7 inflation rate, LAYUP laid up tonnage for tanker and dry bulk vessels in deadweight tons, dOlL 
represents changes in the U.S. dollar price per barrel of Brent Oil, dGlOFX is the G-IO aggregate exchange rate against the U.S. dollar, and dG7IP is monthly industrial production in 
the G-7 countries. UTLP, LAYUP, UdOIL, UdGI0FX, and UdG71P are the unexpected components ofTLP, LAYUP, dOlL, dGlOFX, and dG7IP, respectively. 
2. ,**, indicates significance at the 5% level. 
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Table 3.5: Regressions of~ - Rr= f( WdRET, UdGI0FX, UTLP, UdOIL, UdG7IP, LAYUP) for the returns of38 shipping companies, 
for the period January 1990 - February 1998. 
PANEL A: Multi Factor Estimates (Significant Lagged, Lead, and Current coefficient values) 
VARIABLE: Constant WdRET UTLP UdOIL UdGI0FX UdG7IP LAYUP 
Lagged Values (-I) 0.2958*** -0.0597** -0.0986*** 
Current Values -0.0077*** 0.4983*** 0.3882*** -0.1033*** 
Lead Values (+1) -0.0491** -0.0692** 
PANELB: Multi Factor Estimates (Significant Long Run coefficients) 
VARIABLE: Constant WdRET UTLP UdOIL UdGIOFX UdG7IP LAYUP 
Long Run Values: -0.0077*** 0.7941*** -0.1088*** 0.3882*** -0.2711*** 
PANEL C: Single Factor Estimates (Significant Long Run coefficients) 
VARIABLE: Constant WdRET 
Long Run Values: -0.0068** 0.8113*** 
Notes: 
1. WdRET is the return on the M.S.C.1. World Equity Index, TLP is the G-7 inflation rate, LAYUP laid up tonnage for tanker and dry bulk vessels in deadweight tons, dOlL 
represents changes in the U.S. dollar price per barrel of Brent Oil, dG 1 OFX is the G-IO aggregate exchange rate against the U.S. dollar, and dG7IP is monthly industrial production in 
the G-7 countries. UTLP, LAYUP, UdOIL, UdGlOFX, and UdG7IP are the unexpected components ofTLP, LAYUP, dOlL, dGIOFX, and dG7IP, respectively. 
2. '**', and .***, indicate significance at the 1 % and 5% levels, respectively. 
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Table 3.6: Reeressions of R. - Rr = f (WdRET, UdGIOFX, UTLP, UdOIL, UdG7IP, LAYUP) for each country, for the period January 
1990 - February 1998. 
Variable: Constant WdRET UTLP UdOIL UdGIOFX UdG7IP LAYUP Number of 
Companies 
USA -0.0048 0.6519*** -0.2008*** 9 
Norway -0.0017 1.1111*** 0.4089** -0.5485*** 9 
Sweden -0.0109 0.8045*** -0.1983** 1.1022*** -0.5199*** 4 
UK -0.0020 0.8372*** 0.9184*** -0.2748*** 4 
Hong Kong -0.0144 0.8177*** -0.1923** -2.9710** -0.2497*** 3 
India -0.0051 -0.6634** -0.2983** 3 
Note: WdRET is the return on the M.S.C.1. World Equity Index, TLP is the G-7 inflation rate, LAYUP laid up tonnage for tanker and dry bulk vessels in deadweight tons, dOlL 
represents changes in the U.S. dollar price per barrel of Brent Oil, dGIOFX is the G-IO aggregate exchange rate against the U.S. dollar, and dG7IP is monthly industrial production in 
the G-7 countries. UTLP, LAYUP, UdOlL, UdGlOFX, and UdG7IP are the unexpected components ofTLP, LAYUP, dOlL, dGIOFX, and dGlIP, respectively. 
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Chapter 4: Determinants of Spreads on New High Yield 
Bonds in the Shipping Industry 
Costas Th. Grammenos and Angelos G. Arkoulis* 
ABSTRACT 
This paper examines for the first time the primary pricing of high yield bond offerings 
in the shipping industry. This is performed by testing for the relationships between the 
new issue spread of 30 high yield bond offerings issued by shipping companies in the 
US market, during the period 1993-1998 and the following factors,' rating, callability, 
term, float, default rate, security status, 144a status, gearing, laid up tonnage and fleet 
age. We find that credit rating is the major pricing determinant, however, company 
financial leverage and shipping market conditions are two important factors that 
should be taken into account by the interested parties, in addition to credit rating, 
when pricing shipping high yield bond issues. Our findings are of particular interest to 
shipping companies who view this type of shipping finance as a means of increasing 
financial flexibility and as a stepping stone to the equity markets; to rating agencies 
that can assess more accurately the credit risk of shipping companies; to investors 
who can improve their investment selection process by considering additional factors 
that are related to bond pricing; and to financial underwriters who can price shipping 
high yield bonds more precisely. 
Keywords: High yield bonds; shipping companies; rating; gearing; laid up tonnage . 
• This paper has been accepted for publication in Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and 
Transportation Review. The authors would like to thank Professor Mario Levis of City University 
Business School for his useful remarks and suggestions. 
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4.1 Introduction 
Credit risk models have attracted attention in recent years, because a significant shift 
has occurred in debt and loan markets. This shift involves the creation of major new 
markets in credit derivatives and the unprecedented growth in the pre-existing markets 
for loan sales and securitisations. Moreover, for the first time bank treasurers have 
been able to manage their credit risks actively. These models also facilitate the pricing 
of portfolios of exposures included in securitisations. 
Another factor that contributed to the increasing interest in credit risk models is the 
fact that they can be used as a basis for banks' calculations of regulatory capital. This 
stems from the greater marketability of credit exposures and the growing focus of 
banks on the assessment of economic risk that has led to strains in the existing 
regulatory framework instituted by the 1988 Basel Accord (Jackson and Perraudin, 
2000). 
Anderson and Sundaresan (2000) compare a variety of firm value based models of 
contingent claims. They find that models fit reasonably well, indicating that variations 
in leverage and asset volatility account for much of the time series variations of 
observed corporate yields. 
Crouhy, Galai, and Mark (2000) provide a survey of current credit risk models. These 
can be broadly classified into (i) mark-to-market models that estimate the distribution 
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of portfolio value at some future date allowing for credit quality declines, even if they 
are short of full default, and thereby generate measures of portfolio Value-at-Risk 
(VaR), and (ii) default-mode models that estimate the distribution of total defaults on 
exposures in the portfolio over a given horizon. 
Caouette, Altman, and Narayanan (1998) also provide a survey of credit risk models. 
They classify them into those based on accounting data and market values (e.g. 
Altman, 1968, 1993; Altman, Haldeman, and Narayanan, 1977), stock price (KMV 
Corporation, 1995) and into consumer finance models and credit models for small 
business, real estate, and financial institutions. 
With respect to the public debt market for high yield bonds, credit analysis is 
examined by several high yield handbooks (e.g. Fridson, 1989; Fabozzi and Cheung, 
1990; Altman, 1990), however, no explicit link is made with valuation. The restricted 
liquidity in the secondary market makes trading in large sums difficult. As a 
consequence, high yield managers rely heavily on the new issue market. Given, 
therefore, that the performance of portfolio managers is sensitive to their valuation 
skills in the primary market, the limited empirical work on the pricing of high yield 
bonds is surprising. 
An exception is the study of Fridson and Garman (1998). The authors, in their attempt 
to establish objective valuation criteria, identify several observable factors and test for 
their impact on the new issue spread of bond offerings in the non investment grade 
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sector for the period 1995-96. Their analysis suggests that the pricing of newly issued 
high yield bonds is sensitive to quantifiable characteristics of the issue and the 
prevailing market conditions. Factors such as rating, term and secondary market 
spreads explain more than half of the variance in risk premiums. 
Although there is a limited number of studies that analyse shipping offerings in the 
equity capital markets (e.g. Grammenos and Marcoulis, 1996; Grammenos and 
Arkoulis, 1999), public debt finance for the shipping industry has not yet been 
researched. The objective in this paper is to fill this literature gap and present evidence 
for the first time on the primary pricing of shipping high yield bond issues. This is 
performed by identifying a set of factors, in line with Fridson and Garman (1998), and 
testing for any effects they may have on the new issue spread of 30 high yield bond 
offerings issued by shipping companies in the US market during the period 1993-
1998. 
The need for shipping funds, in conjunction with the structural changes in the shipping 
market - driven primarily by changes in the regulatory environment - induce shipping 
companies to seek different financing means. In addition, shipping companies will 
tend to become more efficient by forming alliances - such as pools - or to increase 
their size by mergers and acquisitions, following the recent trend in the oil, banking 
and other sectors. These developments imply an increasing need for capital and, thus, 
we believe that there will be renewed interest in raising shipping funds through the 
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high yield market in the future, despite a number of shipping high yield bond defaults 
witnessed since 1998. 
The shipping industry is of interest due to its distinctive characteristics. These are 
cyclicality and high volatility, and the potential effects gearing can have on shipping 
company operations, in an environment where large swings in freight rates and vessel 
values can occur in very short periods of time. 
The factors employed in the study are rating, callability, tenn (years to maturity), float 
(issue amount), default rate, security, 144a status, gearing, laid up tonnage and fleet 
age. The latter three factors are important for shipping companies. In addition, taking 
into account the increasing focus towards an industry oriented investor approach 
(Kavussanos, Marcoulis and Arkoulis, 2001), the issuer's industry category has a role 
to play in the primary market of high yield bonds (Fridson and Garman, 1998). 
The paper is organised into five sections. The next section describes the variables 
included in the study. In section 3 we discuss several characteristics of our sample. In 
section 4 regression results are presented, whereas section 5 summarises the findings 
and offers concluding remarks. 
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4.2 Data and Methodology 
The sample is comprised of 30 high yield debt offerings issued by shipping companies 
during the period January 1993 to December 1998 in the US market l . The analysis 
includes all high yield offerings by shipping companies2 in the period under 
examination, whose prime business is in the operation of vessels in the tanker, dry and 
In examining the pricing of high yield bonds in the shipping sector we filtered out the 
influence of fluctuations in the general level of spreads, as in Fridson and Garman 
(1998). The offering yield of each high yield bond issue in the sample is expressed as 
a spread over the same day yield on a Treasury security with the same maturity. 
We then sought to identify factors that cause variations in this new issue spread across 
the 30 issues in the sample. The majority of the factors4 included in the analysis have 
been tested in past studies - in similar or other context - and market practitioners 
believe them to have a material influence on pricing. These are rating, float, term, 
security, callability, 144a status, and the rate of default for high yield bonds. 
t The shipping high yield bond offerings in the sample are presented in the Appendix by date of issue. 
2 One offering with a spread over Treasury of 1381 basis points at issue and a maturity of four years was 
considered an outlier and, thus, was excluded from the sample. 
3 Some of the companies diversify their operations within these sectors. 
4 Fridson and Garman (1998) examine the effects of 19 variables on new issue spread. We do not employ 
the same total of independent variables, as this would make inference tests impossible. Moreover, some of 
the variables were not available to the authors. 
172 
Fridson and Gannan (1998) suggest that the issuer's industry category may affect 
pricing. Therefore, we tested three additional factors that we believe have a role to 
play in the pricing of non investment grade bonds in the shipping sector, namely laid 
up tonnage, company fleet age and pre issue gearing. 
Descriptions of the variables5 employed in the analysis and their sources are shown in 
Table 1. 
Rating 
Rating is regarded as the most important factor in the pricing of high yield bonds. 
Fridson and Garman (1998) find rating to have by far the highest correlation with new 
issue spreads, among all the variables employed in their analysis. 
Bonds in the high yield debt market are considered non investment grade and are rated 
Ba1 or below by Moody's and BB+ or lower by Standard & Poors'. Table 2 shows the 
rating scales of the two agencies. Agency ratings are credit risk measures and reflect 
an assessment of the bond issuer's creditworthiness. The primary focus of rating 
agencies is the predictability of future cash generation by the issuing company so that 
timely payments of interest and principal can be made. A rough guide of the 
company's capacity to repay debt obligations is provided by Moody's with the main 
5 We also employed a ranking procedure to test for the effects of float, term, fleet age and gearing on new 
issue spread. Rankings are based on the groupings of tables 5 and 6, respectively. Results are qualitatively 
similar and are available from the authors. With respect to the laid up tonnage variable both the one month 
and three month percentage change in laid up tonnage were tested. Only the former proved to have a 
significant effect on new issue spread. The natural logarithm of one plus the fleet age in years was also 
employed as an explanatory variable. No significant relationship is established. Again, results are available 
from the authors. 
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areas of focus being: industry trends, national political and regulatory environment, 
management quality, basic operating and competitive position, financial position and 
liquidity sources, company structure, parent company support agreements, and special 
event risk (Moody's Investors Service, 1999). 
This general list of credit factors varies considerably depending on which industry the 
issuer operates in. Accordingly, ratings assigned to shipping bond issues take into 
account factors that are related to the general conditions in the shipping markets, the 
ability of shipping companies to sustain future cash flow generation and their 
vulnerability to economic cycles (Moody's Investors Service, 1999; Jefferies & 
Company, Inc., 1998). 
In an industry of a highly cyclical nature such as shipping, there are great uncertainties 
regarding the direction of future freight rates - the main income source for shipping 
companies - and fleet value. A decline in charter rates affects earnings and, therefore, 
the company's ability to repay principal at maturity. Ratings in this context also reflect 
the chartering policy of the issuer. Operators with aggressive charters in the spot 
market can find themselves unable to even repay interest in the face of adverse 
changes in the shipping business environment. 
Additional factors incorporated in credit quality ratings of shipping companies are 
related to the companies' fleet (size, age, utilisation), financial leverage, market 
position in the segment of operations, management track record, the customer base, 
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regulatory innovations in the industry and other issue specific factors such as the 
secured or unsecured nature of the notes and the covenants included in the indenture. 
Rating is measured here with a ranking dummy variable in accordance with the 
Moody's rating scale, as in Fridson and Garman (1998), by assigning the value of 1 to 
issues with the highest credit quality (Bal) up to 7 for issues with the lowest credit 
quality (Caal). Lower rated issues are associated with higher default probabilities, 
therefore, we expect a positive relationship between this variable and new issue 
spreads of shipping high yield offerings. 
Callability 
Bonds in the high yield market often come with a call option (24/30 in our sample) 
that allows the issuer to retire the bonds at specified prices before maturity. Typically, 
a high yield bond with a 10 year maturity has a 5 year call protection. 
Kalotay (1997) argues that the choice the issuer of a callable bond has, is beneficial in 
the sense that the outstanding debt can be refinanced at a lower rate if interest rates are 
expected to decline. In addition, calling a bond is also valuable to the issuer in the face 
of an upgrade in the offering's rating quality, since in this case, a lower default risk 
premium is expected to be paid on new borrowings. 
On the other hand, Fridson and Garman (1998) suggest that the early retirement of a 
high yield bond is a cost to the investor who is forced to reinvest at a lower rate of 
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interest. On these grounds Fridson and Gannan (1998) expect and find that callable 
bonds have larger spreads than non callable bonds. Based on this rationale, we expect 
to find the same relationship, so that investors who hold callable bonds are 
compensated for taking this risk. 
Term 
Primary pricing may also be influenced by the maturity tenn of a bond. In line with 
Fridson and Garman (1998), we measure tenn as the number of years to final maturity. 
Kim, Ramaswamy, and Sundaresan (1993) attempt to identify a pattern for callable 
bonds between yield spread and tenn by dividing their sample into different groups of 
maturities. They find that spread is smallest for issues with short maturities, highest 
for those with intennediate maturities, and declining for bonds with the longest tenn. 
Fons (1994) finds that spread increases with maturity for investment grade bonds, but 
decreases with maturity for high yield bonds. Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) observe 
a positive association between spread and bonds with a maturity of 5 to 10 years that 
becomes negative for bonds with a longer tenn. 
Fridson and Gannan (1998) include this variable in their analysis of primary pricing of 
high yield bonds and expect their results to support those of Fons (1994). They find, 
however, that maturity is negatively related to spread. In light of these contradictory 
findings, we let any relationship that exists between new issue spreads of shipping 
bonds and tenn to be detennined empirically. 
176 
Float 
The principal amount of a bond outstanding at issue - also known as 'float' - is 
employed as a proxy for liquidity. Other measures derived from historical trading such 
as price volatility, trading volume and bid/asked spreads have been criticised in the 
past6 and are not applicable, since we examine new issue offerings. Moreover, float 
can be precisely measured at the time of issue. 
The importance of liquidity in pricing a high yield bond is documented in past studies 
(e.g. Cornell, 1992). Fisher (1959) argues that larger bond issues have lower risk 
premiums than smaller bond issues. He attributes this to the fact that the uncertainty 
evolving around the market price of a large issue is not as great as that of smaller ones, 
because small issues trade in a thinner market. 
Consistent with Fisher (1959), Fridson and Bersh (1996) detect a statistically 
significant negative relationship between newly issued high yield bonds in their 
sample and principal amount outstanding at issue, across different sizes. Fridson and 
Garman (1998) include the variable in their paper, but do not find any correlation 
between float and new issue spread. Based on Fisher's arguments we expect smaller 
issues to be associated with larger spreads in the case of shipping bonds. 
6 e.g. Fisher (1959) postulates that bid ask spreads and trading volume are not good marketability proxies, 
because of insufficient data in the over the counter market. 
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Default Rate 
The default rate variable is included in the analysis as a measure of credit risk in the 
high yield market as a whole. Surprisingly, past studies have not explicitly linked the 
variable to primary pricing7. Some have examined its contribution as a credit risk 
variable in evaluating the overall risk premium in the high yield market (e.g. Fridson 
and Johnson, 1996), whereas others include it to study the detenninants of aggregate 
default rates (Fridson, Gannan, and Wu, 1998; Halweke and Kleiman, 1996; Johnson, 
Fridson and Zhong, 1996). 
Fridson and Gannan (1998) expect a positive association between default rates and 
new issue spreads, but do not detect a statistically significant correlation. Following 
the view that higher default rates imply a higher risk premium for high yield bonds, we 
also expect a positive relationship, because investors would demand a higher spread 
for compensation. 
Security 
Fridson and Gannan (1998) model seniority of security as a pricing factor of non 
investment grade bonds, by including a variable that indicates subordination. They 
find that subordinated issues have a higher yield than senior issues. This is explained 
by the fact that subordinated bonds have greater default severity than senior bonds. In 
the event of liquidation, subordinated debt is junior in claim to other debt on assets and 
technically senior debt investors will nonnally be paid in full before subordinated debt 
holders get back any money. 
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All of the issues, though, in our sample of shipping bonds are senior debt issues, 
however, they differ with respect to whether they are secured or unsecured. Senior 
secured bonds are collaterised by assets, in the case of shipping companies their 
vessels - usually in the form of a first preferred mortgage. Unsecured debt is not 
backed by any assets and in terms of debt claims is subordinated to senior secured 
indebtedness. 
It is in this respect that we model ranking, by using a dummy variable to indicate that 
an issue is unsecured. Since unsecured issues rank below secured debt, we expect the 
former to carry wider spreads. 
144a Status 
The decision to issue debt privately or publicly may affect its pricing. The Securities 
Exchange Commission (SEC) adopted Rule 144a in 1990 to create a secondary market 
for high yield bonds. The advantage for issues under the rule is the speed with which 
they are brought to the market, because review and registration with the SEC is not 
required. 
The norm, though, is that 144a deals are done with registration commitment attached, 
and in this respect they are indistinguishable from public debt. However, until 
registration the issue can only be distributed to a smaller number of investors (QIBs) 
and secondary market trading takes place in the PORTAL market. This may represent 
7 with the exception of Fridson and Garman (1998) 
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lower liquidity and, thus, in line with Fridson and Garman (1998), we expect that 144a 
issues in our sample carry larger spreads. 
Gearing 
The importance of gearing in the shipping industry and in raising shipping finance in 
the capital markets has been highlighted in past studies. Grammenos (1995) notes that 
the high debt to equity ratios shipping companies sustained in the 1970s and 1980s -
ratios of 3 or higher were not unusual at the time - proved to be quite painful during 
the crises over these two decades. During these crises, high leverage has been 
disastrous for companies that did not have a stable cash flow income through 
medium/long term charters and/or contracts of affreightment, but were too heavily 
exposed in the spot market. Since high swings can occur in freight rates and vessel 
values in very short periods of time, gearing in the shipping markets becomes a double 
edge sword: in periods of prosperity, gearing provides the shipowner with an increased 
cash flow capacity to exploit any opportunities available in the investment front~ in 
times of depression, though, the shipowner may not cover operating expenses, let 
alone the repayment of the loan. 
Grammenos and Marcoulis (1996) detect a positive relationship between gearing and 
the degree of underpricing for initial public offerings of common stock for shipping 
companies, in contrast to Hegde and Miller (1995). The authors attribute this to the 
negative investor perception towards highly geared shipping companies and to the 
potentially catastrophical effects of high debt in the face of adverse changes in the 
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freight rate market, particularly for companies that do not secure sufficient cash flow 
by solid charters. 
Grammenos and Arkoulis (1999) find that highly leveraged shipping IPOs perform 
better during the first two years in the aftermarket than lower geared companies. They 
explain this by the fact that a compensating return is required for taking more risk. 
Furthermore, they suggest that the lowering debt to equity ratios observed for the 
majority of companies in their sample after their lPO, is perceived as a positive signal 
by investors. In view of these findings, we also expect bonds from highly geared 
issuers in the high yield market to be associated with wider spreads. 
Laid up Tonnage 
Laid up tonnage is an indicator specific to the shipping industry and is closely linked 
to the equilibrium of supply and demand for vessels and, hence, with the 
determination of freight rates. McConville (1999, p. 73) characterises laid up tonnage 
as '... the barometer giving a clear indication of the economic and commercial 
condition of the industry'. In periods of depression, vessels are laid up, because no 
remunerative employment can be found and market conditions make it uneconomical 
to trade. Conversely, in periods of prosperity, there is little or no laid up tonnage and 
freight rates are sustained at high levels. 
Zannetos (1966) has shown that the greater the capacity of laid up (tanker) vessels, the 
lower freight rates will be. Grammenos and Arkoulis (1999) find that laid up tonnage 
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negatively influences stock returns of shipping companies. They attribute this to the 
fact that an increase in the number of vessels being laid up indicates a worsening state 
of the shipping market. In view of these findings, we expect this variable to be 
associated with larger new issue spreads, to reflect deteriorating conditions in the 
industry. 
Fleet Age 
The age of the fleet of shipping companies is closely linked to vessel value. New 
vessels are more expensive, however, it is not clear whether they are favoured by the 
existence of a two tier market. Tamvakis (1994) and Tamvakis and Thanopoulou 
(2000) do not find sufficient evidence to support a two tier market hypothesis in the 
tanker or the dry bulk markets, respectively. As a result, it is possible that in a 
prosperous market vessels may earn the same freight irrespective of their age; while, 
provided they were bought when the market was low, they may survive a bad market 
less painfully than new ships, since new ones have the additional burden of high 
capital outlay and debt repayment. 
Grammenos and Arkoulis (1999) find that IPOs of companies with a younger fleet 
perform better in the aftermarket than those companies who operate with an older 
fleet. This is because the operation of older vessels usually entails higher running costs 
in terms of maintenance and repairs, insurance, and oil consumption. In addition, 
regulatory changes in the industrl- such as the US Oil Pollution Act of 1990 - and 
8 OPA 90 is designed to protect US waters from oil pollution; it requires vessels to have double hulls 
therefore increasing newbuilding costs; it also imposes unlimited liability for damage resulting from oil 
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often the reluctance of first class charterers and major oil companies to employ older 
vessels may result in the creation of a two tier market in tem1S of preference for 
employment. 
Following this intuition, we hypothesised that new offerings of shipping high yield 
bonds must carry higher risk premia in cases where the issuer operates with older 
vessels, implying a negative relationship between primary pricing and company fleet 
age. 
spills therefore increasing insurance costs. Furthermore, OP A 90 provides for the gradual phasing out of 
older single hull vessels. 
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4.3 Initial Discussion 
Table 3 displays several characteristics of the 30 high yield debt offerings by shipping 
companies in the sample by year of issuance. A total of $4.674 billion was raised by 
shipping companies in the non investment grade sector during the period 1993-1998, 
with the average issue size being $155.8 million. The average spread over Treasury 
stands at 428 basis points being highest in 1997 and 1998 at 464 and 466 basis points, 
respectively. The lowest spread in high yield debt issuance by shipping companies is 
observed in 1996 (337 basis points). 
There are no major differences for coupon and maturity throughout the period under 
examination. The average coupon is 9.94% and the average term to maturity 9.57 
years. The average debt to equity ratio for the issues stands at 2.19. With the exception 
of the one company that issued high yield debt in 1994 with a debt to equity ratio of 
2.86, gearing is highest in 1997 (2.45) and 1998 (2.62). The same pattern is observed 
for fleet age. Companies issuing debt during these two years operated fleets with an 
average fleet age of 15.55 and 16.12 years, respectively, while the average figure for 
the whole period is 14.31 years. 
It is evident that most of the issuing activity is concentrated in 1993 when 7 debt 
issues take place, and in the years 1997 and 1998 when 19 offerings are issued. 
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The first cluster, in fact, observed in 1993 coincides with low interest rates - a 
prerequisite for high yield bond issues - and high IPO issuing activity, as documented 
in Grammenos and Marcoulis (1996). The authors suggest that the boom was mainly 
due to tanker companies entering the market in anticipation of an upturn in tanker 
freight rates. These expectations were mainly due to increased scrapping and the 
replacement of the fleet by newbuildings that were expected to reduce supply and 
boost demand. In addition, several companies that entered the IPO market at that time 
operated in the developing economies of China and the Pacific Rim and raised capital 
assuming high rates of growth in these geographical areas. This seems to be the case in 
the high yield debt market as well. Out of the six companies that issue a total of seven 
offerings in 1993, three are pure tanker companies, whereas the remaining three 
operate partly in the tanker sector. Moreover, all six companies base part or all their 
operations in the Pacific Rim and/or China. 
Regarding the second boom of high yield debt issuance in 1997 and 1998, it can be 
seen that shipping companies seeking finance in this market had high gearing levels 
and old fleets compared to previous years. It seems, therefore, that companies at the 
time were raising funds for the purpose of replacing and/or restructuring their debt 
levels by the more attractive amortisation schedule offered by high yield debt; and/or 
to provide funds for the renewal of their fleets. In fact, out of a total of nineteen 
offerings that took place during this period, in eighteen cases it is stated in the 
prospectuses that a percentage of the proceeds is to be used for debt repayment 
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purposes, whereas in fourteen occasions a proportion of the proceeds is to go towards 
acquisitions. 
In table 4, the 30 issues in our sample are classified according their credit rating 
category, from Bal to Caal. The number of issues is spread across different credit 
quality classes. Most of the offerings fall under the ratings of Ba2 ($1200 million), 
Ba3 ($935 million), Bl ($1240 million) and B3 ($883 million). Ratings of Bal, B2 
and Caal are assigned to only one issue, respectively. As far as float is concerned, 
there is a tendency for smaller issues to be associated with lower ratings. In fact, the 
average issue size for offerings in the Ba band (14 issues - $2.275 billion) is $162.50 
million compared to $149.94 million for all lower rated issues. 
A clear pattern emerges between rating and new issue spread. Higher rated issues have 
smaller spreads at issue, in relation to issues of a lower rating class. The average 
spread for issues rated Bal to Ba3 is 337.57 basis points, whereas that for offerings 
with an assigned rating of B 1 to Caa I is considerably higher and stands at 507.33 basis 
points. This is not surprising, since issues of a lower credit quality are associated with 
a higher probability of default. 
In Table 5 issues are categorised according to amount issued (float), term to maturity, 
security, 144a status, and callability. Regarding float, it can be said that there is a 
tendency for smaller offerings to be associated with higher new issue spreads. This is 
expected, because of the lower marketability these issues have compared to larger 
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issues. However, only a small portion of the total amount issued (12.84% or $600 
million) has an average float of $1 00 million, the category with the smaller size. 
In panel B of the table, it is shown that secured offerings have a larger new issue 
spread than unsecured issues. This is rather surprising at first glance, because 
unsecured issues rank lower than secured issues in the event of default. A closer 
examination, however, indicated that the secured issues tend to be associated with 
lower ratings. In fact, 47.60% of the secured issuance volume (in $ terms) is lower 
rated, B3 or less by Moody's, whereas only 5.94% of total unsecured issue volume in 
our sample has the same assigned rating. This higher uncertainty regarding the 
payment of interest and capital - represented by these low assigned ratings - might 
account for the unexpected difference in spreads between the two issue types. Due to 
this uncertainty, the bondholders take the security of first preferred mortgages on 
vessels; this enables them to sell the vessels in the international sale and purchase 
market, in the event of default of the company. The uncertainty, however, is not 
decreased by the assignment of mortgage. 
Issues with smaller term to maturity display wider spreads, as shown in panel C of the 
table. This difference in spreads, however, is also largely explained by the low credit 
quality of the issues with shorter maturity. By examining the Moody's ratings of such 
issues we find that 66.24% of their issuance is rated B3 or less. The comparative 
figure for offerings with a term to maturity greater than 10 years is 13.40%. 
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Offerings issued through rule 144a and those with a call option display wider spreads 
than public and non callable bonds, respectively. This is not surprising, since, in the 
case of 144a deals a larger premium is expected, because, until registration secondary 
market trading takes place in a less liquid market. Callable bonds are also expected to 
carry wider spreads, to compensate investors for taking the risk of being forced to 
reinvest at a lower rate. 
In table 6, offerings are also classified in order of the debt to equity ratio and the age 
of the fleet of the issuer, respectively. Regarding gearing it can be seen in panel A of 
the table, that new issue spread increases for issues with higher debt to equity ratios. 
This is not surprising, because of the risk entailed for shipping companies with high 
gearing, as explained earlier. 
No specific pattern emerges between spread and different groupings of fleet age. 
However, issues from companies in the sample that operate the oldest fleet, exhibit the 
highest new issue spread. This higher risk premium is expected, since charterers may 
be reluctant to employ older vessels. Furthermore, old vessels often require higher 
costs in terms of maintenance, insurance and repairs. 
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4.4 Regression Analysis9 
Univariate Regressions 
Table 7 displays univariate regressIOn results. For each regressIon the dependent 
variable is new issue spread and the explanatory variables are the factors deemed to 
cause variations in this spread. Results from this set of regressions gIve us an 
indication as to which factors to consider in assessing the final model. 
Five factors emerge as significant and in order of the absolute value of t-statistic they 
are gearing, rating, laid up tonnage, security status, and term. Regarding the signs of 
the coefficients, all are consistent with our hypotheses, with the exception of the 
coefficient of the security variable. The negative sign indicates that, all other things 
being equal, unsecured issues carry lower spreads than secured issues. Given that 
unsecured bonds are subordinated to secured issues in the event of default, this finding 
is puzzling. However, as discussed above, this is due to the fact that a substantial 
amount of secured issuance is of lower credit quality and this is translated into higher 
new issue spreads for these issues. The same holds for the significantly negative 
coefficient of the term variable. This creates serious doubts as to whether these two 
factors are to emerge as significant when estimating the final model. 
Table 7 also displays R2 values for univariate regression models. Consistent with 
Fridson and Garman (1998), credit rating exhibits the strongest correlation with new 
9 All regressions were performed by the Ordinary Least Squares method. Standard errors are adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity. 
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issue spread (R2=0.59). Other variables that display correlations higher than 0.10 as 
indicated by R2 are gearing (R2=0.38), laid up tonnage (R2=0.37), term (R2=0.29), 
security status (R2=0.27) and 144a status (R2=0.11). 
Multivariate Regression: The Final Model 
In order to select the 'best' model, the general to specific modelling approach is 
adopted 10. It involves starting from the most general model with all the variables 
included and allowing the data to determine which variables are significant. The 
approach avoids the possible omitted variables bias problems that may arise otherwise 
(Spanos, 1986). 
Results from this estimation procedure are reported in Table 8. The percentage of 
variance explained, as measured by R2, is considerable and stands at 7l.01%. The 
three variables that emerge as statistically significant are (by absolute value of t-
statistic) gearing, rating, and laid up tonnage. All coefficients of these variables are 
significant at a confidence level of95%, as indicated by their P-values. 
One can observe from the table that the coefficients for the gearing and the laid up 
tonnage variables are statistically significant, when rating is present in the model. 
Given that assigned credit ratings incorporate the effects of company leverage and the 
state of the shipping markets in assessing the credit risk of a high yield bond issue 
(Moody's, 1999), this finding is surprising. The serious implication for rating agencies 
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is that they have not taken fully into account the potential effects of gearing and 
market conditions on the issue, as credit risk factors. 
The increase of 12% in R2 arising from the inclusion of gearing and laid up tonnage in 
the estimation is statistically significant, as suggested by the F-Statistic reported in the 
table. The statistic rejects the hypothesis that the coefficients of these two variables are 
jointly equal to zero. Consequently, gearing and laid up tonnage - proxy for market 
conditions - are important pricing factors that merit attention that may lead to a more 
objective credit rating assessment. 
In addition, the three significant coefficients in the final model shown in Table 8 
display the expected signs, as discussed earlier in the text. Other things being equal, 
we find that high yield bonds issued by shipping companies carry wider spreads, the 
lower the credit rating of the issue, the higher their gearing levels, and the higher the 
laid up tonnage in the shipping industry for the two months preceding the issue. 
In addition, the fact that the two industry specific factors - gearing and laid up tonnage 
- emerge as significant in the estimation of our final model highlights the importance 
of the issuer's industry classification, as noted by Fridson and Gamlan (1998). Given 
the trend towards an industry oriented investor approach, high yield portfolio 
managers can diversify their funds by considering holding stakes in shipping bond 
issues, provided they undertake sound credit analysis. 
10 To check the robustness of our results and to avoid any statistical distortIOns that might anse from efTects 
such as multicollinearity. we also adopted stepwise regression as a tool in the estll1lation. Results. availahle 
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The coefficients of the security and tenn variables do not 'make the cut' in the final 
model, despite being correlated with new issue spread in a univariate context. As 
suspected above, secured issues and those with shorter maturity in our sample, do not 
create statistically significant price discrimination, but have comparatively higher 
yields, because they tend to be lower rated issues. 
The absence of the fleet age variable from the final model is rather surprising. At first 
glance, one would expect that any effects the age of vessels may have on pricing are 
incorporated in assigned ratings. However, a closer examination into the amount of B3 
or lower rated issuance (in $ tenns) based on different fleet age groupings does not 
point to this direction. Although the group with the oldest fleet exhibits the highest 
percentage of low rated issues (36.95%), the corresponding figure for the youngest 
fleet age group is also high and stands at 25.06% with just 6.61 % for the intennediary 
age group. 
The list of factors examined in this study is not exhaustive. Based on the views of 
market participants in the shipping community, we believe that the company's adopted 
chartering policy may playa major role in the pricing of high yield bond issues in the 
shipping industry. We attempted to quantify and include a chartering variable in the 
analysis, however, the infonnation supplied in company prospecti related to the 
companies' chartering preferences proved insufficient in several cases. We are 
from the authors. are essentially the same. 
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confident, though, that future research might devise a workable approach In this 
respect and add to the explanatory power of the model presented. 
Another potentially important factor in the pricing of shipping bonds in the high yield 
sector is the quality of management and its ability and stamina to deal with adverse 
market conditions. These attributes, coupled with sound investment, chartering, and 
vessel sale and purchase policies, may earn a narrower spread for an issue, especially 
when they are effectively communicated to investors by the company's managers, 
during the roadshow presentation. 
193 
4.5 Conclusions 
This study presents evidence for the first time on the pricing of shipping high yield 
bonds. Our sample includes 30 high yield bond offerings in the shipping industry that 
came into market during the period 1993-1998. 
The increased popularity of this market in the 1990s has been due to low prevailing 
interest rates, the need for funds required for replacement and expansion purposes, the 
globalisation of capital markets internationally and the search for new financial 
products by shipping companies since the crisis of the 1980s. 
The majority of shipping companies in our sample raised funds to replace and/or 
restructure their debt with the more attractive amortisation schedule offered by high 
yield bonds. Since only interest is paid during the life of the bond, substantial 
amounts are made available for fleet renewal and alternative investments. In addition, 
the longer maturity offered by bonds compared to traditional bank debt matches more 
closely the duration of vessel operating life. 
Most of the issuing activity in the industry is concentrated in 1993 (7 issues) and in the 
years 1997 and 1998 (19 issues). This clustering of non investment grade bond 
offerings during two distinct time periods demonstrates the cyclicality in the shipping 
industry. 
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The factors employed in the study are rating, callability, teml (years to maturity), float 
(issue amount), default rate, security status, 144a status, gearing, laid up tonnage and 
fleet age. Three factors emerge as significant in our regression analysis. These are 
rating, gearing, and laid up tonnage. All coefficients are consistent with our 
hypotheses and shipping high yield bonds carry wider spreads, the lower the rating of 
their issue, the higher their gearing levels, and the higher the laid up tonnage in the 
shipping market for the two months preceding the issue. These factors explain as much 
as 71.07% of the variance in spread. Moreover, the inclusion of gearing and laid up 
tonnage in the estimation adds significant explanatory power in the model, suggesting 
that rating agencies have not fully incorporated these variables in their assigned 
ratings. 
The established relationships between new issue spread and the factors under analysis 
are of interest to all major players of high yield bond issues of shipping companies: 
shipowners, rating agencies, investors, and financial underwriters. 
Shipping managers can benefit as the important factors related to the pncmg of 
shipping high yield bonds - rating, gearing and market conditions - convey useful 
infom1ation about the cost of raising finance in this sector. Rating agencies can use 
such factors to enhance their credit risk assessments of shipping companies. Investors 
in high yield bond offerings can improve their selection process by considering 
additional factors that are related to bond pricing. Underwriters can also use these 
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established relationships to price high yield bond issues more accurately and, thereby, 
enhance their reputation. 
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Table 4.1: Descriptions of Test Variables 
Short Title 
Spread 
Rating 
Callability 
Term 
Float 
Default Rate 
Security Status 
144A Status 
Gearing 
Fleet Age 
Laid Up Tonnage 
Description 
Spread between an issue's offering yield and same day 
yield on a Treasury security with the same maturity 
Moody's Rating Scale (Ba1 =1, Ba2=2, ... , Caa1 =7) 
Dummy variable:O=noncallable, 1 =callable 
Maturity( years) 
Principal Amount at Issue ($million) 
Moody's Trailing 12 month Issuer based Default rate 
Dummy variable: O=senior secured, 1 =senior unsecured 
Dummy variable:O=public, 1 = 144A 
Long Term Debt I Total Shareholders' Equity 
Average Vessel Age (years) 
Two-Month Percentage Change in Laid Up Tonnage for 
tankers and dry cargo vessels in deadweight tons for 
vessels of 300 grtlgt and over 
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Source 
Securities Data Company 
Securities Data Company 
Securities Data Company 
Securities Data Company 
Securities Data Company 
Merrill Lynch 
Securities Data Company 
Securities Data Company 
Company Prospecti 
Company Prospecti 
Shipping Statistics Yearbooks 
1993 - 1998 by the Institute of 
Shipping 
Logistics 
Economics and 
Table 4.2: Comparison of Moodv's and Standard and Poor's Rating Scales 
Investment Grade 
Non Investment Grade 
Moody's 
Aaa 
Aa1 
Aa2 
Aa3 
A1 
A2 
A3 
Baa1 
Baa2 
Baa3 
Ba1 
Ba2 
Ba3 
B1 
B2 
B3 
Caa1 
Caa2 
Caa3 
Ca 
C 
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Standard & 
Poor's 
AAA 
AA+ 
AA 
AA-
A+ 
A 
A-
BBB+ 
BBB 
BBB-
BB+ 
BB 
BB-
B+ 
B 
B-
CCC+ 
CCC 
CCC-
CC 
C 
D 
Table 4.3: Characteristics of Shipping High Yield Bond Offerings by Year of Issue (1993-1998) 
Year Number Total Float Average Spread Coupon Term Gearing Fleet 
of ($ million) Float (basis (%) (years) Age 
Issues ($ million} Qoints} (:rears} 
1993 7 1035 147.86 356.70 9.13 9.57 1.40 11.13 
1994 1 175 175.00 344.70 11.25 10.00 2.86 13.29 
1995 1 175 175.00 476.30 10.50 10.00 1.70 14.79 
1996 2 425 212.50 336.55 9.16 11.00 1.29 9.91 
1997 5 676 135.20 464.30 10.55 9.40 2.45 15.55 
1998 14 2188 156.29 466.49 10.12 9.36 2.62 16.12 
All Issues 30 4674 155.80 428.11 9.94 9.57 2.20 14.31 
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Table 4.4: Shipping High Yield Bond Offerings bv Rating CategorY (Moodv's), 
1993-1998 
Moody's Number Total Float Average Spread 
Rating of Issues ($ million) Float (basis points) 
Category ($ million) 
Ba1 1 100 100.00 226.30 
Ba2 7 1240 177.14 346.66 
Ba3 6 935 155.83 345.52 
B1 7 1240 177.14 429.84 
B2 1 126 126.00 425.30 
B3 7 883 126.14 572.43 
Caa1 1 150 150.00 676.10 
All Issues 30 4674 155.80 428.11 
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Table 4.5: Shipping High Yield Bond Offerings categorised bv Float, Term, 
Security, 144A Status and Callabilitv, 1993-1998 
Number Total Average Spread 
of Float Float (basis 
Issues ($ million) ($ million) points) 
Panel A: Float 
($million) 
~OO 6 600 100.00 479.20 
101-150 11 1454 132.18 461.20 
>150 13 2620 201.54 376.53 
Panel B: Securit'i 
Secured 13 1813 139.46 503.27 
Unsecured 17 2861 168.29 370.64 
PaneIC:Tenn(Yea~l 
<10 6 770 128.33 540.97 
~10 24 3904 162.67 399.90 
Panel 0: 144A Status 
Public 14 2385 170.36 383.14 
144A 16 2289 143.06 467.46 
Panel E: Callabilit'i 
Non-Callable 6 920 153.33 366.60 
Callable 24 3754 156.42 443.49 
All Issues 30 4674 155.80 428.11 
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Table 4.6: Shipping High Yield Bond Offerings categorised bv Gearing and Fleet 
Age, 1993-1998 
Number Total Average Spread 
of Float Float (basis 
Issues ($ million) ($ million) points) 
Panel A: Gearing 
<1.02 6 835 139.17 406.43 
1.03-1.58 6 1175 195.83 344.12 
1.59-1.93 6 760 126.67 416.62 
1.94-2.62 6 1093 182.17 405.87 
2.63+ 6 811 135.17 567.52 
Panel B: Fleet Age 
<10.68 6 890 148.33 407.15 
10.69-13.29 6 973 162.17 403.05 
13.30-14.79 6 980 163.33 406.35 
14.80-17.14 6 1045 174.17 455.25 
17.15+ 6 786 131.00 468.75 
All Issues 30 4674 155.80 428.11 
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Table 4.7: Univariate Re2ression Models for New Issue S~read of Shi~~in2 Hi2h 
Yield Bonds, 1993-1998 
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic P-Value R2 R2_ 
adjusted 
Gearing 46.80 6.71 0.00 0.38 0.35 
Rating 62.41 5.19 0.00 0.59 0.57 
Laid Up 573.10 4.20 0.00 0.37 0.34 
Tonnage 
Security Status -137.31 -3.09 0.00 0.27 0.24 
Term -62.46 -2.90 0.01 0.29 0.26 
144a Status 84.33 1.81 0.08 0.11 0.07 
Callability 76.89 1.42 0.17 0.05 0.02 
Float -0.61 -1.18 0.25 0.06 0.02 
Fleet Age 36.94 0.33 0.75 0.01 0.00 
Default Rate -26.20 -0.72 0.48 0.01 0.00 
Note: 30 observations for each regression 
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Table 4.8: Multivariate Regression Model for New Issue Spread of Shipping High 
Yield Bonds, 1993-1998 
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic P-Value 
Intercept 205.55 5.51 0.00 
Rating 42.78 3.68 0.00 
Gearing 25.50 4.30 0.00 
Laid Up Tonnage 162.19 2.07 0.04 
R2 0.71 
R2 - adjusted 0.68 
F (2,26)* 5.54 
Observations 30 
* Note: The F-Statistic sho\\'n is for an F-Test employed to test whether the increase of 12% observed in 
the R2 is significant. when Gearing and Laid Cp Tonnage are included as explanatory variables in 
addition to Rating. 
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Appendix 4.1: Shippin2 Hh::h Yield Bond Issues, 1993-1998 
DATE OF 
ISSUE 
15/05/93 
01/07/93 
08/07/93 
06/10/93 
27/10/93 
19/11/93 
02/12/93 
23/11/94 
13/12/95 
19/01/96 
21/11/96 
20/06/97 
15/07/97 
25/09/97 
18/11/97 
08/12/97 
14/01/98 
11/02/98 
19/02/98 
27/02/98 
05/03/98 
09/03/98 
24/03/98 
22/04/98 
29/04/98 
21/05/98 
28/05/98 
02/06/98 
12/06/98 
20/07/98 
COMPANY NAME 
TRANSPORTACION MARITIMA MEXICANA, S.A. de CV. 
INTERNATIONAL SHIPHOLDING CORPORATION 
TEEKAY SHIPPING CORPORATION 
TRANSPORTACION MARITIMA MEXICANA, S.A. de C.V. 
OMI CORP. 
ELETSON HOLDINGS INC. 
OVERSEAS SHIPHOLDING GROUP INC. 
GEARBULK HOLDING LIMITED 
STENAAB 
TEEKAY SHIPPING CORPORATION 
TRANSPORTACION MARITIMA MEXICANA, S.A. de C.V. 
EQUIMAR SHIPHOLDINGS LTD. 
GLOBAL OCEAN CARRIERS LIMITED 
STENAAB 
PEGASUS SHIPPING HELLAS LTD. 
PANOCEANIC BULK CARRIERS LIMITED 
INTERNATIONAL SHIPHOLDING CORPORATION 
ALPHA SHIPPING PLC 
HVIDE MARINE INCORPORATED 
AMER REEFER CO. LIMITED 
MC SHIPPING INC. 
ERMIS MARITIME HOLDINGS LIMITED 
UL TRAPETROL BAHAMAS LIMITED 
ENTERPRISES CORPORATION CORPORATION 
TBS SHIPPING INTERNATIONAL LIMITED 
PACIFIC & ATLANTIC HOLDINGS INC. 
STENA LINE AB 
GULFMARK OFFSHORE INC. 
CENARGO INTERNATIONAL PLC 
MILLENIUM SEACARRIERS INC. 
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